Autonomous System
AS48374
Last fetched
AS48374 is operated by GOBLER-AS - MH HOLDING AF 1. JUNI 2009 ApS, registered in DK, and announces 4 prefixes to 20 BGP neighbours. AS48374 has a reputation score of 15.8 (NEUTRAL); 0 of its 2,048 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 4
- BGP neighbours
- 20
- RPKI ROAs
- 4
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 7,349
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 3
- Facilities
- 85
- Internet exchanges
- 3
- Customer degree
- 2
- Peer degree
- 12
- Provider degree
- 2
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.02
- Route leaks
- 1
Leak types observed: TYPE3_PROVIDER_TO_PEER.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (3 total)
Facilities (85 total)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Equinix LD8 - London, Docklands
- Digital Realty London LHR20
- Telehouse - London (Docklands East)
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Equinix AM8 - Amsterdam, Gyroscoopweg
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Digital Realty AMS17 - Amsterdam
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- ITENOS Frankfurt (FRA1)
- Digital Realty BRU1 - Brussels
- Digital Realty AMS3/5/7/8/10 - Amsterdam
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
- Global Switch Amsterdam
- Telehouse - Frankfurt
- EdgeConneX Munich (EDCMUC01)
- Digital Realty Dusseldorf DUS1-3
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- Digital Realty Copenhagen CPH1-3
- Equinix EN1 - Enschede
- Digital Realty Dublin DUB1-2
- Speedbone Berlin
- NorthC Duesseldorf
- GlobalConnect Taastrup 1 (CPH1)
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 4 of this network’s 4 ROAs.
- 185.141.144.0/22 · max length /22
- 185.168.180.0/22 · max length /22
- 2a07:2500::/29 · max length /29
- 2a10:abc0::/29 · max length /29
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS48374.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 2,048
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 2
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 20 of this network’s 20 BGP neighbours.
- SURFNET-NL - SURF B.V. · AS1103
- KPN - KPN B.V. · AS1136
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- GTT-BACKBONE - GTT Communications Inc. · AS3257
- RIPE-NCC-AS - Reseaux IP Europeens Network Coordination Centre (RIPE NCC) · AS3333
- STARHUB-INTERNET - StarHub Ltd · AS4657
- VERIXI - VERIXI SA · AS6696
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- NL-BIT - BIT BV · AS12859
- CONVERGE-AS - Converge ICT Solutions Inc. · AS17639
- TRANSTELECOM - Joint Stock Company TransTeleCom · AS20485
- GITOYEN-MAIN-AS - Association "Gitoyen" · AS20766
- SGGS-AS-AP - SG.GS · AS24482
- CORE-BACKBONE - Core-Backbone GmbH · AS33891
- HIVANE - Hivane Association · AS34019
- Virtual Technologies & Solutions - Virtual Technologies & Solutions · AS37721
- team_blue - team.blue NV · AS48185
- Serverius-as - Serverius Holding B.V. · AS50673
- GRIFON - Association GRIFON · AS204092
- TDH-NET - TDH-Net ApS · AS204988
Reputation
15.8reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS48374 (GOBLER-AS - MH HOLDING AF 1. JUNI 2009 ApS, DK) has a reputation score of 58.4 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 76.2/100
- Graph metrics
- 30.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- MH HOLDING AF 1. JUNI 2009 ApS
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Thu, 03 Mar 2016 12:14:36 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@gobler.net
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS48374 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.