Threat actor
Tonto Team
Last fetched
Tonto Team is a threat actor tracked in WhisperGraph's MITRE ATT&CK corpus, observed using 15 techniques and also known as 11 other names.
Also known as
CactusPete, KARMA PANDA, BRONZE HUNTLEY, COPPER, Red Beifang, G0131, PLA Unit 65017, Earth Akhlut, TAG-74, LONE CASTLE, Karma Panda
Description
[Tonto Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0131) is a suspected Chinese state-sponsored cyber espionage threat group that has primarily targeted South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the United States since at least 2009; by 2020 they expanded operations to include other Asian as well as Eastern European countries. [Tonto Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0131) has targeted government, military, energy, mining, financial, education, healthcare, and technology organizations, including through the Heartbeat Campaign (2009-2012) and Operation Bitter Biscuit (2017).(Citation: Kaspersky CactusPete Aug 2020)(Citation: ESET Exchange Mar 2021)(Citation: FireEye Chinese Espionage October 2019)(Citation: ARS Technica China Hack SK April 2017)(Citation: Trend Micro HeartBeat Campaign January 2013)(Citation: Talos Bisonal 10 Years March 2020)
Techniques by tactic
Attributed infrastructure
None published. WhisperGraph carries no ATTRIBUTED_TO edge to Tonto Team today — this states the absence of a published link, not that Tonto Team has no infrastructure.
References
- https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/04/researchers-claim-china-trying-to-hack-south-korea-missile-defense-efforts/
- https://docs.huihoo.com/rsaconference/usa-2014/anf-t07b-the-art-of-attribution-identifying-and-pursuing-your-cyber-adversaries-final.pdf
- https://securelist.com/cactuspete-apt-groups-updated-bisonal-backdoor/97962/
- https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-secret-weapon-in-south-korea-missile-fight-hackers-1492766403
- https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/pwc-cyber-threats-2020-a-year-in-retrospect.pdf
- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/summit/cds-2019/presentations/cds19-executive-s08-achievement-unlocked.pdf
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2021/03/10/exchange-servers-under-siege-10-apt-groups/
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/g/supply-chain-attack-targeting-pakistani-government-delivers-shad.html
- https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/targets-of-interest-russian-organizations-increasingly-under-attack-by-chinese-apts/
- https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/cta-2023-0919.pdf
- https://www.recordedfuture.com/multi-year-chinese-apt-campaign-targets-south-korean-academic-government-political-entities
- https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/updated-cyber-threat-actor-naming-system/
- https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0131
- https://vb2020.vblocalhost.com/uploads/VB2020-06.pdf
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/adversaries-targeting-the-manufacturing-industry/
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/03/bisonal-10-years-of-play.html
- https://web.archive.org/web/20210308054208/https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/summit/cds-2019/presentations/cds19-executive-s08-achievement-unlocked.pdf
- https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_the-heartbeat-apt-campaign.pdf?
- https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/bronze-huntley
© The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation.
Related pages
Pivot from Tonto Team into its techniques, tactics and any attributed infrastructure.
Queries
Resolves the slug to this actor, merging every duplicate node sharing the same name.
MATCH (a:ACTOR)
WHERE a.name =~ $pattern OR any(x IN a.aliases WHERE x =~ $pattern)
RETURN a.id AS id, a.name AS name, a.aliases AS aliases, a.description AS description,
a.references AS references, a.campaigns AS campaigns
LIMIT 25Techniques this actor uses, grouped by the tactic each one serves.
MATCH (a:ACTOR {name: $name})-[:USES_TECHNIQUE]->(t:ATTACK_PATTERN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (t)-[:USES_TACTIC]->(tac:ATTACK_PATTERN)
RETURN t.id AS techniqueId, t.name AS techniqueName, tac.id AS tacticId, tac.name AS tacticName
LIMIT 1000Infrastructure publicly attributed to this actor.
MATCH (n)-[:ATTRIBUTED_TO]->(a:ACTOR {name: $name})
RETURN labels(n)[0] AS kind, n.name AS name
LIMIT 25Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.