Autonomous System
AS60064
Last fetched
AS60064 is operated by HOSTPALACE - HOSTPALACE DATACENTERS LTD, registered in GB, and announces 39 prefixes to 8 BGP neighbours. AS60064 has a reputation score of 17.0 (NEUTRAL); 13 of its 8,192 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 39
- BGP neighbours
- 8
- RPKI ROAs
- 26
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 3,992
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 6
- Facilities
- 14
- Internet exchanges
- 0
- Customer degree
- 5
- Peer degree
- 2
- Provider degree
- 1
- 5.178.2.0/24
- 43.239.140.0/24
- 43.239.141.0/24
- 43.239.142.0/24
- 43.239.143.0/24
- 84.12.255.0/24
- 103.194.170.0/24
- 103.252.220.0/24
- 103.252.221.0/24
- 103.252.222.0/24
- 149.57.4.0/24
- 149.57.18.0/24
- 149.57.26.0/24
- 149.57.152.0/24
- 185.63.252.0/24
- 185.63.253.0/24
- 185.63.254.0/24
- 192.142.24.0/24
- 192.142.25.0/24
- 192.142.26.0/24
- 192.142.27.0/24
- 192.142.24.0/21
- 192.142.28.0/24
- 192.142.29.0/24
- 192.142.30.0/24
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.18
- Origin mismatches
- 1
Infrastructure presence
Facilities (14 total)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
- Global Switch Amsterdam
- Equinix FR7 - Frankfurt, Gutleutstrasse
- Equinix AM1/AM2 - Amsterdam, Luttenbergweg
- Equinix FR4 - Frankfurt, West
- Equinix AM5 - Amsterdam, Schepenbergweg
- Equinix AM11 - Amsterdam, Lemelerbergweg
- Equinix AM3 - Amsterdam, Science Park
- Equinix AM4 - Amsterdam, Science Park
- Equinix FR6 - Frankfurt, West
- maincubes AMS01
- Equinix FR8 - Frankfurt, West
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 26 ROAs.
- 192.142.24.0/21 · max length /24
- 192.142.56.0/21 · max length /24
- 41.180.170.0/23 · max length /24
- 103.194.170.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.252.220.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.252.221.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.252.222.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.71.175.0/24 · max length /24
- 43.239.140.0/24 · max length /24
- 43.239.141.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS60064.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 8,192
- Threat-listed addresses
- 13
- Threat density
- 0.1587 %
- Routed prefixes
- 33
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 8 of this network’s 8 BGP neighbours.
- ASN-TELSTRA-GLOBAL - Telstra Global · AS4637
- DIEDERIK-AS - Diederik Focko de Zee · AS50917
- HWSPL-AS-AP - HostPalace Web Solution PVT LTD · AS134512
- IDONCLOUD - IDON Digital Solutions, Unipessoal LDA · AS200859
- HS-HOST9X - Host9x Web Solutions Limited · AS203144
- HAOXIANGYONG - HONGKONG HAO XIANG YONG TECHNOLOGY CO., LIMITED · AS210597
- LOGICINFO-AS - LOGIC INFOTECH ELECTRICAL SPARE PARTS TRADING L.L.C. · AS214120
- ARISTO-NET - ARISTO NETWORKS LTD · AS216265
Reputation
17.0reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS60064 (HOSTPALACE - HOSTPALACE DATACENTERS LTD, GB) has a reputation score of 56.0 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 51.4/100
- Graph metrics
- 55.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- HOSTPALACE DATACENTERS LTD
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Mon, 22 Jun 2020 15:18:21 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@host-palace.uk
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS60064 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.