Threat actor
Turla
Last fetched
Turla is a threat actor tracked in WhisperGraph's MITRE ATT&CK corpus, observed using 68 techniques and also known as 30 other names.
Also known as
IRON HUNTER, Group 88, Waterbug, WhiteBear, Snake, Krypton, Venomous Bear, Secret Blizzard, BELUGASTURGEON, VENOMOUS Bear, WRAITH, Uroburos, Pfinet, TAG_0530, KRYPTON, Hippo Team, Pacifier APT, Popeye, SIG23, MAKERSMARK, ATK13, G0010, ITG12, Blue Python, SUMMIT, UNC4210, UAC-0144, UAC-0024, UAC-0003, TURLA RELIC
Description
[Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) is a cyber espionage threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB). They have compromised victims in over 50 countries since at least 2004, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies. [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) is known for conducting watering hole and spearphishing campaigns, and leveraging in-house tools and malware, such as [Uroburos](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0022).(Citation: Kaspersky Turla)(Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)(Citation: CrowdStrike VENOMOUS BEAR)(Citation: ESET Turla Mosquito Jan 2018)(Citation: Joint Cybersecurity Advisory AA23-129A Snake Malware May 2023)
Techniques by tactic
Discovery
- T1007 · System Service Discovery
- T1012 · Query Registry
- T1016 · System Network Configuration Discovery
- T1016.001 · Internet Connection Discovery
- T1018 · Remote System Discovery
- T1049 · System Network Connections Discovery
- T1057 · Process Discovery
- T1069.001 · Local Groups
- T1069.002 · Domain Groups
- T1082 · System Information Discovery
- T1083 · File and Directory Discovery
- T1087.001 · Local Account
- T1087.002 · Domain Account
- T1120 · Peripheral Device Discovery
- T1124 · System Time Discovery
- T1201 · Password Policy Discovery
- T1518.001 · Security Software Discovery
- T1615 · Group Policy Discovery
Privilege Escalation
- T1055 · Process Injection
- T1055.001 · Dynamic-link Library Injection
- T1068 · Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
- T1078.003 · Local Accounts
- T1134.002 · Create Process with Token
- T1546.003 · Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription
- T1546.013 · PowerShell Profile
- T1547.001 · Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- T1547.004 · Winlogon Helper DLL
Stealth
- T1027.005 · Indicator Removal from Tools
- T1027.010 · Command Obfuscation
- T1027.011 · Fileless Storage
- T1036.005 · Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1055 · Process Injection
- T1055.001 · Dynamic-link Library Injection
- T1078.003 · Local Accounts
- T1134.002 · Create Process with Token
- T1140 · Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1564.012 · File/Path Exclusions
Attributed infrastructure
None published. WhisperGraph carries no ATTRIBUTED_TO edge to Turla today — this states the absence of a published link, not that Turla has no infrastructure.
References
- https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010
- https://web.archive.org/web/20201101015247/https://www.accenture.com/us-en/blogs/cyber-defense/turla-belugasturgeon-compromises-government-entity
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/09/tinyturla.html
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ESET_Turla_Mosquito.pdf
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/29/turla-powershell-usage/
- https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-05/aa23-129a_snake_malware_2.pdf
- https://securelist.com/introducing-whitebear/81638/
- https://securelist.com/the-epic-turla-operation/65545/
- https://www.leonardo.com/documents/20142/10868623/Malware+Technical+Insight+_Turla+%E2%80%9CPenquin_x64%E2%80%9D.pdf
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-march-venomous-bear/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/intelligence/microsoft-threat-actor-naming?view=o365-worldwide
- http://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-hunter
- https://www.threatminer.org/report.php?q=waterbug-attack-group.pdf&y=2015#gsc.tab=0&gsc.q=waterbug-attack-group.pdf&gsc.page=1
- https://www.circl.lu/pub/tr-25/
- https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/turla
- https://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/26/technology/26cyber.html
- https://securelist.com/blog/research/67962/the-penquin-turla-2/
- https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/moonlight-maze-the-lessons/6713/
- https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-witchcoven.pdf
- https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/65545/the-epic-turla-operation/
- https://threatpost.com/linux-modules-connected-to-turla-apt-discovered/109765/
- https://securelist.com/satellite-turla-apt-command-and-control-in-the-sky/72081/
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/05/22/turla-mosquito-shift-towards-generic-tools/
- https://www.first.org/resources/papers/tbilisi2014/turla-operations_and_development.pdf
- https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/russian_group_behind_2013_foreign_ministry_hack/8591548
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/03/30/carbon-paper-peering-turlas-second-stage-backdoor/
- https://securelist.com/blog/research/72081/satellite-turla-apt-command-and-control-in-the-sky/
- https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2018/november/turla-png-dropper-is-back/
- https://docs.broadcom.com/doc/waterbug-attack-group
- https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/aug/07/turla-hackers-spying-governments-researcher-kaspersky-symantec
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/turla-outlook-backdoor-uses-clever-tactics-for-stealth-and-persistence/
- https://download.bitdefender.com/resources/files/News/CaseStudies/study/115/Bitdefender-Whitepaper-PAC-A4-en-EN1.pdf
- https://www.melani.admin.ch/melani/en/home/dokumentation/reports/technical-reports/technical-report_apt_case_ruag.html
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-kazuar-multiplatform-espionage-backdoor-api-access/
- https://www.engadget.com/2017/06/07/russian-malware-hidden-britney-spears-instagram/
- https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/vn/security/news/cyber-attacks/cyberespionage-group-turla-deploys-backdoor-ahead-of-g20-summit
- https://www.zdnet.com/article/this-hacking-gang-just-updated-the-malware-it-uses-against-uk-targets/
- https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010/
- https://www.telsy.com/turla-venomous-bear-updates-its-arsenal-newpass-appears-on-the-apt-threat-scene/
- https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-hunter
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/12/02/turla-crutch-keeping-back-door-open/
- https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/continued-cyber-activity-in-eastern-europe-observed-by-tag
- https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/fog-of-war-how-the-ukraine-conflict-transformed-the-cyber-threat-landscape/
- https://services.google.com/fh/files/blogs/google_fog_of_war_research_report.pdf
- https://www.bsi.bund.de/DE/Themen/Unternehmen-und-Organisationen/Cyber-Sicherheitslage/Analysen-und-Prognosen/Threat-Intelligence/Aktive_APT-Gruppen/aktive-apt-gruppen_node.html
- https://cip.gov.ua/services/cm/api/attachment/download?id=60068
- https://r136a1.dev/2026/01/14/command-and-evade-turlas-kazuar-v3-loader/
- https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/updated-cyber-threat-actor-naming-system/
© The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation.
Related pages
Pivot from Turla into its techniques, tactics and any attributed infrastructure.
Queries
Resolves the slug to this actor, merging every duplicate node sharing the same name.
MATCH (a:ACTOR)
WHERE a.name =~ $pattern OR any(x IN a.aliases WHERE x =~ $pattern)
RETURN a.id AS id, a.name AS name, a.aliases AS aliases, a.description AS description,
a.references AS references, a.campaigns AS campaigns
LIMIT 25Run yourself →Techniques this actor uses, grouped by the tactic each one serves.
MATCH (a:ACTOR {name: $name})-[:USES_TECHNIQUE]->(t:ATTACK_PATTERN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (t)-[:USES_TACTIC]->(tac:ATTACK_PATTERN)
RETURN t.id AS techniqueId, t.name AS techniqueName, tac.id AS tacticId, tac.name AS tacticName
LIMIT 1000Run yourself →Infrastructure publicly attributed to this actor.
MATCH (n)-[:ATTRIBUTED_TO]->(a:ACTOR {name: $name})
RETURN labels(n)[0] AS kind, n.name AS name
LIMIT 25Run yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.