Autonomous System
AS43754
Last fetched
AS43754 is operated by ASIATECH - Asiatech Data Transmission company, registered in IR, and announces 332 prefixes to 89 BGP neighbours. AS43754 has a reputation score of 17.8 (NEUTRAL); 57 of its 210,176 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 332
- BGP neighbours
- 89
- RPKI ROAs
- 416
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 442
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 108
- Facilities
- 0
- Internet exchanges
- 0
- Customer degree
- 86
- Peer degree
- 0
- Provider degree
- 1
- 5.63.11.0/24
- 5.134.192.0/22
- 5.134.192.0/21
- 5.230.17.0/24
- 31.7.64.0/22
- 31.7.67.0/24
- 31.7.68.0/23
- 31.7.70.0/24
- 31.7.70.0/23
- 31.7.64.0/20
- 31.7.72.0/24
- 31.7.72.0/23
- 31.7.72.0/22
- 31.7.76.0/22
- 31.7.78.0/24
- 31.25.128.0/22
- 31.25.128.0/21
- 31.25.132.0/22
- 31.216.62.0/24
- 37.156.8.0/22
- 37.156.8.0/21
- 37.156.12.0/22
- 37.156.144.0/24
- 37.156.144.0/23
- 37.156.145.0/24
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 416 ROAs.
- 109.122.224.0/20 · max length /32
- 109.122.224.0/21 · max length /21
- 109.122.232.0/21 · max length /21
- 128.65.176.0/20 · max length /32
- 128.65.176.0/21 · max length /21
- 128.65.184.0/21 · max length /21
- 152.89.44.0/22 · max length /24
- 164.215.128.0/17 · max length /32
- 176.65.240.0/22 · max length /32
- 176.65.241.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS43754.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 210,176
- Threat-listed addresses
- 57
- Threat density
- 0.0271 %
- Routed prefixes
- 317
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 89 BGP neighbours.
- UoKashan - University of Kashan · AS16286
- MORVA-AS - Morva System Engineering Technical Company Private Joint Stock · AS31476
- SABA-HOST - Saba Abr Mizban LLC · AS34412
- Part-Financial-Information-Processing - Part Financial Information Processing Co. · AS34871
- Alibaba-Travels-Company - Alibaba Travel Company (LTD) · AS34947
- ALLAMEH-UNIVERSITY-AS - Allameh Tabataba'i University · AS35043
- ASK-AS - ANDISHE SABZ KHAZAR CO. P.J.S. · AS39308
- EDGE-NETWORK - Asiatech Data Transmission company · AS41689
- Fanava-AS - Fanava Group · AS41881
- miz - Behin Ertebatat Faragir Co. Ltd · AS42468
- digikala - Noavaran Fan Avazeh Co. PJS · AS43211
- SITSCO-AS - Secure Infrastructure of Transactional Services Company PJSC · AS43415
- MEHVARMACHINE-AS - Mehvar Machine · AS43510
- SEFROYEKPARDAZENG-AS - Sefroyek Pardaz Engineering PJSC · AS44285
- IR-FCP - Ertebatat Sabet Parsian Co. PJS · AS44400
- SABAIDEA - Fannavaran-e Idea Pardaz-e Saba PJSC · AS44932
- HAMARA-AS - Hamara System Tabriz Engineering Company · AS47262
- WGB-LLC - Web Gostaran Bandar Company (PJS) · AS47376
- SEFROYEKPARDAZENG-AS - Sefroyek Pardaz Engineering PJSC · AS48715
- MehrFCP - Rasaneh Mehr Vatan Co. PJS · AS48903
- tadbir-as - Tadbir Pardaz IT Group LTD · AS49099
- IR-THR-PTE - Pishgaman Toseeh Ertebatat Company (Private Joint Stock) · AS49100
- RAYAZMA-AS - Pardazeshgar Ray Azma Co. Ltd. · AS49847
- Parvaz-System - Parvaz System Information Technology Company (Ltd) · AS50057
- Mobinnet-AS - Mobin Net Communication Company (Private Joint Stock) · AS50810
Reputation
17.8reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS43754 (ASIATECH - Asiatech Data Transmission company, IR) has a reputation score of 54.5 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 47.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 55.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Asiatech Data Transmission company
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Mon, 24 Sep 2007 09:43:57 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@asiatech.ir
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS43754 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.