Threat actor
FIN7
Last fetched
FIN7 is a threat actor tracked in WhisperGraph's MITRE ATT&CK corpus, observed using 67 techniques and also known as 14 other names.
Also known as
GOLD NIAGARA, ITG14, Carbon Spider, ELBRUS, Sangria Tempest, CARBON SPIDER, Calcium, ATK32, G0046, G0008, Coreid, Carbanak, JokerStash, WILD COMET
Description
[FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013. [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) has targeted the retail, restaurant, hospitality, software, consulting, financial services, medical equipment, cloud services, media, food and beverage, transportation, pharmaceutical, and utilities industries in the United States. A portion of [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) was operated out of a front company called Combi Security and often used point-of-sale malware for targeting efforts. Since 2020, [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) shifted operations to big game hunting (BGH), including use of [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) ransomware and their own Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS), Darkside. FIN7 may be linked to the [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) Group, but multiple threat groups have been observed using [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030), leading these groups to be tracked separately.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)(Citation: Mandiant FIN7 Apr 2022)(Citation: BiZone Lizar May 2021)
Techniques by tactic
Execution
- T1047 · Windows Management Instrumentation
- T1053.005 · Scheduled Task
- T1059 · Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1059.001 · PowerShell
- T1059.003 · Windows Command Shell
- T1059.005 · Visual Basic
- T1059.007 · JavaScript
- T1204.001 · Malicious Link
- T1204.002 · Malicious File
- T1559.002 · Dynamic Data Exchange
- T1569.002 · Service Execution
- T1674 · Input Injection
Stealth
- T1027.010 · Command Obfuscation
- T1027.016 · Junk Code Insertion
- T1036.004 · Masquerade Task or Service
- T1036.005 · Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1078 · Valid Accounts
- T1078.003 · Local Accounts
- T1140 · Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1218.005 · Mshta
- T1218.011 · Rundll32
- T1497.002 · User Activity Based Checks
- T1564.001 · Hidden Files and Directories
- T1564.003 · Hidden Window
- T1620 · Reflective Code Loading
Attributed infrastructure
None published. WhisperGraph carries no ATTRIBUTED_TO edge to FIN7 today — this states the absence of a published link, not that FIN7 has no infrastructure.
References
- https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/evolution-of-fin7
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/behind-the-carbanak-backdoor.html
- https://bi-zone.medium.com/from-pentest-to-apt-attack-cybercriminal-group-fin7-disguises-its-malware-as-an-ethical-hackers-c23c9a75e319
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html
- https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/gold-niagara
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html
- http://blog.morphisec.com/fin7-attacks-restaurant-industry
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/carbon-spider-embraces-big-game-hunting-part-1/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/intelligence/microsoft-threat-actor-naming?view=o365-worldwide
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/05/09/ransomware-as-a-service-understanding-the-cybercrime-gig-economy-and-how-to-protect-yourself/
- https://web.archive.org/web/20180808125108/https:/www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html
- https://securityintelligence.com/posts/ransomware-2020-attack-trends-new-techniques-affecting-organizations-worldwide/
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbanak
- https://app.box.com/s/p7qzcury97tuwk26694uutujwqmwqyhe
- http://2014.zeronights.ru/assets/files/slides/ivanovb-zeronights.pdf
- https://web.archive.org/web/20161223002016/https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/odinaff-new-trojan-used-high-level-financial-attacks
- https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/fin7carbanak-threat-actor-unleashes-bateleur-jscript-backdoor
- https://www.icebrg.io/blog/footprints-of-fin7-tracking-actor-patterns
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/arrests-put-new-focus-on-carbon-spider-adversary-group/
- https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/mastermind-behind-eur-1-billion-cyber-bank-robbery-arrested-in-spain
- https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252446153/Three-Carbanak-cyber-heist-gang-members-arrested
- https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08064518/Carbanak_APT_eng.pdf
- https://www.group-ib.com/resources/threat-research/Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions.pdf
- https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008/
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html
- https://threatpost.com/fileless-malware-campaigns-tied-to-same-attacker/124369/
- https://blog.morphisec.com/fin7-attacks-restaurant-industry
- https://www.flashpoint-intel.com/blog/fin7-revisited-inside-astra-panel-and-sqlrat-malware/
- https://blog.morphisec.com/fin7-attack-modifications-revealed
- https://blog.morphisec.com/fin7-not-finished-morphisec-spots-new-campaign
- https://securelist.com/fin7-5-the-infamous-cybercrime-rig-fin7-continues-its-activities/90703/
- https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/
- https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/Report2020CrowdStrikeGlobalThreatReport.pdf
- https://threatintel.blog/OPBlueRaven-Part1/
- https://threatintel.blog/OPBlueRaven-Part2/
- https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252525240/ALPHV-BlackCat-ransomware-family-becoming-more-dangerous
- https://www.deepinstinct.com/blog/understanding-the-windows-javascript-threat-landscape
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/12/28/financially-motivated-threat-actors-misusing-app-installer/
- https://www.wired.com/story/fin7-carbanak-hacking-group-behind-a-string-of-big-breaches/
- https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/updated-cyber-threat-actor-naming-system/
© The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation.
Related pages
Pivot from FIN7 into its techniques, tactics and any attributed infrastructure.
Queries
Resolves the slug to this actor, merging every duplicate node sharing the same name.
MATCH (a:ACTOR)
WHERE a.name =~ $pattern OR any(x IN a.aliases WHERE x =~ $pattern)
RETURN a.id AS id, a.name AS name, a.aliases AS aliases, a.description AS description,
a.references AS references, a.campaigns AS campaigns
LIMIT 25Run yourself →Techniques this actor uses, grouped by the tactic each one serves.
MATCH (a:ACTOR {name: $name})-[:USES_TECHNIQUE]->(t:ATTACK_PATTERN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (t)-[:USES_TACTIC]->(tac:ATTACK_PATTERN)
RETURN t.id AS techniqueId, t.name AS techniqueName, tac.id AS tacticId, tac.name AS tacticName
LIMIT 1000Run yourself →Infrastructure publicly attributed to this actor.
MATCH (n)-[:ATTRIBUTED_TO]->(a:ACTOR {name: $name})
RETURN labels(n)[0] AS kind, n.name AS name
LIMIT 25Run yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.