Autonomous System
AS5385
Last fetched
AS5385 is operated by RUSSMEDIA-IT - Russmedia IT GmbH, registered in AT, and announces 10 prefixes to 11 BGP neighbours. AS5385 has a reputation score of 8.9 (REPUTABLE); 2 of its 67,584 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 10
- BGP neighbours
- 11
- RPKI ROAs
- 264
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 2,900
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 9
- Facilities
- 22
- Internet exchanges
- 3
- Customer degree
- 8
- Peer degree
- 61
- Provider degree
- 3
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (3 total)
Facilities (22 total)
- Digital Realty VIE1/2 - Vienna
- Vienna University Computer Center (Wien)
- Equinix ZH2 - Zurich
- Digital Realty Zurich ZUR1
- IWB Datacenter Basel
- colobern.ch Bern
- colozueri.ch Zurich
- Equinix ZH4 - Zurich
- LKW Kollokation TZ Eschen
- Green Datacenter ZRH4 (fka: Green Glattbrugg)
- Green Datacenter ZRH1 (fka: Green Lupfig)
- Datacenter-Feldkirch
- NTT Zurich 1 Data Center (ZRH1)
- Equinix ZH5 - Zurich, South
- NTT Vienna1 Data Center (VIE1)
- Green Datacenter ZRH3 (fka: Green Schlieren)
- Datacenter Stadtwerk Konstanz
- Rechenzentrum Ostschweiz
- Datacenter Weidach
- Datacenter Thurgau
- Green Datacenter ZRH2 (fka: Green Dielsdorf)
- TeleData - Umspannwerk Jettenhausen
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 264 ROAs.
- 194.183.128.0/19 · max length /19
- 194.183.128.0/24 · max length /24
- 194.183.129.0/24 · max length /24
- 194.183.130.0/24 · max length /24
- 194.183.131.0/24 · max length /24
- 194.183.132.0/24 · max length /24
- 194.183.133.0/24 · max length /24
- 194.183.134.0/24 · max length /24
- 194.183.135.0/24 · max length /24
- 194.183.136.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS5385.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 67,584
- Threat-listed addresses
- 2
- Threat density
- 0.0030 %
- Routed prefixes
- 7
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 11 of this network’s 11 BGP neighbours.
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- RETN-AS - RETN Limited · AS9002
- WEISS-ASN - Gebrueder-Weiss GmbH · AS24824
- CORE-BACKBONE - Core-Backbone GmbH · AS33891
- SCHALLERT-AS - Dominic Schallert trading as schallert.com e.U. · AS49432
- ZUERS-AT_AS - Zuers.net Betriebs GmbH · AS197082
- OFFSET-AT-AS - VBG Immo GmbH · AS197198
- EWF - Elektrizitaetswerke Frastanz GmbH · AS197917
- GANTNER - Gantner Electronic GmbH · AS208082
- HIF - Heron Innovations Factory GmbH · AS214335
Reputation
8.9reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS5385 (RUSSMEDIA-IT - Russmedia IT GmbH, AT) has a reputation score of 73.3 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 90.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 80.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Russmedia IT GmbH
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Thu, 11 Apr 2002 22:25:34 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@tele.net
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS5385 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.