Threat actor
Magic Hound
Last fetched
Magic Hound is a threat actor tracked in WhisperGraph's MITRE ATT&CK corpus, observed using 78 techniques and also known as 8 other names.
Also known as
TA453, COBALT ILLUSION, Charming Kitten, ITG18, Phosphorus, Newscaster, APT35, Mint Sandstorm
Description
[Magic Hound](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0059) is an Iranian-sponsored threat group that conducts long term, resource-intensive cyber espionage operations, likely on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. They have targeted European, U.S., and Middle Eastern government and military personnel, academics, journalists, and organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO), via complex social engineering campaigns since at least 2014.(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: ClearSky Kittens Back 3 August 2020)(Citation: Certfa Charming Kitten January 2021)(Citation: Secureworks COBALT ILLUSION Threat Profile)(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 July2021)
Techniques by tactic
Discovery
- T1016 · System Network Configuration Discovery
- T1016.001 · Internet Connection Discovery
- T1016.002 · Wi-Fi Discovery
- T1018 · Remote System Discovery
- T1033 · System Owner/User Discovery
- T1046 · Network Service Discovery
- T1049 · System Network Connections Discovery
- T1057 · Process Discovery
- T1082 · System Information Discovery
- T1083 · File and Directory Discovery
- T1087.003 · Email Account
- T1482 · Domain Trust Discovery
Stealth
- T1027.010 · Command Obfuscation
- T1027.013 · Encrypted/Encoded File
- T1036.004 · Masquerade Task or Service
- T1036.005 · Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1036.010 · Masquerade Account Name
- T1070.003 · Clear Command History
- T1070.004 · File Deletion
- T1078.001 · Default Accounts
- T1078.002 · Domain Accounts
- T1218.011 · Rundll32
- T1564.003 · Hidden Window
Attributed infrastructure
None published. WhisperGraph carries no ATTRIBUTED_TO edge to Magic Hound today — this states the absence of a published link, not that Magic Hound has no infrastructure.
References
- https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0059
- https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2019/03/27/new-steps-to-protect-customers-from-hacking/
- https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/10/28/cyberattacks-phosphorus-t20-munich-security-conference/
- https://blog.certfa.com/posts/charming-kitten-christmas-gift/
- https://research.checkpoint.com/2022/apt35-exploits-log4j-vulnerability-to-distribute-new-modular-powershell-toolkit/
- http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Charming_Kitten_2017.pdf
- https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/The-Kittens-Are-Back-in-Town-2-1.pdf
- https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/The-Kittens-are-Back-in-Town-3.pdf
- https://www.eweek.com/security/newscaster-threat-uses-social-media-for-intelligence-gathering
- https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-magic-hound-campaign-attacks-saudi-targets/
- https://static.carahsoft.com/concrete/files/1015/2779/3571/M-Trends-2018-Report.pdf
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/intelligence/microsoft-threat-actor-naming?view=o365-worldwide
- https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/operation-spoofedscholars-conversation-ta453
- https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/badblood-ta453-targets-us-and-israeli-medical-research-personnel-credential
- https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/cobalt-illusion
- https://noticeofpleadings.com/phosphorus/files/Complaint.pdf
- https://securityintelligence.com/posts/new-research-exposes-iranian-threat-group-operations/
© The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation.
Related pages
Pivot from Magic Hound into its techniques, tactics and any attributed infrastructure.
Queries
Resolves the slug to this actor, merging every duplicate node sharing the same name.
MATCH (a:ACTOR)
WHERE a.name =~ $pattern OR any(x IN a.aliases WHERE x =~ $pattern)
RETURN a.id AS id, a.name AS name, a.aliases AS aliases, a.description AS description,
a.references AS references, a.campaigns AS campaigns
LIMIT 25Run yourself →Techniques this actor uses, grouped by the tactic each one serves.
MATCH (a:ACTOR {name: $name})-[:USES_TECHNIQUE]->(t:ATTACK_PATTERN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (t)-[:USES_TACTIC]->(tac:ATTACK_PATTERN)
RETURN t.id AS techniqueId, t.name AS techniqueName, tac.id AS tacticId, tac.name AS tacticName
LIMIT 1000Run yourself →Infrastructure publicly attributed to this actor.
MATCH (n)-[:ATTRIBUTED_TO]->(a:ACTOR {name: $name})
RETURN labels(n)[0] AS kind, n.name AS name
LIMIT 25Run yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.