Threat actor
Sandworm
Last fetched
Sandworm is a threat actor tracked in WhisperGraph's MITRE ATT&CK corpus, observed using 0 techniques and also known as 16 other names.
Also known as
Quedagh, VOODOO BEAR, TEMP.Noble, IRON VIKING, G0034, ELECTRUM, TeleBots, IRIDIUM, Blue Echidna, FROZENBARENTS, UAC-0113, Seashell Blizzard, UAC-0082, APT44, SANDWORM RELIC, UAC-0145
Description
This threat actor targets industrial control systems, using a tool called Black Energy, associated with electricity and power generation for espionage, denial of service, and data destruction purposes. Some believe that the threat actor is linked to the 2015 compromise of the Ukrainian electrical grid and a distributed denial of service prior to the Russian invasion of Georgia. Believed to be responsible for the 2008 DDoS attacks in Georgia and the 2015 Ukraine power grid outage
Techniques by tactic
No ATT&CK techniques are recorded for Sandworm in WhisperGraph.
Attributed infrastructure
None published. WhisperGraph carries no ATTRIBUTED_TO edge to Sandworm today — this states the absence of a published link, not that Sandworm has no infrastructure.
References
- https://dragos.com/blog/crashoverride/CrashOverride-01.pdf
- https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-163A
- https://ics.sans.org/blog/2016/01/09/confirmation-of-a-coordinated-attack-on-the-ukrainian-power-grid
- https://web.archive.org/web/20141016132823/https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/sandworm-windows-zero-day-vulnerability-being-actively-exploited-targeted-attacks
- https://ics.sans.org/blog/2015/12/30/current-reporting-on-the-cyber-attack-in-ukraine-resulting-in-power-outage
- https://web.archive.org/web/20141224060545/http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/timeline-of-sandworm-attacks/
- https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034
- https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/continued-cyber-activity-in-eastern-europe-observed-by-tag
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdf
- https://dragos.com/media/2017-Review-Industrial-Control-System-Threats.pdf
- https://dragos.com/adversaries.html
- http://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/12/13/rise-telebots-analyzing-disruptive-killdisk-attacks
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/01/05/killdisk-now-targeting-linux-demands-250k-ransom-cant-decrypt
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/06/30/telebots-back-supply-chain-attacks-against-ukraine
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/05/23/xdata-ransomware-making-rounds-amid-global-wannacryptor-scare
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/06/27/new-ransomware-attack-hits-ukraine
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/10/24/bad-rabbit-not-petya-back
- https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/fog-of-war-how-the-ukraine-conflict-transformed-the-cyber-threat-landscape/
- https://www.recordedfuture.com/russia-nexus-uac-0113-emulating-telecommunication-providers-in-ukraine
- https://cert.gov.ua/article/405538
- https://cip.gov.ua/services/cm/api/attachment/download?id=60068
- https://packetstormsecurity.com/news/view/35790/Recent-OT-And-Espionage-Attacks-Linked-To-Russias-Sandworm-Now-Named-APT44.html
- https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/apt44-unearthing-sandworm?linkId=9627235
- https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/apt44-unearthing-sandworm.pdf
- https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/updated-cyber-threat-actor-naming-system/
- https://cert.gov.ua/article/4279195
© The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation.
Related pages
Pivot from Sandworm into its techniques, tactics and any attributed infrastructure.
Queries
Resolves the slug to this actor, merging every duplicate node sharing the same name.
MATCH (a:ACTOR)
WHERE a.name =~ $pattern OR any(x IN a.aliases WHERE x =~ $pattern)
RETURN a.id AS id, a.name AS name, a.aliases AS aliases, a.description AS description,
a.references AS references, a.campaigns AS campaigns
LIMIT 25Run yourself →Techniques this actor uses, grouped by the tactic each one serves.
MATCH (a:ACTOR {name: $name})-[:USES_TECHNIQUE]->(t:ATTACK_PATTERN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (t)-[:USES_TACTIC]->(tac:ATTACK_PATTERN)
RETURN t.id AS techniqueId, t.name AS techniqueName, tac.id AS tacticId, tac.name AS tacticName
LIMIT 1000Run yourself →Infrastructure publicly attributed to this actor.
MATCH (n)-[:ATTRIBUTED_TO]->(a:ACTOR {name: $name})
RETURN labels(n)[0] AS kind, n.name AS name
LIMIT 25Run yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.