Threat actor
Madi
Last fetched
Madi is a threat actor tracked in WhisperGraph's MITRE ATT&CK corpus, observed using 0 techniques.
Description
Kaspersky Lab and Seculert worked together to sinkhole the Madi Command & Control (C&C) servers to monitor the campaign. Kaspersky Lab and Seculert identified more than 800 victims located in Iran, Israel and select countries across the globe connecting to the C&Cs over the past eight months. Statistics from the sinkhole revealed that the victims were primarily business people working on Iranian and Israeli critical infrastructure projects, Israeli financial institutions, Middle Eastern engineering students, and various government agencies communicating in the Middle East. Common applications and websites that were spied on include accounts on Gmail, Hotmail, Yahoo! Mail, ICQ, Skype, Google+, and Facebook. Surveillance is also performed over integrated ERP/CRM systems, business contracts, and financial management systems.
Techniques by tactic
No ATT&CK techniques are recorded for Madi in WhisperGraph.
Attributed infrastructure
None published. WhisperGraph carries no ATTRIBUTED_TO edge to Madi today — this states the absence of a published link, not that Madi has no infrastructure.
References
- https://securelist.com/the-madi-campaign-part-i-5/33693/
- https://securelist.com/the-madi-campaign-part-ii-53/33701/
- https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/madi
- https://www.kaspersky.com/about/press-releases/2012_kaspersky-lab-and-seculert-announce--madi--a-newly-discovered-cyber-espionage-campaign-in-the-middle-east
- https://threatpost.com/new-and-improved-madi-spyware-campaign-continues-072512/76849/
- https://web.archive.org/web/20120718173322/https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/madi-attacks-series-social-engineering-campaigns
© The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation.
Related pages
Pivot from Madi into its techniques, tactics and any attributed infrastructure.
Queries
Resolves the slug to this actor, merging every duplicate node sharing the same name.
MATCH (a:ACTOR)
WHERE a.name =~ $pattern OR any(x IN a.aliases WHERE x =~ $pattern)
RETURN a.id AS id, a.name AS name, a.aliases AS aliases, a.description AS description,
a.references AS references, a.campaigns AS campaigns
LIMIT 25Techniques this actor uses, grouped by the tactic each one serves.
MATCH (a:ACTOR {name: $name})-[:USES_TECHNIQUE]->(t:ATTACK_PATTERN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (t)-[:USES_TACTIC]->(tac:ATTACK_PATTERN)
RETURN t.id AS techniqueId, t.name AS techniqueName, tac.id AS tacticId, tac.name AS tacticName
LIMIT 1000Infrastructure publicly attributed to this actor.
MATCH (n)-[:ATTRIBUTED_TO]->(a:ACTOR {name: $name})
RETURN labels(n)[0] AS kind, n.name AS name
LIMIT 25Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.