Autonomous System
AS51178
Last fetched
AS51178 is operated by AVANTEL-SPB-AS - JSC "ER-Telecom Holding", registered in RU, and announces 15 prefixes to 18 BGP neighbours. AS51178 has a reputation score of 9.3 (REPUTABLE); 1 of its 7,168 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 15
- BGP neighbours
- 18
- RPKI ROAs
- 2
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 1,976
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 16
- Facilities
- 70
- Internet exchanges
- 13
- Customer degree
- 14
- Peer degree
- 23
- Provider degree
- 12
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (13 total)
Facilities (70 total)
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Digital Realty VIE1/2 - Vienna
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- Speedbone Berlin
- Equinix SK1 - Stockholm, Bromma
- Moscow M9
- Digital Realty Marseille MRS1/2/3/4
- CE Colo Prague
- Digital Realty Stockholm STO1-6
- Dataplex Budapest
- Linxdatacenter (Moscow)
- CSS MPS Moscow
- NewTelco Kiev
- NXDATA-1 Bucharest (BUH1)
- Ucomline Kiev
- Moscow M10
- LIM Warsaw
- Sitel Bratislava
- Equinix WA1 - Warsaw, Centrum LIM
- Moscow CSS MPS
- TELEPOINT Sofia Centre
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 2 of this network’s 2 ROAs.
- 93.88.172.0/22 · max length /22
- 93.88.175.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS51178.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 7,168
- Threat-listed addresses
- 1
- Threat density
- 0.0140 %
- Routed prefixes
- 14
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 18 of this network’s 18 BGP neighbours.
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- RETN-AS - RETN Limited · AS9002
- ERTH-TRANSIT-AS - JSC "ER-Telecom Holding" · AS9049
- TRANSTELECOM - Joint Stock Company TransTeleCom · AS20485
- CITYTELECOM-AS - Citytelecom LLC · AS29076
- PETERSERVICE - JSC Neksain · AS48102
- GIGAHOST - Gigahost AS · AS56655
- RETNRU-AS - JSC "RetnNet" · AS57304
- RMRS-AS - FAI Russian Maritime Register of Shipping · AS59399
- IQWEB - IQWeb FZ-LLC · AS59692
- ASH-AS - ASH Ltd · AS62330
- CKR-AS - "Center of Computor Research" JSC · AS199072
- Livetex - Omnichannel technologies LLC · AS200015
- AS-SERVICEPIPE - SERVICEPIPE LLC · AS201706
- ETM - Feniks JSC · AS202537
- ASARTA-SPB-AS - ASARTA LLC · AS204272
- csi - LLC Crystal Service Integration · AS204891
- CDEK4-AS - CDEK-Global LLC · AS210787
Reputation
9.3reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS51178 (AVANTEL-SPB-AS - JSC "ER-Telecom Holding", RU) has a reputation score of 72.0 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 72.1/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- JSC Avantel
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Mon, 27 Sep 2010 12:57:12 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@spb.avantel.ru
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS51178 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.