Autonomous System
AS41913
Last fetched
AS41913 is operated by COMPUTERLINE - Computerline GmbH, registered in CH, and announces 16 prefixes to 7 BGP neighbours. AS41913 has a reputation score of 11.7 (NEUTRAL); 0 of its 7,680 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 16
- BGP neighbours
- 7
- RPKI ROAs
- 11
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 6,685
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 3
- Facilities
- 32
- Internet exchanges
- 3
- Customer degree
- 2
- Peer degree
- 114
- Provider degree
- 3
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (3 total)
Facilities (32 total)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Equinix ZH2 - Zurich
- Digital Realty Zurich ZUR1
- Digital Realty AMS3/5/7/8/10 - Amsterdam
- Global Switch Amsterdam
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
- Digital Realty AMS17 - Amsterdam
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- IWB Datacenter Basel
- Equinix HK1 - Hong Kong
- colobern.ch Bern
- colozueri.ch Zurich
- Equinix AM1/AM2 - Amsterdam, Luttenbergweg
- Iron Mountain Data Center - Amsterdam (AMS-1)
- Hutchinson HK
- Smartdc Rotterdam
- Equinix GV2 - Geneva, West
- Equinix ZH4 - Zurich
- NorthC Amsterdam 1
- Green Datacenter ZRH1 (fka: Green Lupfig)
- Green Datacenter ZRH4 (fka: Green Glattbrugg)
- NTT Zurich 1 Data Center (ZRH1)
- Equinix AM5 - Amsterdam, Schepenbergweg
- Equinix AM3 - Amsterdam, Science Park
- HGC - Sino Favour Centre
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 11 ROAs.
- 136.143.168.0/23 · max length /23
- 185.172.198.0/23 · max length /24
- 185.20.208.0/22 · max length /24
- 2a01:278::/32 · max length /32
- 89.36.170.0/23 · max length /24
- 91.103.152.0/23 · max length /23
- 91.103.154.0/23 · max length /23
- 91.135.64.0/20 · max length /24
- 91.135.68.0/24 · max length /24
- 91.135.76.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS41913.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 7,680
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 13
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 7 of this network’s 7 BGP neighbours.
- CENTURYLINK-LEGACY-LVLT-202 - Level 3 Parent, LLC · AS202
- LEVEL3 - Level 3 Parent, LLC · AS3356
- DIAG-AS - Diag Dienstleistungen AG · AS5529
- LibertyGlobal - Liberty Global Europe Holding B.V. · AS6830
- HUTCHISON-AS-AP - HGC Global Communications Limited · AS9304
- TKSWF-AS - Stadtwerke Feldkirch · AS48362
- UCSP - UCSP Schweiz AG · AS60384
Reputation
11.7reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS41913 (COMPUTERLINE - Computerline GmbH, CH) has a reputation score of 66.5 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 74.3/100
- Graph metrics
- 65.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Computerline GmbH
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Wed, 15 Nov 2006 09:42:10 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse-net@computerline.com
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS41913 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.