IPv4 address

192.253.229.23

Last fetched Fri, 09 Oct 2026 17:52:42 GMT

192.253.229.23 is announced in 192.253.229.0/24 by CTGSERVERLIMITED-AS-AP - CTG Server Limited and geolocates to HK. 192.253.229.23 is listed by 1 threat feed; reconciled level CRITICAL.

Threat posture

60threat score (procedure-native scale)

CRITICAL

Listed by 1 threat feed. At least one source recommends blocking. Advisory: asn-bulletproof-context.

Categories: Command-and-control

Threat feeds listing this: 1
Verdict coverage: malicious-evidenced
First seen on a feed: Wed, 23 Sep 2026 21:44:00 GMT
Last seen on a feed: Fri, 09 Oct 2026 00:44:14 GMT

Nutrition Label

Attribution

Announced prefix: 192.253.229.0/24
Announcing network: CTGSERVERLIMITED-AS-AP - CTG Server Limited
RIR-registered prefix: 192.253.224.0/20
RPKI: not-found

Abuse contact

Report abuse from 192.253.229.23 to the address block's holder first and copy the announcing network. These are the abuse contacts WhisperGraph holds for the block and the network.

Address block: mfjp@hotmail.com
Network (AS152194): cs.mail@ctgserver.com

Network context

Attributed threat actor: Gambling Goblin

Signals on the covering block

toxic-neighborhoodShares this address block with a disproportionate share of listed neighbours.
prefix-age-anomalyThis block's registration age is inconsistent with its routing history.

Anycast detection

This does not appear to be an anycast address on the three signals Canon evaluates: reverse DNS, announced-prefix width and the announcing network's peer count.

Reverse DNS

Geographic detail

City: Hong Kong, HK
Country: HK

Threat-feed listings

abuse-ch-threatfox-ip · c2

Threat-feed evidence

History

Pivot from 192.253.229.23 into the prefix, network and country that carry it.

Queries

This address's full card — routing attribution, reverse DNS and listed feeds.


MATCH (ip:IPV4 {name: $ip})
OPTIONAL MATCH (ip)-[:BELONGS_TO]->(rp:REGISTERED_PREFIX)
OPTIONAL MATCH (ip)-[:ANNOUNCED_BY]->(ap:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a:ASN)-[:ROUTES]->(ap)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (ip)-[:LOCATED_IN]->(city:CITY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (ip)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(ipc:COUNTRY)
WITH ip, rp, ap, a, an, city, ipc
LIMIT 10
WITH ip,
     collect(rp.name) AS registeredPrefixes,
     collect(rp.abuseEmail) AS registeredAbuseEmails,
     collect({prefix: ap.name, asn: a.name, network: an.name, isMoas: ap.isMoas, rpkiStatus: ap.rpkiStatus, isAnycast: ap.isAnycast, dominantCity: ap.dominantCity, abuseEmail: ap.abuseEmail, networkAbuseEmail: a.abuseEmail}) AS announcements,
     collect(city.name) AS cities,
     collect(ipc.name) AS countries,
     collect(a.name) AS announcerNames,
     head(collect(a)) AS primaryAsn,
     head(collect(ap)) AS primaryPrefix
OPTIONAL MATCH (primaryPrefix)-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]->(conflict:ASN)
WITH ip, registeredPrefixes, registeredAbuseEmails, announcements, cities, countries, announcerNames, primaryAsn,
     collect(conflict.name) AS conflictAsns
CALL { WITH primaryAsn MATCH (primaryAsn)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS asnPrefixCount }
CALL { WITH primaryAsn MATCH (primaryAsn)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN) RETURN count(peer) AS asnPeerCount }
RETURN ip.name AS name,
       ip.verdictLevel AS verdictLevel,
       ip.verdictScore AS verdictScore,
       ip.verdictBlocking AS verdictBlocking,
       ip.verdictCoverage AS verdictCoverage,
       ip.verdictAdvisory AS verdictAdvisory,
       ip.threatSources AS threatSources,
       ip.threatFirstSeen AS threatFirstSeen,
       ip.threatLastSeen AS threatLastSeen,
       ip.isTor AS isTor,
       ip.isVpn AS isVpn,
       ip.isProxy AS isProxy,
       ip.isC2 AS isC2,
       ip.isPhishing AS isPhishing,
       registeredPrefixes, registeredAbuseEmails, announcements, cities, countries, announcerNames, conflictAsns,
       asnPrefixCount, asnPeerCount

Run yourself →

Network context — Tor exit relays, attributed actors, and the covering blocks' signals, cloud region and vendor.


MATCH (ip:IPV4 {name: $ip})
OPTIONAL MATCH (ip)-[:OPERATES_EXIT_NODE]->(tor:TOR_RELAY)
WITH ip, count(tor) AS torRelays
OPTIONAL MATCH (ip)-[:ATTRIBUTED_TO]->(actor:ACTOR)
WITH ip, torRelays, collect(actor.name)[0..5] AS actors
OPTIONAL MATCH (ip)-[:BELONGS_TO]->(p:PREFIX)
WITH torRelays, actors, collect(p.name) AS coveringPrefixes
UNWIND (CASE WHEN size(coveringPrefixes) = 0 THEN [null] ELSE coveringPrefixes END) AS pn
OPTIONAL MATCH (cp:PREFIX {name: pn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (cp)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
OPTIONAL MATCH (cp)-[:PREFIX_IN_REGION]->(reg:CLOUD_REGION)
OPTIONAL MATCH (cp)-[:DELEGATED_TO]->(v:VENDOR)
RETURN torRelays, actors,
       collect(sig.name) AS signals,
       collect(reg.name) AS regions,
       collect(v.name) AS vendors