Autonomous System
AS12880
Last fetched
AS12880 is operated by DCI-AS - Iran Information Technology Company PJSC, registered in IR, and announces 71 prefixes to 23 BGP neighbours. AS12880 has a reputation score of 15.3 (NEUTRAL); 4 of its 1,060,096 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 71
- BGP neighbours
- 23
- RPKI ROAs
- 226
- MOAS conflicts
- 1
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 242
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 225
- Facilities
- 0
- Internet exchanges
- 0
- Customer degree
- 22
- Peer degree
- 0
- Provider degree
- 1
- 2.176.0.0/12
- 2.188.2.0/24
- 2.188.3.0/24
- 2.188.4.0/24
- 2.188.6.0/24
- 2.188.8.0/24
- 2.188.10.0/24
- 2.188.12.0/24
- 2.188.13.0/24
- 2.188.14.0/24
- 2.188.15.0/24
- 2.188.18.0/24
- 2.188.19.0/24
- 2.188.20.0/24
- 2.188.24.0/24
- 2.188.25.0/24
- 2.188.26.0/23
- 2.188.28.0/24
- 2.188.29.0/24
- 2.188.31.0/24
- 2.188.48.0/22
- 2.188.52.0/24
- 2.188.53.0/24
- 2.188.54.0/24
- 2.188.55.0/24
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 226 ROAs.
- 2011:4188::/48
- 178.236.104.0/24 · max length /24
- 178.236.110.0/24 · max length /24
- 178.236.96.0/24 · max length /24
- 178.236.97.0/24 · max length /24
- 185.105.100.0/23 · max length /23
- 185.105.102.0/23 · max length /23
- 185.111.80.0/24 · max length /24
- 185.111.81.0/24 · max length /24
- 185.111.82.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS12880.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 1,060,096
- Threat-listed addresses
- 4
- Threat density
- 0.0004 %
- Routed prefixes
- 70
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 23 of this network’s 23 BGP neighbours.
- SINET-AS - Soroush Rasanheh Company Ltd · AS21341
- FANAPTELECOM-FCP - Tose'h Fanavari Ertebabat Pasargad Arian Co. PJS · AS24631
- UT-AS - University of Tehran · AS29068
- NIOC-AS - National Iranian Oil Company · AS31303
- IRIPO-NET - Iranian Presidential Administration · AS34592
- Fanava-AS - Fanava Group · AS41881
- RESPINA-AS - Respina Networks & Beyond PJSC · AS42337
- Tebyan - Tebyan-e-Noor Cultural-Artistic Institute · AS48434
- MehrFCP - Rasaneh Mehr Vatan Co. PJS · AS48903
- TIC-GW-AS - Telecommunication Infrastructure Company · AS49666
- Mobinnet-AS - Mobin Net Communication Company (Private Joint Stock) · AS50810
- MABNA - GOSTARESH-E-ERTEBATAT-E MABNA COMPANY (Private Joint Stock) · AS51074
- ITRC - ICT Research Institute (Iran Telecommunications Research Center "ITRC") · AS57292
- TCI - Iran Telecommunication Company PJS · AS58224
- Hostiran-Network - NOAVARAN SHABAKEH SABZ MEHREGAN (Ltd.) · AS59441
- ITO-AS - Iran Information Technology Company PJSC · AS60148
- SINAICT - Sina Financial & Investment Holding Co (PJS) · AS62238
- FPCC-AS - Farzanegan Pars Communications Company PJS · AS200370
- IRCAO - IR IRAN Civil Aviation Authority · AS201442
- Padiz-Daderesan-Company - Padiz-Daderesan-Company · AS202251
- CRA - Communication Regulatory Authority · AS202735
- AbreNik-Cloud - Padiz Dadeh Resan PJSC · AS205207
- FDI - Tose'h Fanavari Ertebabat Pasargad Arian Co. PJS · AS206065
MOAS / hijack watch
1 announced prefix conflict with AS12880 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
Reputation
15.3reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS12880 (DCI-AS - Iran Information Technology Company PJSC, IR) has a reputation score of 59.4 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 61.2/100
- Graph metrics
- 55.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Iran Information Technology Company PJSC
- RIR
- RIPE
- Abuse contact
- abuse@ito.gov.ir
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS12880 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.