Autonomous System
AS150623
Last fetched
AS150623 is operated by HOSTPAT-AS-IN - HOSTDZIRE WEB SERVICES PRIVATE LIMITED, registered in IN, and announces 22 prefixes to 3 BGP neighbours. AS150623 has a reputation score of 20.8 (SUSPICIOUS).
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 22
- BGP neighbours
- 3
- RPKI ROAs
- 287
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- Facilities
- 27
- Internet exchanges
- 3
- 103.146.207.0/24
- 103.149.34.0/24
- 103.149.35.0/24
- 103.159.220.0/24
- 103.163.130.0/23
- 103.181.160.0/24
- 103.181.161.0/24
- 103.182.76.0/24
- 103.182.78.0/24
- 160.187.250.0/24
- 160.187.251.0/24
- 160.250.76.0/23
- 163.61.5.0/24
- 163.61.6.0/24
- 163.223.22.0/24
- 163.227.164.0/24
- 163.227.165.0/24
- 2400:5c60::/48
- 2400:5c60:1::/48
- 2400:5c60:2::/48
- 2400:5c60:3::/48
- 2400:5c60:4::/48
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (3 total)
Facilities (27 total)
- TATA Communications Mumbai
- CtrlS Mumbai DC1
- Web Werks Mumbai 1
- Equinix MB1 - Mumbai (GPX Mumbai 1)
- Nxtra Data Mumbai DC 2
- Sify Vashi - Mumbai
- Sify Rabale - Mumbai
- Sify Airoli-DC- Mumbai
- Netmagic Chandivali - MUM-DC05
- STT Mumbai 2
- Equinix MB2 - Mumbai (GPX Mumbai 2)
- CtrlS Mumbai DC2
- Netmagic Chandivali - MUM DC07
- Netmagic Chandivali - MUM DC06
- YOTTA NM1
- Extreme Kalyan
- Extreme Thane
- CtrlS Patna DC1
- Web Werks Mumbai 2
- Iron Mountain Data Center - Mumbai (MUM-2)
- Iron Mountain Data Center - Mumbai (MUM-1)
- NTT NAV01 Mahape
- Nxtra Data Mumbai DC 1
- Netmagic Chandivali - MUM DC09
- Nxtra Data Mumbai DC 3
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 287 ROAs.
- 103.146.222.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.149.52.0/23 · max length /24
- 103.159.242.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.163.148.0/23 · max length /24
- 103.165.22.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.181.176.0/23 · max length /24
- 103.182.102.0/23 · max length /24
- 160.191.28.0/23 · max length /24
- 160.250.111.0/24 · max length /24
- 163.223.52.0/23 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS150623.
Blast radius
Blast radius is temporarily unavailable.
The threat-density procedure returned no result for this ASN. Refresh in a moment to retry — fresh data is fetched on the next visit.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 3 of this network’s 3 BGP neighbours.
- WEBWERKS-AS-IN - Web Werks India Pvt. Ltd. · AS133296
- AGPL-AS-AP - Apeiron Global Pvt. Ltd. · AS139884
- INDTEL-AS-IN - INDTEL INFRA PRIVATE LIMITED · AS141799
Reputation
20.8reputation score (SUSPICIOUS)
AS150623 (HOSTPAT-AS-IN - HOSTDZIRE WEB SERVICES PRIVATE LIMITED, IN) has a reputation score of 49.2 (SUSPICIOUS). This ASN shows suspicious characteristics.
- Threat density
- 49.9/100
- Graph metrics
- 30.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS150623 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.