Autonomous System
AS11983
Last fetched
AS11983 is operated by TIKTOK-USDS - Tiktok U.S. Data Security Inc., registered in US, and announces 19 prefixes to 4 BGP neighbours. AS11983 has a reputation score of 10.2 (NEUTRAL); 0 of its 2,560 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 19
- BGP neighbours
- 4
- RPKI ROAs
- 62
- MOAS conflicts
- 33
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 45,135
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 1
- Facilities
- 97
- Internet exchanges
- 11
- Customer degree
- 0
- Peer degree
- 45
- Provider degree
- 5
- 71.18.31.0/24
- 71.18.130.0/24
- 71.18.166.0/24
- 71.18.191.0/24
- 71.18.192.0/24
- 71.18.193.0/24
- 71.18.206.0/24
- 71.18.207.0/24
- 71.18.208.0/24
- 147.160.180.0/24
- 2605:340:f01e::/48
- 2605:340:f03a::/48
- 2605:340:f087::/48
- 2605:340:f097::/48
- 2605:340:f0a6::/48
- 2605:340:f0b2::/48
- 2605:340:f0b6::/48
- 2605:340:f0cd::/48
- 2605:340:f0d7::/48
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (11 total)
Facilities (97 total)
- Equinix DA1 - Dallas
- Equinix SV1/SV5/SV10 - Silicon Valley, San Jose
- Equinix SV8 - Silicon Valley, Palo Alto
- Equinix DC1-DC15,DC21-DC22 - Ashburn
- Equinix LA1 - Los Angeles
- Equinix CH1/CH2/CH4 - Chicago
- Digital Realty NYC (60 Hudson)
- Digital Realty NYC (111 8th Ave)
- Equinix MI1 - Miami, NOTA
- Equinix DA3 - Dallas
- Digital Realty Seattle SEA10
- Equinix SE2/SE3 - Seattle
- Digital Realty ATL13 - Atlanta
- Digital Realty NYC (32 AofA)
- iM Critical Miami
- Digital Realty PHX10 (120 E Van Buren)
- 365 Data Centers Chicago (CH6)
- 165 Halsey Meet-Me Room
- CoreSite - Denver (DE1)
- Digital Realty DFW (2323 Bryan St)
- KOMO Plaza Seattle (Formerly Fisher Plaza)
- Equinix SV3 - Silicon Valley, San Jose
- Equinix SV2 - Silicon Valley, Santa Clara
- CoreSite - Chicago (CH1)
- Digital Realty CHI (350 E Cermak)
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 62 ROAs.
- 147.160.177.0/24 · max length /24
- 147.160.180.0/24 · max length /24
- 147.160.182.0/24 · max length /24
- 152.235.0.0/17 · max length /24
- 192.64.15.0/24 · max length /24
- 2602:f477::/40 · max length /48
- 2605:340:f01e::/48 · max length /48
- 2605:340:f033::/48 · max length /48
- 2605:340:f03a::/48 · max length /48
- 2605:340:f080::/48 · max length /48
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS11983.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 2,560
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 10
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 4 of this network’s 4 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- ASN-FLEXENTIAL - Flexential Colorado Corp. · AS13649
MOAS / hijack watch
33 announced prefixes conflict with AS11983 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
- 71.18.6.0/24
- 71.18.8.0/24
- 71.18.10.0/24
- 71.18.11.0/24
- 71.18.31.0/24
- 71.18.33.0/24
- 71.18.38.0/24
- 71.18.43.0/24
- 71.18.50.0/24
- 71.18.52.0/24
- 71.18.53.0/24
- 71.18.60.0/24
- 71.18.95.0/24
- 71.18.104.0/24
- 71.18.116.0/24
- 71.18.123.0/24
- 71.18.124.0/24
- 71.18.125.0/24
- 71.18.130.0/24
- 71.18.135.0/24
- 71.18.162.0/24
- 71.18.166.0/24
- 71.18.183.0/24
- 71.18.188.0/24
- 71.18.206.0/24
Reputation
10.2reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS11983 (TIKTOK-USDS - Tiktok U.S. Data Security Inc., US) has a reputation score of 69.5 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 90.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 55.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Tiktok U.S. Data Security Inc.
- RIR
- ARIN
- Registered
- Wed, 31 Dec 2025 19:15:26 GMT
- Abuse contact
- brett.davidson@tiktokusds.com
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS11983 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.