Autonomous System
AS3269
Last fetched
AS3269 is operated by ASN-IBSNAZ - Telecom Italia S.p.A., registered in IT, and announces 316 prefixes to 163 BGP neighbours. AS3269 has a reputation score of 8.8 (REPUTABLE); 1,253 of its 19,890,176 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 316
- BGP neighbours
- 163
- RPKI ROAs
- 14
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 269
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 193
- Facilities
- 0
- Internet exchanges
- 0
- Customer degree
- 177
- Peer degree
- 28
- Provider degree
- 1
- 2.112.0.0/15
- 2.114.0.0/15
- 2.115.212.0/24
- 2.116.0.0/15
- 2.118.0.0/15
- 5.11.112.0/20
- 5.77.96.0/19
- 5.96.0.0/15
- 5.98.0.0/15
- 5.179.128.0/19
- 5.252.84.0/24
- 5.252.85.0/24
- 31.194.0.0/16
- 31.195.0.0/16
- 31.196.0.0/15
- 31.198.0.0/15
- 37.32.80.0/21
- 37.205.128.0/17
- 37.206.0.0/16
- 37.207.0.0/16
- 62.86.0.0/16
- 62.86.128.0/17
- 62.100.90.0/24
- 62.110.0.0/16
- 62.110.128.0/17
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.03
- Route leaks
- 1
Leak types observed: TYPE4_PEER_TO_PROVIDER.
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 14 ROAs.
- 198.179.134.0/23
- 198.199.5.0/24
- 212.210.0.0/16
- 80.105.0.0/16
- 193.104.86.0/24 · max length /24
- 193.207.192.0/20 · max length /20
- 193.207.208.0/20 · max length /20
- 193.207.224.0/21 · max length /21
- 193.207.232.0/21 · max length /21
- 193.207.240.0/22 · max length /22
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS3269.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 19,890,176
- Threat-listed addresses
- 1,253
- Threat density
- 0.0063 %
- Routed prefixes
- 315
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 163 BGP neighbours.
- NYU-DOMAIN - New York University · AS12
- ASN-VSIX - Universita di Padova · AS2593
- ACCENTURE - Accenture LLP · AS3573
- ASN-CSELT # AS-CSELT converted to ASN-CSELT for RPSL compliance - Telecom Italia S.p.A. · AS5609
- SEABONE-NET - TELECOM ITALIA SPARKLE S.p.A. · AS6762
- NETECOM - Net & Com s.r.l. · AS6831
- RTRT-PEGASO - Regione Toscana · AS6882
- ASN-ENI - ENI S.p.A. · AS8217
- SPARKLENET - TELECOM ITALIA SPARKLE S.p.A. · AS8244
- MATRIX-AS - Italiaonline S.p.A. · AS8660
- BPM - Banco BPM S.P.A · AS12505
- UNSPECIFIED - RS Advanced Systems S.R.L. · AS12515
- AS-ENEL-IT - ENEL S.p.A · AS12551
- Ilsole24ore - Il Sole 24 Ore SpA · AS12650
- FIAT-AS1 - Stellantis Auto SAS · AS12734
- ITGATE - IT.Gate S.p.A. · AS12779
- UNSPECIFIED - Banca Monte Dei Paschi Di Siena S.P.A. · AS13018
- ISP-ASn4 - Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A. · AS13253
- SIAG - Informatica Alto Adige Spa · AS15584
- FINDOMESTIC-AS - Findomestic Banca S.p.A. · AS15660
- LEONET-AS-IT - UAN COMPANY S.R.L. · AS15691
- ASN-MERCURIO72 - IL SENTIERO SERVIZI SOC.COOP. A R.L. · AS15746
- CSEBO-NET - CSEBO-NET · AS15981
- ASN-SELECTA - ASN-SELECTA · AS16052
- ASN-TIM - Telecom Italia S.p.A. · AS16232
Reputation
8.8reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS3269 (ASN-IBSNAZ - Telecom Italia S.p.A., IT) has a reputation score of 73.6 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 83.8/100
- Graph metrics
- 80.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Telecom Italia S.p.A.
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Mon, 05 Aug 2002 10:21:26 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@business.telecomitalia.it
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS3269 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.