Autonomous System
AS209990
Last fetched
AS209990 is operated by KARMUZ - Diyaaeldin Moustafa trading as Karmuz, registered in NL, and announces 20 prefixes to 22 BGP neighbours. AS209990 has a reputation score of 8.1 (REPUTABLE); 0 of its 256 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 20
- BGP neighbours
- 22
- RPKI ROAs
- 8
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 60,579
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 1
- Facilities
- 42
- Internet exchanges
- 7
- Customer degree
- 0
- Peer degree
- 17
- Provider degree
- 4
- 185.214.243.0/24
- 2001:67c:910::/48
- 2001:67c:9d8::/48
- 2001:67c:aa0::/48
- 2a14:7580:f500::/48
- 2a14:7580:f501::/48
- 2a14:7580:f510::/48
- 2a14:7580:f511::/48
- 2a14:7580:f520::/48
- 2a14:7580:f521::/48
- 2a14:7580:f530::/48
- 2a14:7580:f531::/48
- 2a14:7580:f540::/48
- 2a14:7580:f550::/48
- 2a14:7580:f551::/48
- 2a14:7580:f590::/48
- 2a14:7580:f591::/48
- 2a14:7580:f592::/48
- 2a14:7580:f593::/48
- 2a14:7580:f5ac::/48
Infrastructure presence
Facilities (42 total)
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- Equinix FR7 - Frankfurt, Gutleutstrasse
- Digital Realty Zurich ZUR1
- Equinix AM8 - Amsterdam, Gyroscoopweg
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- Digital Realty AMS17 - Amsterdam
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- Global Switch Amsterdam
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Equinix AM1/AM2 - Amsterdam, Luttenbergweg
- Iron Mountain Data Center - Amsterdam (AMS-1)
- colozueri.ch Zurich
- NTT Frankfurt 1 Data Center (FRA1)
- WIIT Datacenter DUS1, DUS2, DUS3, DUS4, DUS6, DUS7
- Hurricane Electric Fremont 2
- nLighten Amsterdam AMS1
- KoloDC NL1
- NorthC Amsterdam 1
- Equinix AM11 - Amsterdam, Lemelerbergweg
- Equinix AM5 - Amsterdam, Schepenbergweg
- NTT Zurich 1 Data Center (ZRH1)
- Equinix AM3 - Amsterdam, Science Park
- firstcolo - FRA4
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 8 of this network’s 8 ROAs.
- 185.214.243.0/24 · max length /24
- 2001:67c:910::/48 · max length /48
- 2001:67c:9d8::/48 · max length /48
- 2001:67c:aa0::/48 · max length /48
- 2a0b:4e07:c8::/46 · max length /48
- 2a0d:f9c0::/29 · max length /32
- 2a14:7580:f500::/40 · max length /48
- 2a14:ae00:8::/48 · max length /48
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS209990.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 256
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 1
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 22 of this network’s 22 BGP neighbours.
- SURFNET-NL - SURF B.V. · AS1103
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- COLOCLUE-AS - Netwerkvereniging Coloclue · AS8283
- GITOYEN-MAIN-AS - Association "Gitoyen" · AS20766
- SGGS-AS-AP - SG.GS · AS24482
- IP-Max - IP-Max SA · AS25091
- IELO - IELO-LIAZO SERVICES SAS · AS29075
- GNM-AS - Global Network Management Inc · AS31500
- MEER-AS - meerfarbig GmbH & Co. KG · AS34549
- iFog-GmbH - iFog GmbH · AS34927
- DCS1PTELTD-AS-AP - DCS1 Pte. Ltd. · AS37989
- AS_10VPN - 10VPN Research Network LTD · AS49134
- LWLCOM - LWLcom GmbH · AS50629
- PARADOXNETWORKS-LIMITED - ParadoxNetworks Limited · AS52025
- MELBICOM-EU-AS - Melbikomas UAB · AS56630
- EUTPNET - Marcin Gondek · AS56662
- SECUREBIT - Securebit AG · AS58057
- ITBYPASSION - Jens Thies · AS199854
- AMIRGT-AS - Youssef Hamed · AS207740
- XYPHEN - Innovation Harbor B.V. · AS211588
- LOWHOSTING-AS - Lowhosting services of Davide Gennari · AS212508
- BIXCE - BIXCE Inc · AS401753
Reputation
8.1reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS209990 (KARMUZ - Diyaaeldin Moustafa trading as Karmuz, NL) has a reputation score of 75.8 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 90.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Diyaaeldin Moustafa trading as Karmuz
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Tue, 02 Dec 2025 08:23:32 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@karmuz.net
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS209990 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.