Autonomous System
AS5467
Last fetched
AS5467 is operated by MIPT - Non state educational institution "Educational Scientific and Experimental Center of Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology", registered in RU, and announces 7 prefixes to 14 BGP neighbours. AS5467 has a reputation score of 14.2 (NEUTRAL); 2 of its 8,448 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 7
- BGP neighbours
- 14
- RPKI ROAs
- 1
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 3,876
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 6
- Facilities
- 56
- Internet exchanges
- 4
- Customer degree
- 4
- Peer degree
- 27
- Provider degree
- 4
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (4 total)
Facilities (56 total)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Digital Realty VIE1/2 - Vienna
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- Moscow M9
- Speedbone Berlin
- Equinix SK1 - Stockholm, Bromma
- Digital Realty Stockholm STO1-6
- CE Colo Prague
- Digital Realty Marseille MRS1/2/3/4
- Dataplex Budapest
- Linxdatacenter (Moscow)
- NewTelco Kiev
- CSS MPS Moscow
- NXDATA-1 Bucharest (BUH1)
- LIM Warsaw
- Sitel Bratislava
- Moscow M10
- Moscow CSS MPS
- Ucomline Kiev
- Equinix WA1 - Warsaw, Centrum LIM
- Bolshaya Morskaya 18
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 1 of this network’s 1 ROAs.
- 93.175.0.0/19 · max length /32
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS5467.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 8,448
- Threat-listed addresses
- 2
- Threat density
- 0.0237 %
- Routed prefixes
- 7
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 14 of this network’s 14 BGP neighbours.
- NETROUTING-AS - Netrouting B.V. · AS6206
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- COMCOR-AS - JSC Comcor · AS8732
- SGGS-AS-AP - SG.GS · AS24482
- IP-Max - IP-Max SA · AS25091
- MIPT-NET - Non state educational institution "Educational Scientific and Experimental Center of Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology" · AS25100
- Fiord-AS - Fiord Networks, UAB · AS28917
- GNM-AS - Global Network Management Inc · AS31500
- INETCOM - INETCOM CARRIER LLC · AS35598
- Virtual Technologies & Solutions - Virtual Technologies & Solutions · AS37721
- LOFIS-AS - PE Filimonov Boris Yurievich · AS42892
- TRUENETWORK - Truenetwork LLC · AS49673
- Serverius-as - Serverius Holding B.V. · AS50673
- OKNO-TV-AS - Okno-TV LLC · AS61396
Reputation
14.2reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS5467 (MIPT - Non state educational institution "Educational Scientific and Experimental Center of Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology", RU) has a reputation score of 61.6 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 49.7/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Thu, 08 Aug 2002 12:31:36 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@mipt.ru
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS5467 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.