Autonomous System
AS48213
Last fetched
AS48213 is operated by ABICOM - ABICOM SAS, registered in FR, and announces 4 prefixes to 16 BGP neighbours. AS48213 has a reputation score of 9.4 (REPUTABLE); 0 of its 2,304 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 4
- BGP neighbours
- 16
- RPKI ROAs
- 4
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 7,098
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 3
- Facilities
- 49
- Internet exchanges
- 4
- Customer degree
- 2
- Peer degree
- 43
- Provider degree
- 3
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (4 total)
Facilities (49 total)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Telehouse - London (Docklands East)
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Digital Realty Paris PAR2
- Equinix PA5 - Paris, Victor Hugo
- Equinix FR7 - Frankfurt, Gutleutstrasse
- Equinix PA7 - Paris, Energy Park
- Equinix ZH2 - Zurich
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- UltraEdge Lyon-Venissieux
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- Digital Realty AMS17 - Amsterdam
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- UltraEdge Bordeaux
- Digital Realty Marseille MRS1/2/3/4
- Equinix PA2 - Paris, Saint-Denis
- NTT Frankfurt 1 Data Center (FRA1)
- Equinix AM1/AM2 - Amsterdam, Luttenbergweg
- CERN Geneva
- OPCORE - DC2 / PAR2
- Telehouse - Paris 3 (Magny)
- Equinix FR4 - Frankfurt, West
- Digital Realty Paris PAR5
- Equinix PA3 - Paris, Saint-Denis
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 4 of this network’s 4 ROAs.
- 185.135.236.0/22 · max length /22
- 213.232.226.0/24 · max length /24
- 2a07:980::/29 · max length /29
- 45.13.172.0/22 · max length /22
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS48213.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 2,304
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 3
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 16 of this network’s 16 BGP neighbours.
- AS3215 - Orange S.A. · AS3215
- VERIXI - VERIXI SA · AS6696
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- NEO-ASN - Zayo Infrastructure France SA · AS8218
- ITGATE - IT.Gate S.p.A. · AS12779
- GITOYEN-MAIN-AS - Association "Gitoyen" · AS20766
- SGGS-AS-AP - SG.GS · AS24482
- HIVANE - Hivane Association · AS34019
- iFog-GmbH - iFog GmbH · AS34927
- Virtual Technologies & Solutions - Virtual Technologies & Solutions · AS37721
- FRANCE-IX-L3P - France IX Services SASU · AS39801
- D-LAKE - D-LAKE SAS · AS49028
- Leonix-Telecom - Leonix Telecom SAS · AS50628
- Cloudeo-AS - OCI Cloud SAS · AS61136
- GRIFON - Association GRIFON · AS204092
- INFRASH - Alexandre PELISSIER · AS211492
Reputation
9.4reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS48213 (ABICOM - ABICOM SAS, FR) has a reputation score of 71.7 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 71.2/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- ABICOM SAS
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Mon, 07 Mar 2022 14:07:07 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@abicom.fr
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS48213 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.