Autonomous System
AS3491
Last fetched
AS3491 is operated by PCCWG-APAC-HK - PCCW Global (HK) Ltd., registered in HK, and announces 584 prefixes to 629 BGP neighbours. AS3491 has a reputation score of 13.9 (NEUTRAL); 9 of its 1,380,608 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 584
- BGP neighbours
- 629
- RPKI ROAs
- 1,183
- MOAS conflicts
- 257
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 10
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 17,433
- Facilities
- 131
- Internet exchanges
- 13
- Customer degree
- 603
- Peer degree
- 108
- Provider degree
- 0
- 31.59.78.0/24
- 41.79.245.0/24
- 41.79.244.0/22
- 41.79.248.0/24
- 41.79.249.0/24
- 41.79.248.0/22
- 41.79.250.0/24
- 41.221.208.0/24
- 41.221.208.0/20
- 41.221.216.0/24
- 41.221.217.0/24
- 41.221.216.0/22
- 43.230.86.0/23
- 45.195.74.0/24
- 49.128.209.0/24
- 49.128.212.0/24
- 61.13.144.0/20
- 61.16.36.0/22
- 63.216.14.0/24
- 63.216.35.0/24
- 63.216.48.0/21
- 63.216.56.0/21
- 63.216.82.0/23
- 63.216.140.0/24
- 63.216.142.0/23
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.29
- Origin mismatches
- 1
- Route leaks
- 5
Leak types observed: TYPE2_LATERAL_PEER_TO_PEER.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (13 total)
Facilities (131 total)
- Equinix DC1-DC15,DC21-DC22 - Ashburn
- Equinix DA1 - Dallas
- Equinix SV1/SV5/SV10 - Silicon Valley, San Jose
- Equinix LA1 - Los Angeles
- Equinix CH1/CH2/CH4 - Chicago
- Digital Realty NYC (60 Hudson)
- Equinix TR1 - Toronto
- Digital Realty NYC (111 8th Ave)
- Equinix MI1 - Miami, NOTA
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- CoreSite - San Jose (SV1)
- CoreSite - Los Angeles (LA1) One Wilshire
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Digital Realty London LHR20
- Telehouse - London (Docklands East)
- Digital Realty London LHR19
- Digital Realty London LON1-3
- Equinix LD8 - London, Docklands
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
- Digital Realty AMS17 - Amsterdam
- Digital Realty AMS3/5/7/8/10 - Amsterdam
- Global Switch Amsterdam
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 1,183 ROAs.
- 196.251.160.0/19 · max length /24
- 196.50.128.0/18 · max length /24
- 2c0f:f3c0::/32 · max length /32
- 2c0f:f3d0::/32 · max length /32
- 41.221.208.0/20 · max length /24
- 41.79.244.0/22 · max length /24
- 41.79.248.0/22 · max length /24
- 45.195.74.0/24 · max length /24
- 101.55.67.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.155.8.0/23 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS3491.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 1,380,608
- Threat-listed addresses
- 9
- Threat density
- 0.0007 %
- Routed prefixes
- 539
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 629 BGP neighbours.
- WOODYNET-1 - WoodyNet, Inc. · AS42
- WASH-NSF-AS - University of Washington · AS101
- CISCOSYSTEMS - CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. · AS109
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- ESNET - ESnet · AS293
- BACOM - Bell Canada · AS577
- UUNET - Verizon Business · AS701
- UUNET - Verizon Business · AS702
- UUNET - Verizon Business · AS703
- APPLE-ENGINEERING - Apple Inc. · AS714
- JANET - Jisc Services Limited · AS786
- ROGERS-COMMUNICATIONS - Rogers Communications Canada Inc. · AS812
- ASN852 - TELUS Communications Inc. · AS852
- N963-AS-AP - N963 PTE. LTD. · AS963
- AKARI-NETWORKS - Akari Networks LLC · AS983
- OWS-NETWORK - OCTOPUS WEB SOLUTION INC · AS984
- COGENT-1239 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS1239
- SWIPNET - Tele2 Sverige AB · AS1257
- CW - IDDQD-AS · AS1273
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- UNITAS - Unitas Global · AS1828
- GCT-HK - HK Global Cloud DataCenter · AS2042
- IIJ - Internet Initiative Japan Inc. · AS2497
- BIGLOBE - BIGLOBE Inc. · AS2518
- NORDUNET - NORDUnet · AS2603
MOAS / hijack watch
257 announced prefixes conflict with AS3491 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
- 41.79.245.0/24
- 41.79.244.0/22
- 41.79.248.0/24
- 41.79.249.0/24
- 41.221.208.0/24
- 41.221.216.0/24
- 41.221.216.0/22
- 63.216.14.0/24
- 63.216.35.0/24
- 63.216.48.0/21
- 63.216.56.0/21
- 63.216.82.0/23
- 63.216.140.0/24
- 63.216.142.0/23
- 63.216.144.0/22
- 63.216.149.0/24
- 63.216.150.0/24
- 63.216.151.0/24
- 63.216.152.0/22
- 63.216.156.0/24
- 63.216.164.0/22
- 63.216.170.0/24
- 63.216.168.0/21
- 63.216.176.0/24
- 63.216.193.0/24
Reputation
13.9reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS3491 (PCCWG-APAC-HK - PCCW Global (HK) Ltd., HK) has a reputation score of 62.2 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 51.4/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- PCCW Global (HK) Limited
- RIR
- APNIC
- Registered
- Wed, 25 Mar 2026 07:45:57 GMT
- Abuse contact
- support@consoleconnect.com
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS3491 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.