Autonomous System
AS10310
Last fetched
AS10310 is operated by YAHOO-1 - Yahoo Holdings Inc., registered in US, and announces 110 prefixes to 55 BGP neighbours. AS10310 has a reputation score of 8.1 (REPUTABLE); 0 of its 106,240 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 110
- BGP neighbours
- 55
- RPKI ROAs
- 21
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 1,172
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 32
- Facilities
- 706
- Internet exchanges
- 88
- Customer degree
- 31
- Peer degree
- 252
- Provider degree
- 10
- 27.123.33.0/24
- 27.123.34.0/23
- 27.123.37.0/24
- 27.123.44.0/22
- 27.123.192.0/23
- 27.123.196.0/23
- 66.196.64.0/21
- 66.196.70.0/23
- 66.196.88.0/22
- 67.195.249.0/24
- 68.142.248.0/24
- 68.142.253.0/24
- 68.180.128.0/20
- 69.147.64.0/18
- 72.30.220.0/22
- 74.6.224.0/22
- 77.238.168.0/22
- 77.238.172.0/23
- 77.238.174.0/24
- 77.238.183.0/24
- 77.238.189.0/24
- 87.248.107.0/24
- 102.165.180.0/24
- 102.165.183.0/24
- 103.40.110.0/23
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (88 total)
Facilities (706 total)
- Digital Realty SFO (200 Paul)
- Equinix DA1 - Dallas
- Equinix SV8 - Silicon Valley, Palo Alto
- Equinix DC1-DC15,DC21-DC22 - Ashburn
- Digital Realty NYC (60 Hudson)
- Equinix AT2/AT3 - Atlanta
- Equinix TR1 - Toronto
- Equinix SV1/SV5/SV10 - Silicon Valley, San Jose
- Equinix CH1/CH2/CH4 - Chicago
- Equinix LA1 - Los Angeles
- Equinix NY1 - New York, Newark
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- CoreSite - Los Angeles (LA1) One Wilshire
- CoreSite - San Jose (SV1)
- Equinix MI1 - Miami, NOTA
- Digital Realty NYC (111 8th Ave)
- Digital Realty SFO (365 Main)
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Equinix NY2/NY4/NY5/NY6 - New York, Secaucus
- Digital Realty London LHR19
- Equinix LD8 - London, Docklands
- Equinix NY9 - New York, 111 8th Avenue
- Telehouse - London (Docklands East)
- Digital Realty London LHR20
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 21 ROAs.
- 183.177.76.0/22 · max length /22
- 202.43.216.0/23 · max length /23
- 202.43.216.0/24 · max length /24
- 202.43.216.0/25 · max length /25
- 27.123.33.0/24 · max length /24
- 27.123.34.0/23 · max length /23
- 192.152.66.0/24 · max length /24
- 198.178.157.0/24 · max length /24
- 204.29.186.0/24 · max length /24
- 204.29.187.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS10310.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 106,240
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 88
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 55 BGP neighbours.
- ASN-TELSTRA - Telstra Limited · AS1221
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- EBOX - EBOX · AS1403
- GREEN - green.ch AG · AS1836
- LEVEL3 - Level 3 Parent, LLC · AS3356
- HINET - Data Communication Business Group · AS3462
- PCCWG-APAC-HK - PCCW Global (HK) Ltd. · AS3491
- ASN-TELSTRA-GLOBAL - Telstra Global · AS4637
- YAHOO-DNB - Yahoo Holdings Inc. · AS5779
- SEABONE-NET - TELECOM ITALIA SPARKLE S.p.A. · AS6762
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- AS7195 - EDGEUNO S.A.S · AS7195
- YAHOO-US - Yahoo · AS7233
- YAHOO-FC - Yahoo Holdings Inc. · AS7280
- AARNET-AS-AP - Australian Academic and Research Network (AARNet) · AS7575
- TELENOR-SE - Telenor Sverige AB · AS8434
- A1TELEKOM-AT - A1 Telekom Austria AG · AS8447
- RETN-AS - RETN Limited · AS9002
- YAHOO-TW1 - Yahoo Inc. · AS10229
- YAHOO-SG - internet content provider · AS10230
- YAHOO-AN2 - Yahoo Holdings Inc. · AS10880
- YAHOO-CHA - Yahoo Holdings Inc. · AS14196
- YAHOO - Yahoo Holdings Inc. · AS14776
- YAHOO - Yahoo Holdings Inc. · AS14777
- YAHOO - Yahoo Holdings Inc. · AS14778
Reputation
8.1reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS10310 (YAHOO-1 - Yahoo Holdings Inc., US) has a reputation score of 75.7 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 89.9/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Yahoo Holdings Inc.
- RIR
- ARIN
- Registered
- Wed, 14 Nov 2001 05:00:00 GMT
- Abuse contact
- rir-abuse@yahooinc.com
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS10310 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.