Autonomous System
AS199624
Last fetched
AS199624 is operated by DKTEL-AS - DK Svyaz OOO, registered in RU, and announces 8 prefixes to 31 BGP neighbours. AS199624 has a reputation score of 12.1 (NEUTRAL); 0 of its 2,304 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 8
- BGP neighbours
- 31
- RPKI ROAs
- 10
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 1,904
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 17
- Facilities
- 63
- Internet exchanges
- 7
- Customer degree
- 15
- Peer degree
- 22
- Provider degree
- 8
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (7 total)
Facilities (63 total)
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Digital Realty VIE1/2 - Vienna
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- Equinix SK1 - Stockholm, Bromma
- Speedbone Berlin
- Moscow M9
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- Dataplex Budapest
- Digital Realty Marseille MRS1/2/3/4
- CE Colo Prague
- Digital Realty Stockholm STO1-6
- NXDATA-1 Bucharest (BUH1)
- Linxdatacenter (Moscow)
- CSS MPS Moscow
- NewTelco Kiev
- Sitel Bratislava
- LIM Warsaw
- Equinix WA1 - Warsaw, Centrum LIM
- Moscow CSS MPS
- Ucomline Kiev
- Moscow M10
- TELEPOINT Sofia Centre
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 10 ROAs.
- 185.166.240.0/22 · max length /32
- 185.166.243.0/24 · max length /32
- 185.25.10.0/23 · max length /32
- 185.25.9.0/24 · max length /32
- 185.8.4.0/22 · max length /32
- 2a00:7b60::/32 · max length /32
- 2a03:13c0::/32 · max length /32
- 2a0a:2100::/29 · max length /29
- 91.208.171.0/24 · max length /32
- 95.131.176.0/21 · max length /32
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS199624.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 2,304
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 5
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 31 BGP neighbours.
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- NAUKANET-AS - LLC "Nauka-Svyaz" · AS8641
- ROSTELECOM-AS - PJSC Rostelecom · AS12389
- KLG-AS - KL Group LLC · AS12456
- SGGS-AS-AP - SG.GS · AS24482
- GNM-AS - Global Network Management Inc · AS31500
- INETCOM - INETCOM CARRIER LLC · AS35598
- Virtual Technologies & Solutions - Virtual Technologies & Solutions · AS37721
- INTSG-AS - LLC INTER-SVYAZ-GROUP · AS44772
- COM-ON-AS - DK Svyaz OOO · AS47857
- RUSNARBANK-AS - JSC "RUSNARBANK" · AS48477
- DKTEL-PLT-AS - DK Svyaz OOO · AS49058
- TRUENETWORK - Truenetwork LLC · AS49673
- MISIS - Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher Education "National Research Technological University "MISIS" · AS49929
- TRANSROUTE - Transroute Telecom LTD · AS50509
- Serverius-as - Serverius Holding B.V. · AS50673
- UTEX-AS - Shchurov Mikhail Yurievich · AS51904
- GIGAHOST - Gigahost AS · AS56655
- DKTEL-OPRF - DK Svyaz OOO · AS56857
- MPROV-RU - DK Svyaz OOO · AS57290
- SATTEL-AS - Satellite Telecom LTD. · AS57490
- REA-AS - Federal State Budgetary Educational Institution of Higher Education "G.V. Plekhanov Russian University of Economics" · AS57867
- BEMYLINK - BiMajLink d.o.o. · AS62255
- FREEWAY - FREEWAY LLC · AS62379
- BIZTEL-AS - Biz Telecom LLC · AS197453
Reputation
12.1reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS199624 (DKTEL-AS - DK Svyaz OOO, RU) has a reputation score of 65.8 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 72.1/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 60.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- DK Svyaz OOO
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Fri, 02 Nov 2012 13:50:42 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@dktel.ru
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS199624 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.