Threat actor
Contagious Interview
Last fetched
Contagious Interview is a threat actor tracked in WhisperGraph's MITRE ATT&CK corpus, observed using 54 techniques and also known as 6 other names.
Also known as
DeceptiveDevelopment, Gwisin Gang, Tenacious Pungsan, DEV#POPPER, PurpleBravo, TAG-121
Description
[Contagious Interview](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1052) is a North Korea–aligned threat group active since 2023. The group conducts both cyberespionage and financially motivated operations, including the theft of cryptocurrency and user credentials. [Contagious Interview](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1052) targets Windows, Linux, and macOS systems, with a particular focus on individuals engaged in software development and cryptocurrency-related activities. (Citation: Validin Contagious Interview North Korea ClickFix January 2025)(Citation: Esentire ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret November 2024)(Citation: Datadog Contagious Interview Tenacious Pungsan October 2024)(Citation: Recorded Future Contagious Inteview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret OtterCookie February 2025)(Citation: ESET Contagious Interview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret February 2025)(Citation: Zscaler ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret November 2024)(Citation: PaloAlto ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret November 2023)(Citation: PaloAlto Unit42 ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibileFerret October 2024)
Techniques by tactic
Resource Development
- T1583 · Acquire Infrastructure
- T1583.001 · Domains
- T1583.003 · Virtual Private Server
- T1583.006 · Web Services
- T1585 · Establish Accounts
- T1585.001 · Social Media Accounts
- T1585.002 · Email Accounts
- T1587 · Develop Capabilities
- T1587.001 · Malware
- T1588.002 · Tool
- T1588.007 · Artificial Intelligence
- T1608.001 · Upload Malware
- T1683.001 · Written Content
- T1683.002 · Audio-Visual Content
Attributed infrastructure
None published. WhisperGraph carries no ATTRIBUTED_TO edge to Contagious Interview today — this states the absence of a published link, not that Contagious Interview has no infrastructure.
References
- https://about.gitlab.com/blog/gitlab-threat-intelligence-reveals-north-korean-tradecraft/
- https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/contagious-interview-threat-actors-scout-cyber-intel-platforms-reveal-plans-and-ops/
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/03/11/contagious-interview-malware-delivered-through-fake-developer-job-interviews/
- https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1052/
- https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1052
- https://www.validin.com/blog/inoculating_contagious_interview_with_validin/
- https://www.esentire.com/blog/bored-beavertail-invisibleferret-yacht-club-a-lazarus-lure-pt-2
- https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/tenacious-pungsan-dprk-threat-actor-contagious-interview/
- https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/inside-the-scam-north-koreas-it-worker-threat
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/deceptivedevelopment-targets-freelance-developers/
- https://reports.dtexsystems.com/DTEX-Exposing+DPRK+Cyber+Syndicate+and+Hidden+IT+Workforce.pdf
- https://www.securonix.com/blog/analysis-of-devpopper-new-attack-campaign-targeting-software-developers-likely-associated-with-north-korean-threat-actors/
- https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/pyongyang-your-payroll-rise-north-korean-remote-workers-west
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/two-campaigns-by-north-korea-bad-actors-target-job-hunters/
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/north-korean-threat-actors-lure-tech-job-seekers-as-fake-recruiters/
© The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation.
Related pages
Pivot from Contagious Interview into its techniques, tactics and any attributed infrastructure.
Queries
Resolves the slug to this actor, merging every duplicate node sharing the same name.
MATCH (a:ACTOR)
WHERE a.name =~ $pattern OR any(x IN a.aliases WHERE x =~ $pattern)
RETURN a.id AS id, a.name AS name, a.aliases AS aliases, a.description AS description,
a.references AS references, a.campaigns AS campaigns
LIMIT 25Techniques this actor uses, grouped by the tactic each one serves.
MATCH (a:ACTOR {name: $name})-[:USES_TECHNIQUE]->(t:ATTACK_PATTERN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (t)-[:USES_TACTIC]->(tac:ATTACK_PATTERN)
RETURN t.id AS techniqueId, t.name AS techniqueName, tac.id AS tacticId, tac.name AS tacticName
LIMIT 1000Infrastructure publicly attributed to this actor.
MATCH (n)-[:ATTRIBUTED_TO]->(a:ACTOR {name: $name})
RETURN labels(n)[0] AS kind, n.name AS name
LIMIT 25Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.