Autonomous System

AS264926

Last fetched Thu, 22 Oct 2026 12:41:33 GMT

AS264926 is operated by AS264926 - BRASILINK SERVICOS EIRELI, registered in BR, and announces 7 prefixes to 5 BGP neighbours. AS264926 has a reputation score of 18.0 (NEUTRAL); 2 of its 1,024 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.

Nutrition Label

Routing footprint

Announced prefixes: 7
BGP neighbours: 5
RPKI ROAs: 2
MOAS conflicts: 0
CAIDA AS-rank: 11,066
Customer-cone ASNs: 2
Facilities: 41
Internet exchanges: 2
Customer degree: 1
Peer degree: 26
Provider degree: 3

Route origin authorizations

A sample of 2 of this network’s 2 ROAs.

168.228.176.0/22 · max length /30
2804:3004::/32 · max length /128

Upstreams

The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS264926.

AS3356 · 5 shared paths
AS269194 · 5 shared paths
AS267331 · 4 shared paths
AS7195 · 3 shared paths
AS263327 · 3 shared paths

Blast radius

Announced IPv4 addresses: 1,024
Threat-listed addresses: 2
Threat density: 0.1953 %
Routed prefixes: 3

How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.

Peering ecosystem

A sample of 5 of this network’s 5 BGP neighbours.

Virtual Technologies & Solutions - Virtual Technologies & Solutions · AS37721
AS52573 - Une Telecom Ltda · AS52573
AS263327 - ONLINE TELECOMUNICACOES LTDA · AS263327
AS267331 - Onefibra Telecomunicacoes Ltda · AS267331
AS269194 - ST1 INTERNET · AS269194

Reputation

18.0reputation score (NEUTRAL)

AS264926 (AS264926 - BRASILINK SERVICOS EIRELI, BR) has a reputation score of 54.0 (NEUTRAL).

Threat density: 45.6/100
Graph metrics: 55.0/100
Historical behaviour: 85.0/100
Prefix age: 20.0/100

These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.

Registration

Registered to: BRASILINK SERVIÇOS EIRELI
RIR: LACNIC
Registered: Thu, 14 Apr 2016 11:53:38 GMT

Threat-feed evidence

Pivot from AS264926 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.

Queries

This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.


MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
     collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
     collect(co.name) AS countries,
     collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
     collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
     collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
     collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
     collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
     collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
     collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
     collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
       a.rir AS rir,
       a.orgName AS orgName,
       a.asRank AS asRank,
       a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
       a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
       a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
       a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
       a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
       a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
       a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
       a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
       a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
       a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
       a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
       a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
       a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
       a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
       a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
       operatorNames, countries, organizations,
       samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
       signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
       prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCount

Run yourself →

The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.


MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observations