Autonomous System
AS203936
Last fetched
AS203936 is operated by AS-MISMENET - AVATEL TELECOM, SA, registered in ES, and announces 10 prefixes to 5 BGP neighbours. AS203936 has a reputation score of 15.3 (NEUTRAL); 2 of its 2,816 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 10
- BGP neighbours
- 5
- RPKI ROAs
- 14
- MOAS conflicts
- 1
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 2,171
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 14
- Facilities
- 13
- Internet exchanges
- 2
- Customer degree
- 4
- Peer degree
- 0
- Provider degree
- 3
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (2 total)
Facilities (13 total)
- Digital Realty Madrid MAD1-2
- Espanix Datacenter
- Equinix MD2 - Madrid
- IPCore Datacenter Madrid
- nLighten Madrid MAD1
- Templus DC Madrid MAD02
- Global Switch Madrid
- Digital Realty Madrid MAD3
- Barcelona Cable Landing Station
- DATA4 Madrid-Alcobendas - MAD1
- Digital Realty Madrid MAD4
- Magdalena Datacenter
- Cantabria Datacenter
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 14 ROAs.
- 185.118.188.0/22 · max length /24
- 185.118.188.0/24 · max length /24
- 185.118.189.0/24 · max length /24
- 185.118.190.0/23 · max length /23
- 185.232.36.0/22 · max length /22
- 185.238.87.0/24 · max length /24
- 185.253.144.0/22 · max length /24
- 193.39.92.0/24 · max length /24
- 193.39.93.0/24 · max length /24
- 193.39.94.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS203936.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 2,816
- Threat-listed addresses
- 2
- Threat density
- 0.0710 %
- Routed prefixes
- 10
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 5 of this network’s 5 BGP neighbours.
- IDDQD-AS - IDDQD-AS · AS12956
- AS-MISMELINK - MISMELINK NETWORKS, SL · AS34696
- AVATEL-AS - AVATEL TELECOM, SA · AS200845
- VERIMAX - Verimax Telecom SL · AS208596
- HUCAME-AS - Hucame Telecom Networks SLU · AS212957
MOAS / hijack watch
1 announced prefix conflict with AS203936 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
Reputation
15.3reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS203936 (AS-MISMENET - AVATEL TELECOM, SA, ES) has a reputation score of 59.4 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 61.2/100
- Graph metrics
- 55.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- AVATEL TELECOM, SA
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Thu, 01 Oct 2015 09:10:28 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@avatel.es
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS203936 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.