Autonomous System

AS50869

Last fetched Wed, 21 Oct 2026 13:33:09 GMT

AS50869 is operated by FREEIX-REMOTE - IPng Networks GmbH, registered in CH, and announces 4 prefixes to 6 BGP neighbours. AS50869 has a reputation score of 25.0 (SUSPICIOUS); 0 of its 0 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.

Nutrition Label

Routing footprint

Announced prefixes: 4
BGP neighbours: 6
RPKI ROAs: 3
MOAS conflicts: 0
CAIDA AS-rank: 305
Customer-cone ASNs: 168
Facilities: 52
Internet exchanges: 10
Customer degree: 56
Peer degree: 42
Provider degree: 0

Infrastructure presence

Internet exchanges (10 total)

Route origin authorizations

A sample of 3 of this network’s 3 ROAs.

194.126.235.0/24 · max length /24
2a0b:dd80:3100::/40 · max length /48
92.119.38.0/24 · max length /24

Upstreams

The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS50869.

AS49432 · 2 shared paths
AS34927 · 2 shared paths
AS31543 · 1 shared path
AS34019 · 1 shared path
AS215510 · 1 shared path

Blast radius

Announced IPv4 addresses: 0
Threat-listed addresses: 0
Threat density: 0.0000 %
Routed prefixes: 0

How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: no-routed-space.

Peering ecosystem

A sample of 6 of this network’s 6 BGP neighbours.

DNET - Antonios A. Chariton · AS4601
INTERDOTLINK - Inter.link GmbH · AS5405
HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
HIVANE - Hivane Association · AS34019
iFog-GmbH - iFog GmbH · AS34927
INALAN - MEDIANET INVEST AE · AS200736

Reputation

25.0reputation score (SUSPICIOUS)

AS50869 (FREEIX-REMOTE - IPng Networks GmbH, CH) has a reputation score of 45.0 (SUSPICIOUS). This ASN shows suspicious characteristics.

Threat density: 50.0/100
Graph metrics: 55.0/100
Historical behaviour: 50.0/100
Prefix age: 20.0/100

These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.

Registration

Registered to: IPng Networks GmbH
RIR: RIPE
Registered: Tue, 09 Jun 2020 06:43:02 GMT
Abuse contact: abuse@ipng.ch

This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.

Threat-feed evidence

Pivot from AS50869 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.

Queries

This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.


MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
     collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
     collect(co.name) AS countries,
     collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
     collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
     collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
     collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
     collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
     collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
     collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
     collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
       a.rir AS rir,
       a.orgName AS orgName,
       a.asRank AS asRank,
       a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
       a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
       a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
       a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
       a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
       a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
       a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
       a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
       a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
       a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
       a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
       a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
       a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
       a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
       a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
       operatorNames, countries, organizations,
       samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
       signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
       prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCount

Run yourself →

The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.


MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observations