Threat actor
Medusa Group
Last fetched
Medusa Group is a threat actor tracked in WhisperGraph's MITRE ATT&CK corpus, observed using 57 techniques.
Description
[Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has been active since at least 2021 and was initially operated as a closed ransomware group before evolving into a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation. Some reporting indicates that certain attacks may still be conducted directly by the ransomware’s core developers. Public sources have also referred to the group as “Spearwing” or “Medusa Actors.” (Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025) (Citation: Broadcom Medusa Ransomware Medusa Group March 2025) [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) employs living-off-the-land techniques, frequently leveraging publicly available tools and common remote management software to conduct operations. The group engages in double extortion tactics, exfiltrating data prior to encryption and threatening to publish stolen information if ransom demands are not met. (Citation: Security Scorecard Medusa Ransomware January 2024) For initial access, [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has exploited publicly known vulnerabilities, conducted phishing campaigns, and used credentials or access purchased from Initial Access Brokers (IABs). The group is opportunistic and has targeted a wide range of sectors globally. (Citation: Intel471 Medusa Ransomware May 2025)
Techniques by tactic
Discovery
- T1016 · System Network Configuration Discovery
- T1018 · Remote System Discovery
- T1033 · System Owner/User Discovery
- T1046 · Network Service Discovery
- T1057 · Process Discovery
- T1069.002 · Domain Groups
- T1082 · System Information Discovery
- T1083 · File and Directory Discovery
- T1087.001 · Local Account
- T1135 · Network Share Discovery
- T1518.001 · Security Software Discovery
- T1652 · Device Driver Discovery
Attributed infrastructure
None published. WhisperGraph carries no ATTRIBUTED_TO edge to Medusa Group today — this states the absence of a published link, not that Medusa Group has no infrastructure.
References
- https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa25-071a
- https://www.intel471.com/blog/threat-hunting-case-study-medusa-ransomware
- https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/medusa-ransomware-attacks
- https://securityscorecard.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/deep-dive-into-medusa-ransomware.pdf
© The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation.
Related pages
Pivot from Medusa Group into its techniques, tactics and any attributed infrastructure.
Queries
Resolves the slug to this actor, merging every duplicate node sharing the same name.
MATCH (a:ACTOR)
WHERE a.name =~ $pattern OR any(x IN a.aliases WHERE x =~ $pattern)
RETURN a.id AS id, a.name AS name, a.aliases AS aliases, a.description AS description,
a.references AS references, a.campaigns AS campaigns
LIMIT 25Techniques this actor uses, grouped by the tactic each one serves.
MATCH (a:ACTOR {name: $name})-[:USES_TECHNIQUE]->(t:ATTACK_PATTERN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (t)-[:USES_TACTIC]->(tac:ATTACK_PATTERN)
RETURN t.id AS techniqueId, t.name AS techniqueName, tac.id AS tacticId, tac.name AS tacticName
LIMIT 1000Infrastructure publicly attributed to this actor.
MATCH (n)-[:ATTRIBUTED_TO]->(a:ACTOR {name: $name})
RETURN labels(n)[0] AS kind, n.name AS name
LIMIT 25Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.