Autonomous System
AS2153
Last fetched
AS2153 is operated by CENIC-2153 - CENIC, registered in US, and announces 12 prefixes to 29 BGP neighbours. AS2153 has a reputation score of 7.3 (REPUTABLE); 0 of its 3,072 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 12
- BGP neighbours
- 29
- RPKI ROAs
- 10
- MOAS conflicts
- 1
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 843
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 49
- Facilities
- 5
- Internet exchanges
- 1
- Customer degree
- 28
- Peer degree
- 13
- Provider degree
- 2
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.02
- Route leaks
- 1
Leak types observed: TYPE4_PEER_TO_PROVIDER.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (1 total)
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 10 ROAs.
- 137.164.17.0/24 · max length /24
- 137.164.25.0/24 · max length /24
- 137.164.26.0/23 · max length /23
- 137.164.28.0/24 · max length /24
- 205.154.51.0/24 · max length /24
- 209.129.60.0/24 · max length /24
- 209.129.61.0/24 · max length /24
- 2607:f380:4:4004::/64 · max length /64
- 2607:f380:4:4005::/64 · max length /64
- 2607:f380:4::/48 · max length /48
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS2153.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 3,072
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 10
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 29 BGP neighbours.
- CMU-ROUTER - Carnegie Mellon University · AS9
- AS24 - National Aeronautics and Space Administration · AS24
- CIT - California Institute of Technology · AS31
- UCLA - University of California, Los Angeles · AS52
- UCSB-NET-AS - University of California, Santa Barbara · AS131
- SDSC-AS - San Diego Supercomputer Center · AS195
- DNIC-AS-00257 - Navy Network Information Center (NNIC) · AS257
- UCINET-AS - University of California, Irvine · AS299
- ASN-LNET-AS - Los Nettos · AS567
- CSUFRESNO - California State University at Fresno · AS2037
- CENIC-2152 - CENIC · AS2152
- SINET-AS - Research Organization of Information and Systems, National Institute of Informatics · AS2907
- UCSF - University of California San Francisco · AS5653
- UCSC - University of California, Santa Cruz · AS5739
- UCR-EDU - University of California, Riverside · AS6106
- UCDAVIS-CORE - University of California, Davis · AS6192
- UCSD - University of California, San Diego · AS7377
- AARNET-AS-AP - Australian Academic and Research Network (AARNet) · AS7575
- CALPOLY-NET-ENS - California Polytechnic State University · AS7960
- INTERNET2-RESEARCH-EDU - Internet2 · AS11537
- UNIVERSITY-OF-CALIFORNIA-MERCED - University of California, Merced · AS22323
- OPTIPUTER - The Regents of the University of California - University of California, San Diego. · AS26397
- SCU-ASN - Santa Clara University · AS26488
- ABQG - New Mexico Lambda Rail, Inc. · AS40498
- CALPOLY-NETLAB - California Polytechnic State University · AS46357
MOAS / hijack watch
1 announced prefix conflict with AS2153 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
Reputation
7.3reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS2153 (CENIC-2153 - CENIC, US) has a reputation score of 78.3 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 90.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- CENIC
- RIR
- ARIN
- Registered
- Mon, 08 Jul 2024 21:00:24 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@cenic.org
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS2153 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.