Threat actor
APT10
Last fetched
APT10 is a threat actor tracked in WhisperGraph's MITRE ATT&CK corpus, observed using 46 techniques and also known as 15 other names.
Also known as
STONE PANDA, Menupass Team, happyyongzi, POTASSIUM, Red Apollo, CVNX, HOGFISH, Cloud Hopper, BRONZE RIVERSIDE, ATK41, G0045, Granite Taurus, TA429, Cicada, Purple Typhoon
Description
menuPass is a threat group that has been active since at least 2006. Individual members of menuPass are known to have acted in association with the Chinese Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Tianjin State Security Bureau and worked for the Huaying Haitai Science and Technology Development Company.
Techniques by tactic
Stealth
- T1027.013 · Encrypted/Encoded File
- T1036 · Masquerading
- T1036.003 · Rename Legitimate Utilities
- T1036.005 · Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1055.012 · Process Hollowing
- T1070.003 · Clear Command History
- T1070.004 · File Deletion
- T1078 · Valid Accounts
- T1140 · Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1218.004 · InstallUtil
- T1574.001 · DLL
Attributed infrastructure
None published. WhisperGraph carries no ATTRIBUTED_TO edge to APT10 today — this states the absence of a published link, not that APT10 has no infrastructure.
References
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-menupass-returns-new-malware-new-attacks-japanese-academics-organizations/
- https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/apt-10
- https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/content/files/protected_files/article_files/Joint%20report%20on%20publicly%20available%20hacking%20tools%20%28NCSC%29.pdf
- https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-report-final-v4.pdf
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10_menupass_grou.html
- https://www.eweek.com/security/chinese-nation-state-hackers-target-u.s-in-operation-tradesecret
- https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/chessmaster-cyber-espionage-campaign/
- https://www.accenture.com/t20180423T055005Z_w_/se-en/_acnmedia/PDF-76/Accenture-Hogfish-Threat-Analysis.pdf
- https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/IR-ALERT-MED-17-093-01C-Intrusions_Affecting_Multiple_Victims_Across_Multiple_Sectors.pdf
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/09/apt10-targeting-japanese-corporations-using-updated-ttps.html
- https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/chinese-hackers-indicted-122018
- https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045/
- https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/bronze-riverside
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/atoms/granite-taurus
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/insights/apt-groups
- https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/pwc-cyber-threats-2020-a-year-in-retrospect.pdf
- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/summit/cds-2019/presentations/cds19-executive-s08-achievement-unlocked.pdf
- https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/ta410-group-behind-lookback-attacks-against-us-utilities-sector-returns-new
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/two-birds-one-stone-panda/
- http://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/cicada-apt10-china-ngo-government-attacks
© The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation.
Related pages
Pivot from APT10 into its techniques, tactics and any attributed infrastructure.
Queries
Resolves the slug to this actor, merging every duplicate node sharing the same name.
MATCH (a:ACTOR)
WHERE a.name =~ $pattern OR any(x IN a.aliases WHERE x =~ $pattern)
RETURN a.id AS id, a.name AS name, a.aliases AS aliases, a.description AS description,
a.references AS references, a.campaigns AS campaigns
LIMIT 25Run yourself →Techniques this actor uses, grouped by the tactic each one serves.
MATCH (a:ACTOR {name: $name})-[:USES_TECHNIQUE]->(t:ATTACK_PATTERN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (t)-[:USES_TACTIC]->(tac:ATTACK_PATTERN)
RETURN t.id AS techniqueId, t.name AS techniqueName, tac.id AS tacticId, tac.name AS tacticName
LIMIT 1000Run yourself →Infrastructure publicly attributed to this actor.
MATCH (n)-[:ATTRIBUTED_TO]->(a:ACTOR {name: $name})
RETURN labels(n)[0] AS kind, n.name AS name
LIMIT 25Run yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.