Autonomous System
AS174
Last fetched
AS174 is operated by COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC, registered in US, and announces 4,387 prefixes to 6,474 BGP neighbours. AS174 has a reputation score of 15.8 (NEUTRAL); 1,467 of its 36,339,968 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 4,387
- BGP neighbours
- 6,474
- RPKI ROAs
- 1,907
- MOAS conflicts
- 199
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 4
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 40,788
- Facilities
- 816
- Internet exchanges
- 0
- Customer degree
- 6,482
- Peer degree
- 100
- Provider degree
- 1
- 2.58.4.0/22
- 5.83.219.0/24
- 5.157.72.0/21
- 8.24.64.0/23
- 8.24.72.0/23
- 16.5.118.0/23
- 16.5.168.0/23
- 16.5.170.0/23
- 16.5.198.0/24
- 23.26.130.0/24
- 23.135.116.0/24
- 23.135.124.0/24
- 23.141.196.0/24
- 23.141.204.0/24
- 23.141.212.0/24
- 23.141.228.0/24
- 23.142.100.0/24
- 23.144.28.0/24
- 23.144.60.0/24
- 23.146.76.0/24
- 23.146.116.0/24
- 23.148.44.0/24
- 23.148.60.0/24
- 23.148.68.0/24
- 23.148.92.0/24
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.71
- Origin mismatches
- 11
- Route leaks
- 19
Leak types observed: TYPE2_LATERAL_PEER_TO_PEER.
Signals
- critical-infrastructureServes infrastructure the internet depends on operationally.
Infrastructure presence
Facilities (816 total)
- Equinix DC1-DC15,DC21-DC22 - Ashburn
- Digital Realty SFO (200 Paul)
- Equinix DA1 - Dallas
- Equinix SV8 - Silicon Valley, Palo Alto
- Equinix SV1/SV5/SV10 - Silicon Valley, San Jose
- Equinix CH1/CH2/CH4 - Chicago
- Equinix LA1 - Los Angeles
- Equinix NY1 - New York, Newark
- Digital Realty NYC (60 Hudson)
- Equinix AT2/AT3 - Atlanta
- Equinix TR1 - Toronto
- Equinix MI1 - Miami, NOTA
- Digital Realty NYC (111 8th Ave)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- CoreSite - Los Angeles (LA1) One Wilshire
- CoreSite - San Jose (SV1)
- Digital Realty SFO (365 Main)
- SVTIX San Jose
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Digital Realty London LHR17
- Equinix NY2/NY4/NY5/NY6 - New York, Secaucus
- Equinix NY9 - New York, 111 8th Avenue
- Telehouse - London (Docklands East)
- Digital Realty London LHR20
- Digital Realty London LHR19
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 1,907 ROAs.
- 102.129.145.0/24 · max length /24
- 102.129.152.0/24 · max length /24
- 102.129.153.0/24 · max length /24
- 102.177.146.0/23 · max length /24
- 154.16.105.0/24 · max length /24
- 154.214.0.0/24 · max length /24
- 45.195.244.0/23 · max length /24
- 45.202.112.0/24 · max length /24
- 66.251.129.0/24 · max length /24
- 66.251.136.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS174.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 36,339,968
- Threat-listed addresses
- 1,467
- Threat density
- 0.0040 %
- Routed prefixes
- 3,860
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 6,474 BGP neighbours.
- MIT-GATEWAYS - Massachusetts Institute of Technology · AS3
- ISI-AS - University of Southern California · AS4
- COLUMBIA-GW - Columbia University · AS14
- UTEXAS - University of Texas at Austin · AS18
- UR - University of Rochester · AS20
- YALE-AS - Yale University · AS29
- UDELNET - University of Delaware · AS34
- UPENN - University of Pennsylvania · AS55
- CONE - CyrusOne LLC · AS62
- SCHLUMBERGER-AS - Schlumberger Limited · AS72
- NCREN - MCNC · AS81
- RPI-AS - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute · AS91
- CLARKSON-AS - Clarkson University · AS92
- ROCKEFELLER-AS - The Rockefeller University · AS98
- WASH-NSF-AS - University of Washington · AS101
- NWU-AS - Northwestern University · AS103
- BOSTONU-AS - Boston University · AS111
- UPMC-AS122 - UPMC · AS122
- ASGARR - Consortium GARR · AS137
- NORTHEASTERN-GW-AS - Northeastern University · AS156
- U-CHICAGO-AS - The University of Chicago · AS160
- WEST-NET-WEST - Utah Education Network · AS210
- MERIT-AS-14 - Merit Network Inc. · AS237
- SRINET-AS - SRI International · AS264
- RISQ-AS - Reseau d'Informations Scientifiques du Quebec (RISQ Inc.) · AS376
MOAS / hijack watch
199 announced prefixes conflict with AS174 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
- 23.141.204.0/24
- 23.141.228.0/24
- 23.144.28.0/24
- 23.144.60.0/24
- 38.9.32.0/24
- 38.9.210.0/24
- 38.9.210.0/23
- 38.9.211.0/24
- 38.19.48.0/24
- 38.19.208.0/24
- 38.19.209.0/24
- 38.19.210.0/24
- 38.19.211.0/24
- 38.19.214.0/24
- 38.19.224.0/23
- 38.19.237.0/24
- 38.22.219.0/24
- 38.45.216.0/24
- 38.45.216.0/23
- 38.45.217.0/24
- 38.46.232.0/24
- 38.46.233.0/24
- 38.46.234.0/24
- 38.46.235.0/24
- 38.51.236.0/24
Reputation
15.8reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS174 (COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC, US) has a reputation score of 58.3 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 51.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 60.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Cogent Communications, LLC
- RIR
- ARIN
- Registered
- Thu, 16 May 1996 04:00:00 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@cogentco.com
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS174 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.