Autonomous System
AS668
Last fetched
AS668 is operated by DNIC-AS-00668 - United States Department of Defense (DoD), registered in US, and announces 193 prefixes to 31 BGP neighbours. AS668 has a reputation score of 8.9 (REPUTABLE); 4 of its 2,555,904 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 193
- BGP neighbours
- 31
- RPKI ROAs
- 0
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 1,559
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 21
- Facilities
- 36
- Internet exchanges
- 10
- Customer degree
- 20
- Peer degree
- 8
- Provider degree
- 3
- 6.2.0.0/18
- 6.2.64.0/19
- 6.2.96.0/22
- 6.2.104.0/22
- 6.2.112.0/22
- 6.2.120.0/22
- 6.3.0.0/17
- 6.4.0.0/16
- 6.11.1.0/24
- 6.11.51.0/24
- 6.11.250.0/24
- 6.11.254.0/24
- 6.15.100.0/24
- 128.132.0.0/16
- 128.160.0.0/17
- 129.92.0.0/16
- 129.229.0.0/16
- 130.109.0.0/16
- 130.163.0.0/16
- 131.92.131.0/24
- 131.92.132.0/22
- 131.92.136.0/21
- 131.92.144.0/21
- 131.92.162.0/23
- 131.92.164.0/22
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (10 total)
Facilities (36 total)
- Equinix DC1-DC15,DC21-DC22 - Ashburn
- Equinix SV8 - Silicon Valley, Palo Alto
- Equinix SV1/SV5/SV10 - Silicon Valley, San Jose
- Equinix CH1/CH2/CH4 - Chicago
- Equinix LA1 - Los Angeles
- Digital Realty Seattle SEA10
- Equinix SE2/SE3 - Seattle
- Equinix LA2 - Los Angeles
- Digital Realty ATL13 - Atlanta
- Level(3) Sunnyvale
- Equinix LA3/LA4 - Los Angeles, El Segundo
- KOMO Plaza Seattle (Formerly Fisher Plaza)
- Equinix SV3 - Silicon Valley, San Jose
- Equinix SV2 - Silicon Valley, Santa Clara
- Digital Realty CHI (350 E Cermak)
- Equinix SV4 - Silicon Valley, Sunnyvale
- Intergate West / Digital.forest / Fortress
- Equinix CU1/CU2/CU3/CU4 - Culpeper
- Cologix MIN1
- NASA Moffet Field
- Equinix CH3 - Elk Grove
- Northwestern University co-location facility
- Level(3) McLean
- Cologix MIN2
- DRFortress HNL
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS668.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 2,555,904
- Threat-listed addresses
- 4
- Threat density
- 0.0002 %
- Routed prefixes
- 192
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 31 BGP neighbours.
- DNIC-AS-00013 - Headquarters, USAISC · AS13
- DNIC-AS-00022 - Navy Network Information Center (NNIC) · AS22
- DNIC-AS-00037 - Navy Network Information Center (NNIC) · AS37
- DNIC-AS-00048 - Navy Network Information Center (NNIC) · AS48
- DNIC-AS-00084 - Navy Network Information Center (NNIC) · AS84
- DNIC-AS-00089 - Navy Network Information Center (NNIC) · AS89
- DNIC-AS-00121 - United States Department of Defense (DoD) · AS121
- DNIC-AS-00213 - Headquarters, USAISC · AS213
- DNIC-AS-00228 - United States Department of Defense (DoD) · AS228
- DNIC-AS-00252 - Headquarters, USAISC · AS252
- DNIC-AS-00289 - Headquarters, USAISC · AS289
- DNIC-ASBLK-00306-00371 - United States Department of Defense (DoD) · AS366
- DNIC-AS-00518 - United States Department of Defense (DoD) · AS518
- DNIC-AS-00687 - United States Department of Defense (DoD) · AS687
- UUNET - Verizon Business · AS701
- DNIC-AS-01508 - Headquarters, USAISC · AS1508
- DNIC-AS-02621 - United States Department of Defense (DoD) · AS2621
- NTT-DATA-2914 - NTT America, Inc. · AS2914
- MHPCC-AS - Maui High Performance Computing Center · AS3381
- DNIC-ASBLK-04214-04221 - United States Department of Defense (DoD) · AS4221
- NRL-EXP - Navy Network Information Center (NNIC) · AS5058
- DNIC-ASBLK-05120-05376 - United States Department of Defense (DoD) · AS5132
- DNIC-ASBLK-05800-06055 - United States Department of Defense (DoD) · AS5887
- DNIC-ASBLK-05800-06055 - United States Department of Defense (DoD) · AS5957
- DNIC-ASBLK-05800-06055 - United States Department of Defense (DoD) · AS5978
Reputation
8.9reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS668 (DNIC-AS-00668 - United States Department of Defense (DoD), US) has a reputation score of 73.3 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 90.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 80.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- United States Department of Defense (DoD)
- RIR
- ARIN
- Registered
- Tue, 24 Apr 1990 04:00:00 GMT
- Abuse contact
- disa.columbus.ns.mbx.hostmaster-dod-nic@mail.mil
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS668 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.