Autonomous System

AS5524

Last fetched Wed, 21 Oct 2026 08:03:39 GMT

AS5524 is operated by BREEDBANDNEDERLAND - Signet B.V., registered in NL, and announces 16 prefixes to 2 BGP neighbours. AS5524 has a reputation score of 16.1 (NEUTRAL); 0 of its 19,712 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.

Nutrition Label

Routing footprint

Announced prefixes: 16
BGP neighbours: 2
RPKI ROAs: 14
MOAS conflicts: 0
CAIDA AS-rank: 8,662
Customer-cone ASNs: 2
Facilities: 13
Internet exchanges: 0
Customer degree: 1
Peer degree: 0
Provider degree: 1

Infrastructure presence

Facilities (13 total)

Route origin authorizations

A sample of 10 of this network’s 14 ROAs.

185.65.52.0/22 · max length /24
185.89.152.0/22 · max length /24
185.95.176.0/22 · max length /24
2001:67c:23b8::/48 · max length /48
2a00:c080::/32 · max length /32
2a03:4f00::/32 · max length /32
2a03:5700::/32 · max length /32
2a10:b940::/29 · max length /48
2a14:6ec0::/32 · max length /48
31.3.8.0/21 · max length /24

Upstreams

The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS5524.

AS39700 · 18 shared paths
AS49685 · 18 shared paths
AS8455 · 10 shared paths
AS199927 · 9 shared paths
AS24785 · 6 shared paths

Blast radius

Announced IPv4 addresses: 19,712
Threat-listed addresses: 0
Threat density: 0.0000 %
Routed prefixes: 10

How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.

Peering ecosystem

A sample of 2 of this network’s 2 BGP neighbours.

signetbreedband - Signet B.V. · AS39700
ITB2 - ITB-Kwadraat BV · AS199927

Reputation

16.1reputation score (NEUTRAL)

AS5524 (BREEDBANDNEDERLAND - Signet B.V., NL) has a reputation score of 57.8 (NEUTRAL).

Threat density: 74.3/100
Graph metrics: 30.0/100
Historical behaviour: 85.0/100
Prefix age: 20.0/100

These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.

Registration

Registered to: Signet B.V.
RIR: RIPE
Registered: Wed, 07 Jan 2009 09:04:24 GMT
Abuse contact: abuse@signet.nl

This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.

Threat-feed evidence

Pivot from AS5524 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.

Queries

This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.


MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
     collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
     collect(co.name) AS countries,
     collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
     collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
     collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
     collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
     collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
     collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
     collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
     collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
       a.rir AS rir,
       a.orgName AS orgName,
       a.asRank AS asRank,
       a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
       a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
       a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
       a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
       a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
       a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
       a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
       a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
       a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
       a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
       a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
       a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
       a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
       a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
       a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
       operatorNames, countries, organizations,
       samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
       signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
       prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCount

Run yourself →

The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.


MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observations