Autonomous System
AS41009
Last fetched
AS41009 is operated by VIZITNETUA-AS - Oleksandr Melnyk, registered in UA, and announces 8 prefixes to 10 BGP neighbours. AS41009 has a reputation score of 29.1 (SUSPICIOUS); 3 of its 2,560 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 8
- BGP neighbours
- 10
- RPKI ROAs
- 3
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 2,059
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 15
- Facilities
- 34
- Internet exchanges
- 8
- Customer degree
- 10
- Peer degree
- 9
- Provider degree
- 4
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (8 total)
Facilities (34 total)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- NewTelco Kiev
- LIM Warsaw
- Ucomline Kiev
- Datagroup Kiev
- TSUA
- Equinix WA1 - Warsaw, Centrum LIM
- TOPNET/UA/Krivonosa27
- TOPNET/UA/Leontovicha9
- DATALINE/UA/Leontovicha9
- 9 Leontovicha
- Datasfera
- ATMAN Data Center Warsaw-2 (WAW-2, Konstruktorska 5)
- ATMAN Data Center Warsaw-1 (WAW-1, Grochowska 21A)
- OD-IX
- BeMobile
- Omega Telecom Kyiv
- Omega Telecom Dnipro
- IF-IX
- KievNet/L9
- UARNet Lviv
- Giganet
- Data Center G50
- DTEL-IX K21
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 3 of this network’s 3 ROAs.
- 46.229.55.0/24 · max length /24
- 46.229.63.0/24 · max length /24
- 80.71.158.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS41009.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 2,560
- Threat-listed addresses
- 3
- Threat density
- 0.1172 %
- Routed prefixes
- 7
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 10 of this network’s 10 BGP neighbours.
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- RETN-AS - RETN Limited · AS9002
- DATALINE-AS - Dataline LLC · AS35297
- LIKONET-AS - Lushchan Evgenij Ivanovich · AS41229
- DTEL-IX-PUBLIC-AS - Digital Telecom IX LLC · AS43380
- ORIONCITY-AS - Orion City LLC · AS43744
- gmhost - Mulgin Alexander Sergeevich · AS201094
- EURO-NET-AS - PP "Euronet" · AS205127
- D2CLOUD-ZA-AS - D2CLOUD NETWORK SERVICES (PTY) LTD · AS210555
- KREMEN-IX - PP Vizit-Service · AS211947
Reputation
29.1reputation score (SUSPICIOUS)
AS41009 (VIZITNETUA-AS - Oleksandr Melnyk, UA) has a reputation score of 40.9 (SUSPICIOUS). This ASN shows suspicious characteristics.
- Threat density
- 47.5/100
- Graph metrics
- 55.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 30.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Oleksandr Melnyk
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Tue, 30 May 2006 11:31:30 GMT
- Abuse contact
- oleksandr.melnyk@vizit-net.com
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS41009 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.