Autonomous System
AS151704
Last fetched
AS151704 is operated by BHARATDC-AS - BHARAT DATACENTER, registered in IN, and announces 36 prefixes to 9 BGP neighbours. AS151704 has a reputation score of 16.6 (NEUTRAL); 16 of its 7,680 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 36
- BGP neighbours
- 9
- RPKI ROAs
- 43
- MOAS conflicts
- 2
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 4,477
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 5
- Facilities
- 21
- Internet exchanges
- 2
- Customer degree
- 4
- Peer degree
- 0
- Provider degree
- 3
- 31.42.125.0/24
- 31.56.59.0/24
- 85.209.161.0/24
- 87.76.149.0/24
- 87.76.217.0/24
- 87.232.72.0/24
- 89.251.16.0/24
- 95.134.165.0/24
- 103.72.102.0/24
- 103.144.36.0/24
- 103.190.92.0/24
- 103.190.93.0/24
- 103.204.22.0/24
- 103.243.119.0/24
- 109.122.56.0/24
- 151.242.176.0/24
- 151.242.178.0/24
- 151.242.184.0/24
- 151.242.187.0/24
- 157.10.98.0/24
- 157.10.99.0/24
- 167.104.222.0/24
- 168.222.105.0/24
- 178.92.122.0/24
- 178.94.176.0/24
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (2 total)
Facilities (21 total)
- TATA Communications Delhi
- TATA Communications GK1
- Equinix MB1 - Mumbai (GPX Mumbai 1)
- Sify Greenfort - Noida
- CtrlS Noida DC1
- Netmagic Noida
- STT Delhi 3
- STT Delhi 2
- Web Werks NCR 2
- Extreme Janakpuri
- Extreme Gurgaon
- CtrlS Lucknow DC1
- CtrlS Patna DC1
- SIFY Ranchi
- SIFY Ludhiana
- SIFY Chandigarh
- Sify Bareilly
- YOTTA D1
- Extreme Laxminagar
- Extreme RDC
- NTT Noida DC2A
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 43 ROAs.
- 103.144.36.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.170.58.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.170.59.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.190.92.0/23 · max length /24
- 103.200.75.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.204.22.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.243.119.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.72.102.0/24 · max length /24
- 157.10.98.0/23 · max length /24
- 2001:df3:5cc0::/48 · max length /48
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS151704.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 7,680
- Threat-listed addresses
- 16
- Threat density
- 0.2083 %
- Routed prefixes
- 30
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 9 of this network’s 9 BGP neighbours.
- TATACOMM-AS - TATA Communications formerly VSNL is Leading ISP · AS4755
- Digital-Network - DIGITAL NETWORK S.R.L. · AS43094
- GSLNETWORKS-AS-AP - GSL Networks Pty LTD · AS137409
- HOSTER-AS-IN - Hosterdaddy Private Limited · AS152485
- VYOMCLOUD-AS - VyomCloud · AS154317
- YOTTASRC - YottaSrc · AS213535
- LHY - LHY TECHNOLOGIES PRIVATE LIMITED · AS214441
- HEROXHOST - HEROXHOST NETWORKS PRIVATE LIMITED · AS214485
- METAMONIX-AS - METAMONIX GLOBAL PRIVATE LIMITED · AS214832
MOAS / hijack watch
2 announced prefixes conflict with AS151704 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
Reputation
16.6reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS151704 (BHARATDC-AS - BHARAT DATACENTER, IN) has a reputation score of 56.7 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 53.6/100
- Graph metrics
- 55.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- BHARAT DATACENTER
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS151704 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.