Threat actor
TeamTNT
Last fetched
TeamTNT is a threat actor tracked in WhisperGraph's MITRE ATT&CK corpus, observed using 56 techniques and also known as 1 other name.
Also known as
Adept Libra
Description
[TeamTNT](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0139) is a threat group that has primarily targeted cloud and containerized environments. The group as been active since at least October 2019 and has mainly focused its efforts on leveraging cloud and container resources to deploy cryptocurrency miners in victim environments.(Citation: Palo Alto Black-T October 2020)(Citation: Lacework TeamTNT May 2021)(Citation: Intezer TeamTNT September 2020)(Citation: Cado Security TeamTNT Worm August 2020)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Trend Micro TeamTNT)(Citation: ATT TeamTNT Chimaera September 2020)(Citation: Aqua TeamTNT August 2020)(Citation: Intezer TeamTNT Explosion September 2021)
Techniques by tactic
Discovery
- T1007 · System Service Discovery
- T1016 · System Network Configuration Discovery
- T1046 · Network Service Discovery
- T1049 · System Network Connections Discovery
- T1057 · Process Discovery
- T1082 · System Information Discovery
- T1083 · File and Directory Discovery
- T1120 · Peripheral Device Discovery
- T1518.001 · Security Software Discovery
- T1613 · Container and Resource Discovery
- T1680 · Local Storage Discovery
Attributed infrastructure
None published. WhisperGraph carries no ATTRIBUTED_TO edge to TeamTNT today — this states the absence of a published link, not that TeamTNT has no infrastructure.
References
- https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0139
- https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/teamtnt-with-new-campaign-aka-chimaera
- https://www.cadosecurity.com/team-tnt-the-first-crypto-mining-worm-to-steal-aws-credentials/
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/
- https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-tracking-the-activities-of-teamTNT.pdf
- https://www.intezer.com/blog/cloud-security/attackers-abusing-legitimate-cloud-monitoring-tools-to-conduct-cyber-attacks/
- https://www.intezer.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/TeamTNT-Cryptomining-Explosion.pdf
- https://blog.aquasec.com/container-security-tnt-container-attack
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/black-t-cryptojacking-variant/
- https://www.lacework.com/blog/taking-teamtnt-docker-images-offline
- https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/elf.teamtnt
- https://blog.aquasec.com/teamtnt-campaign-against-docker-kubernetes-environment
- https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/teamtnt-delivers-malware-with-new-detection-evasion-tool
- https://www.cadosecurity.com/post/team-tnt-the-first-crypto-mining-worm-to-steal-aws-credentials
- https://www.intezer.com/blog/cloud-security/top-linux-cloud-threats-of-2020/
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/l/teamtnt-now-deploying-ddos-capable-irc-bot-tntbotinger.html
- https://cyware.com/news/hildegard-teamtnts-new-feature-rich-malware-targeting-kubernetes-6587eb45
- https://www.lacework.com/teamtnt-builds-botnet-from-chinese-cloud-servers/
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/atoms/adept-libra/
© The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation.
Related pages
Pivot from TeamTNT into its techniques, tactics and any attributed infrastructure.
Queries
Resolves the slug to this actor, merging every duplicate node sharing the same name.
MATCH (a:ACTOR)
WHERE a.name =~ $pattern OR any(x IN a.aliases WHERE x =~ $pattern)
RETURN a.id AS id, a.name AS name, a.aliases AS aliases, a.description AS description,
a.references AS references, a.campaigns AS campaigns
LIMIT 25Techniques this actor uses, grouped by the tactic each one serves.
MATCH (a:ACTOR {name: $name})-[:USES_TECHNIQUE]->(t:ATTACK_PATTERN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (t)-[:USES_TACTIC]->(tac:ATTACK_PATTERN)
RETURN t.id AS techniqueId, t.name AS techniqueName, tac.id AS tacticId, tac.name AS tacticName
LIMIT 1000Infrastructure publicly attributed to this actor.
MATCH (n)-[:ATTRIBUTED_TO]->(a:ACTOR {name: $name})
RETURN labels(n)[0] AS kind, n.name AS name
LIMIT 25Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.