Threat actor
MUSTANG PANDA
Last fetched
MUSTANG PANDA is a threat actor tracked in WhisperGraph's MITRE ATT&CK corpus, observed using 85 techniques and also known as 17 other names.
Also known as
BRONZE PRESIDENT, HoneyMyte, Red Lich, TEMP.HEX, BASIN, Earth Preta, TA416, Stately Taurus, LuminousMoth, Polaris, TANTALUM, Twill Typhoon, BASIN CASTLE, ITG27, Hive0154, Mustang Panda, UNK_SteadySplit
Description
This threat actor targets nongovernmental organizations using Mongolian-themed lures for espionage purposes. In April 2017, CrowdStrike Falcon Intelligence observed a previously unattributed actor group with a Chinese nexus targeting a U.S.-based think tank. Further analysis revealed a wider campaign with unique tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). This adversary targets non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in general, but uses Mongolian language decoys and themes, suggesting this actor has a specific focus on gathering intelligence on Mongolia. These campaigns involve the use of shared malware like Poison Ivy or PlugX. Recently, Falcon Intelligence observed new activity from MUSTANG PANDA, using a unique infection chain to target likely Mongolia-based victims. This newly observed activity uses a series of redirections and fileless, malicious implementations of legitimate tools to gain access to the targeted systems. Additionally, MUSTANG PANDA actors reused previously-observed legitimate domains to host files.
Techniques by tactic
Command and Control
- T1001.003 · Protocol or Service Impersonation
- T1071.001 · Web Protocols
- T1095 · Non-Application Layer Protocol
- T1102 · Web Service
- T1105 · Ingress Tool Transfer
- T1205 · Traffic Signaling
- T1219.001 · IDE Tunneling
- T1219.002 · Remote Desktop Software
- T1572 · Protocol Tunneling
- T1573.001 · Symmetric Cryptography
Discovery
- T1016 · System Network Configuration Discovery
- T1018 · Remote System Discovery
- T1046 · Network Service Discovery
- T1049 · System Network Connections Discovery
- T1057 · Process Discovery
- T1069.002 · Domain Groups
- T1082 · System Information Discovery
- T1083 · File and Directory Discovery
- T1087.002 · Domain Account
- T1518 · Software Discovery
- T1622 · Debugger Evasion
- T1654 · Log Enumeration
Execution
- T1047 · Windows Management Instrumentation
- T1053.005 · Scheduled Task
- T1059 · Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1059.001 · PowerShell
- T1059.003 · Windows Command Shell
- T1059.005 · Visual Basic
- T1059.007 · JavaScript
- T1072 · Software Deployment Tools
- T1106 · Native API
- T1129 · Shared Modules
- T1203 · Exploitation for Client Execution
- T1204.001 · Malicious Link
- T1204.002 · Malicious File
- T1574.001 · DLL
- T1574.005 · Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness
Stealth
- T1027 · Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1027.007 · Dynamic API Resolution
- T1027.012 · LNK Icon Smuggling
- T1027.016 · Junk Code Insertion
- T1036.005 · Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1036.007 · Double File Extension
- T1036.008 · Masquerade File Type
- T1070 · Indicator Removal
- T1070.004 · File Deletion
- T1070.006 · Timestomp
- T1140 · Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1205 · Traffic Signaling
- T1218.004 · InstallUtil
- T1218.005 · Mshta
- T1564.001 · Hidden Files and Directories
- T1574.001 · DLL
- T1574.005 · Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness
- T1622 · Debugger Evasion
- T1678 · Delay Execution
Attributed infrastructure
Infrastructure with a published ATTRIBUTED_TO link to MUSTANG PANDA in WhisperGraph. Attribution is sparse graph-wide — this list is rarely exhaustive.
- black-popular.comHOSTNAME
- whatismybestthing.comHOSTNAME
References
- https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/mustang-panda
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-june-mustang-panda/
- https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/Report2020CrowdStrikeGlobalThreatReport.pdf
- https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/bronze-president
- https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/chinese-apt-bronze-president-spy-campaign-russian-military
- https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/assets/cyber-threats-2019-retrospect.pdf
- https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/pwc-cyber-threats-2020-a-year-in-retrospect.pdf
- https://services.google.com/fh/files/blogs/google_fog_of_war_research_report.pdf
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/k/earth-preta-spear-phishing-governments-worldwide.html
- https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/ta416-goes-ground-and-returns-golang-plugx-malware-loader
- https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/good-bad-and-web-bug-ta416-increases-operational-tempo-against-european
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/stately-taurus-targets-philippines-government-cyberespionage/
- https://www.bsi.bund.de/DE/Themen/Unternehmen-und-Organisationen/Cyber-Sicherheitslage/Analysen-und-Prognosen/Threat-Intelligence/Aktive_APT-Gruppen/aktive-apt-gruppen_node.html
- https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RW1aFyW
- https://jsac.jpcert.or.jp/archive/2023/pdf/JSAC2023_2_LT4.pdf
- https://thecyberwire.com/podcasts/microsoft-threat-intelligence/4/notes
- https://web-assets.esetstatic.com/wls/en/papers/white-papers/ceranakeeper.pdf
- https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/updated-cyber-threat-actor-naming-system/
- https://www.ibm.com/think/x-force/trapping-a-mustang-panda
© The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation.
Related pages
Pivot from MUSTANG PANDA into its techniques, tactics and any attributed infrastructure.
Queries
Resolves the slug to this actor, merging every duplicate node sharing the same name.
MATCH (a:ACTOR)
WHERE a.name =~ $pattern OR any(x IN a.aliases WHERE x =~ $pattern)
RETURN a.id AS id, a.name AS name, a.aliases AS aliases, a.description AS description,
a.references AS references, a.campaigns AS campaigns
LIMIT 25Run yourself →Techniques this actor uses, grouped by the tactic each one serves.
MATCH (a:ACTOR {name: $name})-[:USES_TECHNIQUE]->(t:ATTACK_PATTERN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (t)-[:USES_TACTIC]->(tac:ATTACK_PATTERN)
RETURN t.id AS techniqueId, t.name AS techniqueName, tac.id AS tacticId, tac.name AS tacticName
LIMIT 1000Run yourself →Infrastructure publicly attributed to this actor.
MATCH (n)-[:ATTRIBUTED_TO]->(a:ACTOR {name: $name})
RETURN labels(n)[0] AS kind, n.name AS name
LIMIT 25Run yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.