Autonomous System
AS6723
Last fetched
AS6723 is operated by UA-XAIM - "AS6723" LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, registered in UA, and announces 7 prefixes to 8 BGP neighbours. AS6723 has a reputation score of 22.7 (SUSPICIOUS); 20 of its 2,304 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 7
- BGP neighbours
- 8
- RPKI ROAs
- 6
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 2,557
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 11
- Facilities
- 33
- Internet exchanges
- 3
- Customer degree
- 4
- Peer degree
- 8
- Provider degree
- 4
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (3 total)
Facilities (33 total)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- NewTelco Kiev
- LIM Warsaw
- Ucomline Kiev
- Datagroup Kiev
- Equinix WA1 - Warsaw, Centrum LIM
- TSUA
- TOPNET/UA/Krivonosa27
- TOPNET/UA/Leontovicha9
- DATALINE/UA/Leontovicha9
- 9 Leontovicha
- Datasfera
- ATMAN Data Center Warsaw-2 (WAW-2, Konstruktorska 5)
- ATMAN Data Center Warsaw-1 (WAW-1, Grochowska 21A)
- BeMobile
- OD-IX
- Omega Telecom Kyiv
- Omega Telecom Dnipro
- KievNet/L9
- UARNet Lviv
- Giganet
- Data Center G50
- DTEL-IX K21
- Data Center Ukr-Com
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 6 of this network’s 6 ROAs.
- 178.255.176.0/22 · max length /24
- 178.255.180.0/23 · max length /24
- 178.255.183.0/24 · max length /24
- 185.5.254.0/24 · max length /24
- 185.5.255.0/24 · max length /24
- 2a01:6d80:f000::/36 · max length /48
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS6723.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 2,304
- Threat-listed addresses
- 20
- Threat density
- 0.8681 %
- Routed prefixes
- 6
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 8 of this network’s 8 BGP neighbours.
- UARNET-AS - LLC EKSINTECH · AS3255
- TTI-NET - Euroweb Romania S.R.L. · AS6663
- RETN-AS - RETN Limited · AS9002
- SKIF-AS - "AS6723" LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY · AS13307
- DOMASHKA-AS - "AS6723" LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY · AS15683
- Fiord-AS - Fiord Networks, UAB · AS28917
- TEREMKI-AS - TEREMKY LAN ISP LLC · AS43967
- UA-M1-AS - TOV TELEODIN · AS59636
Reputation
22.7reputation score (SUSPICIOUS)
AS6723 (UA-XAIM - "AS6723" LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, UA) has a reputation score of 47.3 (SUSPICIOUS). This ASN shows suspicious characteristics.
- Threat density
- 33.7/100
- Graph metrics
- 55.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- "AS6723" LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Thu, 10 Apr 2008 09:39:58 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@as6723.net
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS6723 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.