Autonomous System
AS60246
Last fetched
AS60246 is operated by PG-19 - Consumer Internet Cooperative PG-19, registered in RU, and announces 39 prefixes to 5 BGP neighbours. AS60246 has a reputation score of 25.8 (SUSPICIOUS); 85 of its 14,592 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 39
- BGP neighbours
- 5
- RPKI ROAs
- 30
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 8,922
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 2
- Facilities
- 27
- Internet exchanges
- 9
- Customer degree
- 1
- Peer degree
- 15
- Provider degree
- 4
- 80.72.20.0/24
- 80.72.21.0/24
- 80.72.24.0/23
- 85.198.120.0/24
- 92.118.72.0/23
- 95.174.96.0/20
- 95.174.112.0/24
- 95.174.113.0/24
- 95.174.114.0/23
- 95.174.116.0/22
- 95.174.120.0/24
- 95.174.121.0/24
- 95.174.123.0/24
- 95.174.124.0/22
- 151.0.48.0/23
- 151.0.50.0/24
- 151.0.51.0/24
- 178.212.139.0/24
- 178.248.0.0/24
- 178.248.1.0/24
- 178.248.2.0/23
- 178.248.4.0/23
- 178.248.6.0/23
- 185.9.184.0/24
- 185.9.186.0/24
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (9 total)
Facilities (27 total)
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Moscow M9
- NewTelco Kiev
- Linxdatacenter (Moscow)
- CSS MPS Moscow
- Moscow CSS MPS
- Moscow M10
- Bolshaya Morskaya 18
- LVRTC TV Tower
- Telia Telehouse KJJ
- NewTelco Frankfurt
- Digita Helsinki Pasila Broadcasting Tower
- IVC ORW Saint-Petersburg
- Moscow TehnoGorod
- Tsvetochnaya Data Center
- StoreData
- Raduga-2
- M100 datacenter Moscow, Varshavskoe 125
- IXcellerate MOS1
- DataSpace Moscow
- Miran-1
- DataLine Moscow DC OST
- DataLine Moscow DC NORD
- KIAEHOUSE
- INFONET DC
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 30 ROAs.
- 2602:fed2:711a::/48 · max length /48
- 178.212.139.0/24 · max length /32
- 178.248.0.0/22 · max length /32
- 178.248.4.0/23 · max length /32
- 178.248.6.0/23 · max length /32
- 185.230.240.0/23 · max length /32
- 185.230.242.0/24 · max length /32
- 185.9.184.0/24 · max length /32
- 185.9.186.0/23 · max length /32
- 2a00:8740:100::/48 · max length /128
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS60246.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 14,592
- Threat-listed addresses
- 85
- Threat density
- 0.5825 %
- Routed prefixes
- 29
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 5 of this network’s 5 BGP neighbours.
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- INETCOM - INETCOM CARRIER LLC · AS35598
- RETNRU-AS - JSC "RetnNet" · AS57304
- BEMYLINK - BiMajLink d.o.o. · AS62255
- NCTRADE - New-Com Trade Ltd. · AS204435
Reputation
25.8reputation score (SUSPICIOUS)
AS60246 (PG-19 - Consumer Internet Cooperative PG-19, RU) has a reputation score of 44.1 (SUSPICIOUS). This ASN shows suspicious characteristics.
- Threat density
- 24.7/100
- Graph metrics
- 55.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Consumer Internet Cooperative PG-19
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Mon, 31 May 2021 09:45:19 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@pg19.ru
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS60246 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.