Autonomous System
AS20080
Last fetched
AS20080 is operated by AMPATH - Florida International University, registered in US, and announces 7 prefixes to 19 BGP neighbours. AS20080 has a reputation score of 8.9 (REPUTABLE); 0 of its 2,048 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 7
- BGP neighbours
- 19
- RPKI ROAs
- 8
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 1,131
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 33
- Facilities
- 14
- Internet exchanges
- 2
- Customer degree
- 10
- Peer degree
- 218
- Provider degree
- 3
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.06
- Route leaks
- 3
Leak types observed: TYPE4_PEER_TO_PROVIDER.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (2 total)
Facilities (14 total)
- Equinix MI1 - Miami, NOTA
- iM Critical Miami
- Equinix MI2 - Miami
- 365 Data Centers Boca Raton (BC1)
- QTS Miami (MIA1)
- 365 Data Centers Ft. Lauderdale (FLL)
- CoreSite - Miami (MI1)
- ColoHouse Miami
- Equinix MI3 - Miami, Boca Raton
- DataBank Miami (MIA1)
- EdgeConneX Miami (EDCMIA01)
- Digital Realty MIA (36 NE 2nd St)
- South Reach Networks
- CoreSite - Miami (MI2)
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 8 of this network’s 8 ROAs.
- 170.39.8.0/23 · max length /24
- 143.255.248.0/22 · max length /24
- 187.251.160.0/19 · max length /24
- 190.103.184.0/22 · max length /24
- 190.15.128.0/20 · max length /24
- 201.159.220.0/22 · max length /24
- 2800:68::/32 · max length /48
- 2800:bc0::/32 · max length /48
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS20080.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 2,048
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 4
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 19 of this network’s 19 BGP neighbours.
- AS1251 - FUNDACAO DE AMPARO A PESQUISA DO ESTADO SAO PAULO · AS1251
- AS1916 - Rede Nacional de Ensino e Pesquisa · AS1916
- Tertiary Education and Research Network of South Africa - Tertiary Education and Research Network of South Africa · AS2018
- NTT-DATA-2914 - NTT America, Inc. · AS2914
- SWISSCOM - Swisscom (Schweiz) AG · AS3303
- FIU - Florida International University · AS3681
- UPRENET - University of Puerto Rico · AS5786
- SEABONE-NET - TELECOM ITALIA SPARKLE S.p.A. · AS6762
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- AS11340 - Red Universitaria Nacional · AS11340
- INTERNET2-RESEARCH-EDU - Internet2 · AS11537
- AURA-SOUTH - NSF'S NOIRLAB · AS19226
- UVI - University of the Virgin Islands · AS20243
- SGGS-AS-AP - SG.GS · AS24482
- AS27676 - ALMA - Atacama Large Millimeter Array · AS27676
- AS27750 - Cooperacion Latino Americana de Redes Avanzadas · AS27750
- Ubuntunet Alliance For Research and Education Networking - Ubuntunet Alliance For Research and Education Networking · AS36944
- AS61468 - CEDIA · AS61468
- BROOT-AS - B.Root-Server-OPS · AS394353
Reputation
8.9reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS20080 (AMPATH - Florida International University, US) has a reputation score of 73.4 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 76.2/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Florida International University
- RIR
- ARIN
- Registered
- Wed, 10 Sep 2014 20:06:00 GMT
- Abuse contact
- david@fiu.edu
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS20080 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.