Autonomous System
AS48287
Last fetched
AS48287 is operated by RU-CENTER - JSC "RU-CENTER", registered in RU, and announces 40 prefixes to 12 BGP neighbours. AS48287 has a reputation score of 12.5 (NEUTRAL); 8 of its 28,672 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 40
- BGP neighbours
- 12
- RPKI ROAs
- 34
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 2,932
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 9
- Facilities
- 26
- Internet exchanges
- 4
- Customer degree
- 8
- Peer degree
- 10
- Provider degree
- 2
- 31.177.64.0/22
- 31.177.68.0/22
- 31.177.76.0/24
- 31.177.78.0/23
- 31.177.80.0/24
- 31.177.84.0/24
- 31.177.91.0/24
- 31.177.92.0/22
- 89.104.80.0/21
- 89.111.128.0/24
- 89.111.130.0/24
- 89.111.132.0/23
- 89.111.144.0/22
- 89.111.148.0/22
- 89.111.156.0/22
- 89.111.164.0/24
- 91.189.114.0/23
- 91.189.112.0/21
- 91.189.116.0/22
- 91.217.20.0/24
- 109.70.24.0/24
- 109.70.25.0/24
- 109.70.26.0/23
- 109.70.24.0/21
- 109.70.30.0/23
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (4 total)
Facilities (26 total)
- Moscow M9
- Linxdatacenter (Moscow)
- CSS MPS Moscow
- Moscow M10
- Moscow CSS MPS
- Bolshaya Morskaya 18
- LVRTC TV Tower
- Telia Telehouse KJJ
- Digita Helsinki Pasila Broadcasting Tower
- IVC ORW Saint-Petersburg
- Tsvetochnaya Data Center
- Moscow TehnoGorod
- StoreData
- Raduga-2
- M100 datacenter Moscow, Varshavskoe 125
- IXcellerate MOS1
- DataSpace Moscow
- Miran-1
- DataLine Moscow DC NORD
- DataLine Moscow DC OST
- KIAEHOUSE
- Xelent
- INFONET DC
- Data-Center IMAQLIQ
- BONCH-IT
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 34 ROAs.
- 109.70.24.0/21 · max length /24
- 178.210.64.0/19 · max length /24
- 185.26.112.0/22 · max length /22
- 185.76.144.0/22 · max length /22
- 195.24.64.0/22 · max length /22
- 195.24.68.0/22 · max length /22
- 195.24.68.0/23 · max length /23
- 195.24.70.0/24 · max length /24
- 195.24.71.0/24 · max length /24
- 2a02:2090:1::/48 · max length /48
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS48287.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 28,672
- Threat-listed addresses
- 8
- Threat density
- 0.0279 %
- Routed prefixes
- 40
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 12 of this network’s 12 BGP neighbours.
- RU-CENTER-AS - JSC "RU-CENTER" · AS5537
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- RU-CENTER-AS - JSC "RU-CENTER" · AS39494
- HCRU-AS - JSC "RU-CENTER" · AS42399
- ANYCAST-AS - JSC "RU-CENTER" · AS43489
- SWEB-AS - SpaceWeb Ltd · AS44112
- ZAO-RU-NIC-AS - JSC "RU-CENTER" · AS47595
- TRUENETWORK - Truenetwork LLC · AS49673
- FAITID-AS - Foundation for Assistance for Internet Technologies and Infrastructure Development · AS60216
- FAITID-AS - Foundation for Assistance for Internet Technologies and Infrastructure Development · AS199472
- CIREX - Telecom-Birzha, LLC · AS199599
- AS-SERVICEPIPE - SERVICEPIPE LLC · AS201706
Reputation
12.5reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS48287 (RU-CENTER - JSC "RU-CENTER", RU) has a reputation score of 65.0 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 66.4/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- JSC "RU-CENTER"
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Tue, 04 Nov 2008 14:06:13 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@nic.ru
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS48287 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.