Autonomous System
AS200070
Last fetched
AS200070 is operated by CZNIC-AS2 - CZ.NIC, z.s.p.o., registered in CZ, and announces 3 prefixes to 15 BGP neighbours. AS200070 has a reputation score of 7.3 (REPUTABLE); 0 of its 512 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 3
- BGP neighbours
- 15
- RPKI ROAs
- 12
- MOAS conflicts
- 4
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 80,338
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 1
- Facilities
- 57
- Internet exchanges
- 7
- Customer degree
- 0
- Peer degree
- 86
- Provider degree
- 6
Signals
- critical-infrastructureServes infrastructure the internet depends on operationally.
Infrastructure presence
Facilities (57 total)
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Vienna University Computer Center (Wien)
- Digital Realty VIE1/2 - Vienna
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- Digital Realty London LON1-3
- Equinix LD8 - London, Docklands
- Digital Realty London LHR19
- Digital Realty London LHR20
- Telehouse - London (Docklands East)
- Equinix DC1-DC15,DC21-DC22 - Ashburn
- Digital Realty London LHR21 (closed)
- GTS Telehouse Prague
- CE Colo Prague
- DC Tower Zizkov CRa
- Digital Realty IAD (44480 Hastings)
- Equinix LD4 - London, Slough
- Equinix TY2 - Tokyo
- TTC TELEPORT DC1
- Equinix LD9 - London, Powergate
- Sitel Bratislava
- CoreSite - Reston (VA1)
- Digital Edge TYO2 (ComSpace 1) - Tokyo
- Telehouse - London (Docklands West)
- Equinix LD5 - London, Slough
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 12 ROAs.
- 199.253.250.0/24
- 2620:10a:80ba::/48
- 185.43.134.0/24 · max length /24
- 193.29.206.0/24 · max length /24
- 194.0.12.0/23 · max length /30
- 194.0.14.0/24 · max length /24
- 2001:148f:fffb::/48 · max length /48
- 2001:148f:fffd::/48 · max length /48
- 2001:678:10::/47 · max length /64
- 2001:678:1::/48 · max length /48
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS200070.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 512
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 2
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 15 of this network’s 15 BGP neighbours.
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- ACOnet - ACONET · AS1853
- LINX-AS - London Internet Exchange Ltd. · AS5459
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- MFEED - INTERNET MULTIFEED CO. · AS7521
- RETN-AS - RETN Limited · AS9002
- ITGATE - IT.Gate S.p.A. · AS12779
- CONVERGE-AS - Converge ICT Solutions Inc. · AS17639
- TRANSTELECOM - Joint Stock Company TransTeleCom · AS20485
- SGGS-AS-AP - SG.GS · AS24482
- IP-Max - IP-Max SA · AS25091
- IELO - IELO-LIAZO SERVICES SAS · AS29075
- GNM-AS - Global Network Management Inc · AS31500
- MEER-AS - meerfarbig GmbH & Co. KG · AS34549
- TKSWF-AS - Stadtwerke Feldkirch · AS48362
MOAS / hijack watch
4 announced prefixes conflict with AS200070 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
Reputation
7.3reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS200070 (CZNIC-AS2 - CZ.NIC, z.s.p.o., CZ) has a reputation score of 78.3 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 90.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- CZ.NIC, z.s.p.o.
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Wed, 16 Oct 2013 10:17:51 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@nic.cz
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS200070 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.