Autonomous System
AS63473
Last fetched
AS63473 is operated by HOSTHATCH - HostHatch, LLC, registered in US, and announces 117 prefixes to 63 BGP neighbours. AS63473 has a reputation score of 14.9 (NEUTRAL); 115 of its 30,720 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 117
- BGP neighbours
- 63
- RPKI ROAs
- 145
- MOAS conflicts
- 1
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 1,373
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 26
- Facilities
- 28
- Internet exchanges
- 1
- Customer degree
- 25
- Peer degree
- 1
- Provider degree
- 19
- 31.56.62.0/24
- 31.56.232.0/24
- 31.57.218.0/24
- 31.57.224.0/24
- 31.187.64.0/24
- 31.220.4.0/24
- 31.220.5.0/24
- 31.220.7.0/24
- 31.220.15.0/24
- 31.220.30.0/24
- 31.220.42.0/24
- 31.220.43.0/24
- 31.220.44.0/23
- 45.45.216.0/24
- 45.45.217.0/24
- 45.45.218.0/24
- 45.45.219.0/24
- 45.67.218.0/24
- 45.67.219.0/24
- 45.91.92.0/24
- 45.91.93.0/24
- 45.91.94.0/24
- 45.91.95.0/24
- 45.132.72.0/24
- 45.132.74.0/24
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.05
- Route leaks
- 2
Leak types observed: TYPE4_PEER_TO_PROVIDER.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (1 total)
Facilities (28 total)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Equinix AM8 - Amsterdam, Gyroscoopweg
- Digital Realty VIE1/2 - Vienna
- Global Switch Amsterdam
- Digital Realty AMS17 - Amsterdam
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- Digital Realty Zurich ZUR1
- KINX Dogok
- Equinix HK1 - Hong Kong
- Digital Realty Stockholm STO1-6
- Equinix AM1/AM2 - Amsterdam, Luttenbergweg
- Digital Realty LAX (600 W 7th)
- nLighten Amsterdam AMS1
- Equinix AM5 - Amsterdam, Schepenbergweg
- Equinix AM3 - Amsterdam, Science Park
- DFDC The Hague
- Equinix AM6 - Amsterdam, Duivendrechtsekade
- Evocative EWR1
- Equinix TY8 - Tokyo
- Equinix AM4 - Amsterdam, Science Park
- Epsilon Global Hubs Singapore
- Iron Mountain Data Center - London (LON-1)
- Penta Infra Leeuwarden LEE01
- Equinix SY5 - Sydney
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 145 ROAs.
- 103.167.150.0/23 · max length /24
- 103.173.178.0/23 · max length /24
- 103.214.22.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.214.23.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.69.128.0/23 · max length /24
- 103.73.64.0/23 · max length /23
- 103.73.66.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.73.67.0/24 · max length /24
- 216.250.96.0/24 · max length /24
- 216.250.97.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS63473.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 30,720
- Threat-listed addresses
- 115
- Threat density
- 0.3743 %
- Routed prefixes
- 99
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 63 BGP neighbours.
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- OBE-NET - Obenet AB · AS3399
- ASN-TELSTRA-GLOBAL - Telstra Global · AS4637
- INTERDOTLINK - Inter.link GmbH · AS5405
- NET-XPERT1-2602-F925 - Net-Xpert Consulting · AS18909
- ZEN-ECN - Zenlayer Inc · AS21859
- UNGAGE - Ungage Capital LLC · AS22665
- PEAKTERA - Peaktera · AS32931
- ESAB-AS - 31173 Services AB · AS39351
- TAONET - TaoNet · AS40776
- PRINODE - Prinode AB · AS43969
- EPSILON - Epsilon Telecommunications Ltd · AS44356
- SHI-Lili - SHI Li Li · AS50922
- NEAROUTE - Nearoute Limited · AS51847
- TerraMC - Terra Management Consulting Ltd · AS51939
- AZT - AZURE TECHNOLOGY CO., LIMITED · AS53587
- DYNAMIC-QUANTUM-NETWORKS - Dynamic Quantum Networks · AS54148
- BGP-NETWORKS-LLC - BGP Networks LLC · AS55223
- SECUREBIT - Securebit AG · AS58057
- CDN77 - Datacamp Limited · AS60068
- BGP-NETWORKS-LLC - BGP NETWORKS LLC · AS61228
- DEDICATED - Dedicated.com · AS63018
- IDC-AS-AP - Dromatics Systems Pte Ltd · AS134677
- ALEX-NEO-AS-AP - Alex Neo · AS135103
- HOST-AS-AP - Host Universal Pty Ltd · AS136557
MOAS / hijack watch
1 announced prefix conflict with AS63473 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
Reputation
14.9reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS63473 (HOSTHATCH - HostHatch, LLC, US) has a reputation score of 60.3 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 45.8/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- HostHatch, LLC
- RIR
- ARIN
- Registered
- Tue, 14 Apr 2015 16:23:11 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@hosthatch.com
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS63473 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.