Autonomous System
AS10094
Last fetched
AS10094 is operated by UNN-BN - Unified National Networks, registered in BN, and announces 192 prefixes to 12 BGP neighbours. AS10094 has a reputation score of 13.2 (NEUTRAL); 15 of its 52,480 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 192
- BGP neighbours
- 12
- RPKI ROAs
- 428
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 2,845
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 9
- Facilities
- 32
- Internet exchanges
- 4
- Customer degree
- 9
- Peer degree
- 36
- Provider degree
- 2
- 61.6.192.0/24
- 61.6.193.0/24
- 61.6.192.0/22
- 61.6.194.0/23
- 61.6.196.0/24
- 61.6.197.0/24
- 61.6.196.0/22
- 61.6.198.0/24
- 61.6.200.0/24
- 61.6.201.0/24
- 61.6.200.0/22
- 61.6.202.0/24
- 61.6.204.0/24
- 61.6.205.0/24
- 61.6.204.0/22
- 61.6.206.0/24
- 61.6.207.0/24
- 61.6.208.0/22
- 61.6.210.0/24
- 61.6.212.0/24
- 61.6.212.0/22
- 61.6.215.0/24
- 61.6.216.0/24
- 61.6.217.0/24
- 61.6.216.0/22
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.04
- Route leaks
- 2
Leak types observed: TYPE4_PEER_TO_PROVIDER.
Signals
- critical-infrastructureServes infrastructure the internet depends on operationally.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (4 total)
Facilities (32 total)
- Equinix HK1 - Hong Kong
- Equinix SG1 - Singapore
- Global Switch Singapore
- AIMS Kuala Lumpur
- Equinix SG2 - Singapore
- Equinix HK2 - Hong Kong
- CSF CX1 / TelcoHub1 Kuala Lumpur
- CX2 / MY01 Cyberjaya Malaysia
- CJ1 CYBERJAYA
- Level(3) Gadong (Tungku CLS)
- NTT Cyberjaya Data Center (CBJ)
- Equinix SG3 - Singapore
- Equinix HK3 - Hong Kong
- Digital Realty Singapore SIN10
- VITRO Makati 1 - Yuchengco Tower
- Digital Realty Singapore SIN11
- Datacenter APJII-Cyber
- PLTPRO Data Centre
- VITRO Pasig
- VITRO Makati 2
- Open DC JB1 - Menara MSC Cyberport
- Equinix HK5 - Hong Kong
- Equinix SG4 - Singapore
- Digital Realty Singapore SIN12
- Equinix SG5 - Singapore
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 428 ROAs.
- 103.20.24.0/22 · max length /22
- 103.4.188.0/22 · max length /22
- 103.4.188.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.4.189.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.4.190.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.4.191.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.42.208.0/22 · max length /22
- 118.103.248.0/21 · max length /21
- 118.103.248.0/22 · max length /22
- 118.103.248.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS10094.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 52,480
- Threat-listed addresses
- 15
- Threat density
- 0.0286 %
- Routed prefixes
- 192
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 12 of this network’s 12 BGP neighbours.
- NTT-DATA-2914 - NTT America, Inc. · AS2914
- AS6453 - TATA COMMUNICATIONS (AMERICA) INC · AS6453
- SIMPUR-BN - UNN-BN · AS10101
- CLOUDFLARENET - Cloudflare, Inc. · AS13335
- NEWMEDIAEXPRESS-AS-AP - NewMedia Express Pte Ltd · AS38001
- FACEBOOK-OFFNET - Facebook, Inc. · AS63293
- TRANSIX-AS-NET - Transhybrid Internet Xchange · AS63516
- EGNC-AS - Unified National Networks · AS131467
- BSPC-NON-AS-AP - Brunei Shell Petroleum Company Sdn Bhd · AS133875
- JNI-AS-AP - JNI SYSTEM SDN BHD · AS136978
- ELD-AS-AP - Edgenext Legend Dynasty Pte. Ltd. · AS139057
- ACE-AS-AP - ACE · AS139341
Reputation
13.2reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS10094 (UNN-BN - Unified National Networks, BN) has a reputation score of 63.5 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 62.3/100
- Graph metrics
- 80.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Unified National Networks
- RIR
- APNIC
- Registered
- Wed, 08 Apr 2020 23:32:33 GMT
- Abuse contact
- unn-apnic@unn.com.bn
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS10094 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.