Threat actor
OilRig
Last fetched
OilRig is a threat actor tracked in WhisperGraph's MITRE ATT&CK corpus, observed using 76 techniques and also known as 17 other names.
Also known as
Twisted Kitten, Cobalt Gypsy, Crambus, Helix Kitten, APT 34, APT34, IRN2, ATK40, G0049, Evasive Serpens, Hazel Sandstorm, EUROPIUM, TA452, Earth Simnavaz, SOLAR ION, COBALT GYPSY, ITG13
Description
[OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. The group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.(Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017)(Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017)(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016)(Citation: Unit42 OilRig Playbook 2023)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)
Techniques by tactic
Credential Access
- T1003.001 · LSASS Memory
- T1003.004 · LSA Secrets
- T1003.005 · Cached Domain Credentials
- T1056.001 · Keylogging
- T1110 · Brute Force
- T1552.001 · Credentials In Files
- T1555 · Credentials from Password Stores
- T1555.003 · Credentials from Web Browsers
- T1555.004 · Windows Credential Manager
- T1556.002 · Password Filter DLL
Discovery
- T1007 · System Service Discovery
- T1012 · Query Registry
- T1016 · System Network Configuration Discovery
- T1033 · System Owner/User Discovery
- T1046 · Network Service Discovery
- T1049 · System Network Connections Discovery
- T1057 · Process Discovery
- T1069.001 · Local Groups
- T1069.002 · Domain Groups
- T1082 · System Information Discovery
- T1087.001 · Local Account
- T1087.002 · Domain Account
- T1120 · Peripheral Device Discovery
- T1201 · Password Policy Discovery
- T1497.001 · System Checks
Stealth
- T1027.005 · Indicator Removal from Tools
- T1027.013 · Encrypted/Encoded File
- T1036 · Masquerading
- T1036.005 · Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1070.004 · File Deletion
- T1078 · Valid Accounts
- T1078.002 · Domain Accounts
- T1140 · Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1218.001 · Compiled HTML File
- T1497.001 · System Checks
Attributed infrastructure
None published. WhisperGraph carries no ATTRIBUTED_TO edge to OilRig today — this states the absence of a published link, not that OilRig has no infrastructure.
References
- https://blog.morphisec.com/iranian-fileless-cyberattack-on-israel-word-vulnerability
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-striking-oil-closer-look-adversary-infrastructure/
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-introducing-the-adversary-playbook-first-up-oilrig/
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-oopsie-oilrig-uses-threedollars-deliver-new-trojan/
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-oilrig-uses-rgdoor-iis-backdoor-targets-middle-east/
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-twoface-webshell-persistent-access-point-lateral-movement/
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-oilrig-actors-provide-glimpse-development-testing-efforts/
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-analyzing-oilrigs-ops-tempo-testing-weaponization-delivery/
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-oilrig-malware-campaign-updates-toolset-and-expands-targets/
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-oilrig-uses-updated-bondupdater-target-middle-eastern-government/
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-oilrig-group-steps-attacks-new-delivery-documents-new-injector-trojan/
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-oilrig-targets-technology-service-provider-government-agency-quadagent/
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/the-oilrig-campaign-attacks-on-saudi-arabian-organizations-deliver-helminth-backdoor/
- https://pan-unit42.github.io/playbook_viewer/
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/05/targeted_attacksaga.html
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html
- https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/attack_il/he/CERT-IL-ALERT-W-120.pdf
- https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2017/02/15/oilrig-iran-hackers-cyberespionage-us-turkey-saudi-arabia/#56749aa2468a
- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pan-unit42/playbook_viewer/master/playbook_json/oilrig.json
- https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/oilrig
- https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/apt-34
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-november-helix-kitten/
- https://symantec-blogs.broadcom.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/shamoon-destructive-threat-re-emerges-new-sting-its-tail
- https://web.archive.org/web/20120818235442/https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shamoon-attacks
- https://community.broadcom.com/symantecenterprise/communities/community-home/librarydocuments/viewdocument?DocumentKey=ad6f8259-2bb4-4f7f-b8e1-710b35a4cbed&CommunityKey=1ecf5f55-9545-44d6-b0f4-4e4a7f5f5e68&tab=librarydocuments
- https://www.clearskysec.com/oilrig/
- https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/shamoon-attackers-employ-new-tool-kit-to-wipe-infected-systems/
- https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049/
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/oilrig-novel-c2-channel-steganography/
- https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/cobalt-gypsy
- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/collateral/en/mtrends-2018.pdf
- https://www.wired.com/story/apt-34-iranian-hackers-critical-infrastructure-companies/
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/atoms/evasive-serpens/
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/08/microsoft-investigates-iranian-attacks-against-the-albanian-government/
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/24/j/earth-simnavaz-cyberattacks.html
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2021/11/16/evolving-trends-in-iranian-threat-actor-activity-mstic-presentation-at-cyberwarcon-2021/
- https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/updated-cyber-threat-actor-naming-system/
- https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049
- https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/
- http://www.clearskysec.com/oilrig/
- http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/the-oilrig-campaign-attacks-on-saudi-arabian-organizations-deliver-helminth-backdoor/
- http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-oilrig-actors-provide-glimpse-development-testing-efforts/
- http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-oilrig-malware-campaign-updates-toolset-and-expands-targets/
- https://securityintelligence.com/posts/new-destructive-wiper-zerocleare-targets-energy-sector-in-the-middle-east/
- https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-oilrig-targets-technology-service-provider-government-agency-quadagent/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/intelligence/microsoft-threat-actor-naming?view=o365-worldwide
- https://www.proofpoint.com/us/corporate-blog/post/iranian-state-sponsored-and-aligned-attacks-what-you-need-know-and-steps-protect
- https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/crambus-middle-east-government
- https://pan-unit42.github.io/playbook_viewer/?pb=evasive-serpens
© The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation.
Related pages
Pivot from OilRig into its techniques, tactics and any attributed infrastructure.
Queries
Resolves the slug to this actor, merging every duplicate node sharing the same name.
MATCH (a:ACTOR)
WHERE a.name =~ $pattern OR any(x IN a.aliases WHERE x =~ $pattern)
RETURN a.id AS id, a.name AS name, a.aliases AS aliases, a.description AS description,
a.references AS references, a.campaigns AS campaigns
LIMIT 25Run yourself →Techniques this actor uses, grouped by the tactic each one serves.
MATCH (a:ACTOR {name: $name})-[:USES_TECHNIQUE]->(t:ATTACK_PATTERN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (t)-[:USES_TACTIC]->(tac:ATTACK_PATTERN)
RETURN t.id AS techniqueId, t.name AS techniqueName, tac.id AS tacticId, tac.name AS tacticName
LIMIT 1000Run yourself →Infrastructure publicly attributed to this actor.
MATCH (n)-[:ATTRIBUTED_TO]->(a:ACTOR {name: $name})
RETURN labels(n)[0] AS kind, n.name AS name
LIMIT 25Run yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.