Autonomous System
AS42201
Last fetched
AS42201 is operated by PVDataNet - PVDataNet AB, registered in SE, and announces 24 prefixes to 2 BGP neighbours. AS42201 has a reputation score of 22.2 (SUSPICIOUS); 103 of its 3,840 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 24
- BGP neighbours
- 2
- RPKI ROAs
- 10
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 21,552
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 1
- Facilities
- 24
- Internet exchanges
- 2
- Customer degree
- 0
- Peer degree
- 20
- Provider degree
- 2
- 45.130.84.0/24
- 45.130.85.0/24
- 45.130.86.0/24
- 45.130.87.0/24
- 45.148.4.0/24
- 45.148.5.0/24
- 45.148.6.0/24
- 91.240.64.0/24
- 91.240.65.0/24
- 91.240.66.0/24
- 192.121.246.0/24
- 193.104.211.0/24
- 193.104.222.0/24
- 193.181.35.0/24
- 194.132.123.0/24
- 2a10:a000::/48
- 2a10:a000:1::/48
- 2a10:a000:2::/48
- 2a10:a000:3::/48
- 2a10:a000:4::/48
- 2a10:a000:5::/48
- 2a10:a000:6::/48
- 2a10:a000:7::/48
- 2a10:a000:8::/48
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (2 total)
Facilities (24 total)
- Equinix NY2/NY4/NY5/NY6 - New York, Secaucus
- Digital Realty Paris PAR2
- Digital Realty London LHR21 (closed)
- Digital Realty Zurich ZUR1
- Digital Realty AMS3/5/7/8/10 - Amsterdam
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA28 (Closed)
- Digital Realty Copenhagen CPH1-3
- Digital Realty Madrid MAD1-2
- Equinix SK1 - Stockholm, Bromma
- Digital Realty Stockholm STO1-6
- CarrierColo Berlin Luetzow (I/P/B/ site B)
- Equinix SK2 - Stockholm, Sköndal
- STOKAB KN7, Östermalm
- GlobalConnect Sätra
- Glesys Stockholm 1
- Stockholm/C
- Stockholm/B
- Web Werks Mumbai 1
- Retelit Avalon 1
- Equinix TR2 - Toronto
- Vaultica Data Centers | STO01
- Obenet Kista Gate
- Conapto Stockholm Nord (Sollentuna)
- Conapto Stockholm Syd (Sätra)
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 10 ROAs.
- 192.121.245.0/24 · max length /24
- 192.121.246.0/24 · max length /24
- 193.104.211.0/24 · max length /24
- 193.104.222.0/24 · max length /24
- 193.181.35.0/24 · max length /24
- 194.132.123.0/24 · max length /24
- 2a10:a000::/44 · max length /48
- 45.130.84.0/22 · max length /24
- 45.148.4.0/22 · max length /24
- 91.240.64.0/22 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS42201.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 3,840
- Threat-listed addresses
- 103
- Threat density
- 2.6823 %
- Routed prefixes
- 15
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 2 of this network’s 2 BGP neighbours.
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- RETN-AS - RETN Limited · AS9002
Reputation
22.2reputation score (SUSPICIOUS)
AS42201 (PVDataNet - PVDataNet AB, SE) has a reputation score of 47.8 (SUSPICIOUS). This ASN shows suspicious characteristics.
- Threat density
- 27.9/100
- Graph metrics
- 55.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- PVDataNet AB
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Fri, 25 Sep 2020 11:41:56 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@pvdatanet.com
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS42201 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.