Autonomous System
AS25184
Last fetched
AS25184 is operated by AFRANET - Afranet, registered in IR, and announces 236 prefixes to 36 BGP neighbours. AS25184 has a reputation score of 15.2 (NEUTRAL); 23 of its 58,112 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 236
- BGP neighbours
- 36
- RPKI ROAs
- 12
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 911
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 45
- Facilities
- 0
- Internet exchanges
- 0
- Customer degree
- 28
- Peer degree
- 3
- Provider degree
- 3
- 31.14.112.0/24
- 31.14.113.0/24
- 31.14.114.0/24
- 31.14.115.0/24
- 31.14.116.0/24
- 31.14.117.0/24
- 31.14.118.0/24
- 31.14.119.0/24
- 31.14.112.0/20
- 31.14.120.0/24
- 31.14.121.0/24
- 31.14.122.0/24
- 31.14.123.0/24
- 31.14.124.0/24
- 31.14.125.0/24
- 31.14.126.0/23
- 31.14.127.0/24
- 31.47.32.0/24
- 31.47.33.0/24
- 31.47.34.0/24
- 31.47.35.0/24
- 31.47.36.0/24
- 31.47.37.0/24
- 31.47.38.0/24
- 31.47.39.0/24
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.06
- Route leaks
- 3
Leak types observed: TYPE4_PEER_TO_PROVIDER.
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 12 ROAs.
- 185.3.124.0/22 · max length /24
- 217.11.16.0/20 · max length /24
- 2a03:4680::/29 · max length /64
- 31.14.112.0/20 · max length /24
- 31.47.32.0/19 · max length /24
- 46.102.128.0/20 · max length /24
- 78.109.192.0/20 · max length /24
- 79.175.128.0/18 · max length /24
- 80.75.0.0/20 · max length /24
- 81.90.144.0/20 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS25184.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 58,112
- Threat-listed addresses
- 23
- Threat density
- 0.0396 %
- Routed prefixes
- 230
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 36 BGP neighbours.
- Serverir - Mahdiar Rafiee · AS39368
- RESPINA-AS - Respina Networks & Beyond PJSC · AS42337
- NIOCI-AS - National Iranian Oil Company PJSC · AS42867
- RIPI - Research Institute Of Petroleum Industry · AS42907
- behpardaz - Behpardaz Jahan PJSC · AS43528
- Novin - Novin Insurance Co. PJS · AS43657
- AZMA-AS - Farhang Azma Communications Company LTD · AS44889
- DigiTurunc - Turunc Smart Bilgisayar Teknoloji Ve Dis Ticaret Limited Sirketi · AS48011
- tadbir-as - Tadbir Pardaz IT Group LTD · AS49099
- IR-ASRETELECOM-AS - Asr-e Enteghal-e Dadeha Company (Private J.S.) · AS49103
- TIC-GW-AS - Telecommunication Infrastructure Company · AS49666
- sina-as - Sina Bank · AS51460
- asan-as - Asan Pardakht Persian Co. LTD · AS57457
- Nrp-Network - Negah Roshan Pars Company (PJS) · AS58262
- Sarmadins-AS - Sarmad Insurance PJSC · AS59757
- PTC-AS - PERSIA TELECOM COMPANY · AS59884
- TSETMC - Tehran Securities Exchange Technology Management Co. PLC · AS60315
- ecdco - Damavand Electronic Card Company (Private J.S) · AS60605
- PARVASYSTEM - Vandad Vira Hooman LLC · AS60631
- Mahan-Air-AS - Mahan Air PJSC · AS62265
- Mojtaba-Imani - Seyed Mojtaba Imani · AS198596
- IRCAO - IR IRAN Civil Aviation Authority · AS201442
- PayaKianParham - Paya Kian Parham Co. (PJS) · AS203616
- Sotoon-Cloud-Infrastructure-DC2 - Hezardastan Unit Cloud Computing PJSC · AS204533
- SADADPSP-AS - Sadad Electronic Payment Company P.J.S. · AS205837
Reputation
15.2reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS25184 (AFRANET - Afranet, IR) has a reputation score of 59.7 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 44.1/100
- Graph metrics
- 80.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Afranet
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Mon, 26 Aug 2002 13:57:36 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@afranet.com
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS25184 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.