Hostname
e8b5a4da.cdnaaaa.com
Last fetched
e8b5a4da.cdnaaaa.com resolves to 104.214.180.61, announced in 104.208.0.0/13 by MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK - Microsoft Corporation in HK. e8b5a4da.cdnaaaa.com is not listed on any threat feed indexed by WhisperGraph; reconciled level NONE.
Threat posture
0threat score (procedure-native scale)
NONENo threats observed.
- Threat feeds listing this
- 0
- Verdict coverage
- known-clean
Nutrition Label
Resolution chain
- 104.214.180.61
104.208.0.0/13 · MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK - Microsoft Corporation · Hong Kong, HK
- 20.2.10.169
20.0.0.0/11 · MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK - Microsoft Corporation · Hong Kong, HK
- 20.2.113.187
20.0.0.0/11 · MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK - Microsoft Corporation · Hong Kong, HK
- 20.2.113.7
20.0.0.0/11 · MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK - Microsoft Corporation · Hong Kong, HK
- 20.2.12.17
20.0.0.0/11 · MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK - Microsoft Corporation · Hong Kong, HK
- 20.2.147.127
20.0.0.0/11 · MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK - Microsoft Corporation · Hong Kong, HK
- 20.2.148.238
20.0.0.0/11 · MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK - Microsoft Corporation · Hong Kong, HK
- 20.2.169.255
20.0.0.0/11 · MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK - Microsoft Corporation · Hong Kong, HK
- 20.2.17.153
20.0.0.0/11 · MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK - Microsoft Corporation · Hong Kong, HK
- 20.2.172.161
20.0.0.0/11 · MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK - Microsoft Corporation · Hong Kong, HK
- 20.2.172.27
20.0.0.0/11 · MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK - Microsoft Corporation · Hong Kong, HK
- 20.2.192.85
20.0.0.0/11 · MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK - Microsoft Corporation · Hong Kong, HK
- 20.2.197.160
20.0.0.0/11 · MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK - Microsoft Corporation · Hong Kong, HK
- 20.2.200.218
20.0.0.0/11 · MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK - Microsoft Corporation · Hong Kong, HK
- 20.2.221.59
20.0.0.0/11 · MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK - Microsoft Corporation · Hong Kong, HK
- 20.2.25.16
20.0.0.0/11 · MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK - Microsoft Corporation · Hong Kong, HK
- 20.2.28.201
20.0.0.0/11 · MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK - Microsoft Corporation · Hong Kong, HK
- 20.2.3.167
20.0.0.0/11 · MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK - Microsoft Corporation · Hong Kong, HK
- 20.2.31.226
20.0.0.0/11 · MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK - Microsoft Corporation · Hong Kong, HK
- 20.2.36.66
20.0.0.0/11 · MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK - Microsoft Corporation · Hong Kong, HK
IPv6 resolution
No AAAA record for e8b5a4da.cdnaaaa.com is recorded in WhisperGraph.
Attribution
Azure
cloud · ORIGIN_AS
WHOIS identity
WhisperGraph holds no WHOIS registrar, registrant organisation or contact email for e8b5a4da.cdnaaaa.com. WHOIS is recorded against the registrable domain, so a subdomain such as a www. host carries none of its own — check the registrable domain for this name.
Mail and authentication
Nameservers
- a.root-servers.net
- b.root-servers.net
- c.root-servers.net
- d.root-servers.net
- e.root-servers.net
- f.root-servers.net
- g.root-servers.net
- h.root-servers.net
- i.root-servers.net
- j.root-servers.net
- k.root-servers.net
- l.root-servers.net
- m.root-servers.net
Threat-feed evidence
History
Related pages
Pivot from e8b5a4da.cdnaaaa.com into the addresses, networks and registries it depends on.
Queries
This hostname's full card — resolution chain, registration and inbound/outbound links.
MATCH (h:HOSTNAME {name: $host})
OPTIONAL MATCH (h)-[:RESOLVES_TO]->(ip:IPV4)-[:ANNOUNCED_BY]->(ap:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a:ASN)-[:ROUTES]->(ap)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (ip)-[:LOCATED_IN]->(city:CITY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (ip)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(ipc:COUNTRY)
WITH h, ip, ap, a, an, city, ipc
LIMIT 20
WITH h,
collect({ip: ip.name, prefix: ap.name, asn: a.name, network: an.name, city: city.name, country: ipc.name}) AS resolutions,
collect(a.name) AS asnNames,
collect(ap.name) AS prefixNames,
collect(ap.isMoas) AS moasFlags,
collect(ap.rpkiStatus) AS rpkiStatuses,
head(collect(a)) AS primaryAsn,
head(collect(ap)) AS primaryPrefix
OPTIONAL MATCH (primaryPrefix)-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]->(conflict:ASN)
WITH h, resolutions, asnNames, prefixNames, moasFlags, rpkiStatuses, primaryAsn,
collect(conflict.name) AS conflictAsns
OPTIONAL MATCH (h)-[:HAS_REGISTRAR]->(reg:REGISTRAR)
OPTIONAL MATCH (h)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
OPTIONAL MATCH (h)-[:CHILD_OF]->(tld:TLD)
WITH h, resolutions, asnNames, prefixNames, moasFlags, rpkiStatuses, primaryAsn, conflictAsns,
collect(reg.name) AS registrars,
collect(org.name) AS organizations,
collect(tld.name) AS tlds
OPTIONAL MATCH (h)-[:HAS_EMAIL]->(em:EMAIL)
WITH h, resolutions, asnNames, prefixNames, moasFlags, rpkiStatuses, primaryAsn, conflictAsns,
registrars, organizations, tlds,
collect(em.name) AS emails
OPTIONAL MATCH (h)-[:HAS_PHONE]->(ph:PHONE)
WITH h, resolutions, asnNames, prefixNames, moasFlags, rpkiStatuses, primaryAsn, conflictAsns,
registrars, organizations, tlds, emails,
count(ph) AS phoneCount
OPTIONAL MATCH (h)<-[:MAIL_FOR]-(mx:HOSTNAME)
WITH h, resolutions, asnNames, prefixNames, moasFlags, rpkiStatuses, primaryAsn, conflictAsns,
registrars, organizations, tlds, emails, phoneCount,
collect(mx.name)[0..20] AS mxHosts
OPTIONAL MATCH (h)<-[:NAMESERVER_FOR]-(ns:HOSTNAME)
WITH h, resolutions, asnNames, prefixNames, moasFlags, rpkiStatuses, primaryAsn, conflictAsns,
registrars, organizations, tlds, emails, phoneCount, mxHosts,
collect(ns.name) AS nameservers
OPTIONAL MATCH (h)-[spf:SPF_A|SPF_EXISTS|SPF_INCLUDE|SPF_IP|SPF_MX|SPF_REDIRECT]->(spfTarget)
WITH h, resolutions, asnNames, prefixNames, moasFlags, rpkiStatuses, primaryAsn, conflictAsns,
registrars, organizations, tlds, emails, phoneCount, mxHosts, nameservers,
collect({mechanism: type(spf), target: spfTarget.name})[0..50] AS spf
CALL { WITH primaryAsn MATCH (primaryAsn)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN) RETURN count(peer) AS asnPeerCount }
RETURN h.name AS name,
h.rank AS rank,
h.verdictLevel AS verdictLevel,
h.verdictScore AS verdictScore,
h.verdictBlocking AS verdictBlocking,
h.verdictCoverage AS verdictCoverage,
h.verdictAdvisory AS verdictAdvisory,
h.threatSources AS threatSources,
h.threatFirstSeen AS threatFirstSeen,
h.threatLastSeen AS threatLastSeen,
h.isTor AS isTor,
h.isVpn AS isVpn,
h.isProxy AS isProxy,
h.isC2 AS isC2,
h.isPhishing AS isPhishing,
resolutions, asnNames, prefixNames, moasFlags, rpkiStatuses, conflictAsns,
registrars, organizations, tlds, emails, phoneCount, mxHosts, nameservers, spf,
asnPeerCountRun yourself →The observed subdomain count, to depth 3.
MATCH (h:HOSTNAME {name: $host})
CALL { WITH h MATCH (h)<-[:CHILD_OF*1..3]-(sub:HOSTNAME) RETURN count(sub) AS subdomainCount }
RETURN subdomainCountRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.