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Autonomous System

AS134196

Last fetched

AS134196 is operated by ANYUN-INTERNET-TECHNOLOGY-HK-CO-LIMITED - ANYUN INTERNET TECHNOLOGY (HK) CO.,LIMITED, registered in HK, and announces 15 prefixes to 26 BGP neighbours. AS134196 has a reputation score of 50.0 (HIGHLY_SUSPICIOUS); 2 of its 4,352 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.

Nutrition Label

WHISPER CANON · AS134196Routing diversity6.0/10Peering density5.7/10MOAS conflict⚠ 1 conflictThreat-feed listings—WHOIS transparency—Resolver footprint—canon.whisper.security/asn/134196

Routing footprint

Announced prefixes
15
BGP neighbours
26
RPKI ROAs
14
MOAS conflicts
1
CAIDA AS-rank
2,948
Customer-cone ASNs
9
Facilities
0
Internet exchanges
0
Customer degree
8
Peer degree
16
Provider degree
4

Routing posture

Hijack posture score
0.05
Route leaks
2

Leak types observed: TYPE2_LATERAL_PEER_TO_PEER, TYPE3_PROVIDER_TO_PEER.

Signals

  • bulletproof-hostingHosts content other providers routinely take down.

Route origin authorizations

A sample of 10 of this network’s 14 ROAs.

Upstreams

The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS134196.

Blast radius

Announced IPv4 addresses
4,352
Threat-listed addresses
2
Threat density
0.0460 %
Routed prefixes
14

How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.

Peering ecosystem

A sample of 25 of this network’s 26 BGP neighbours.

MOAS / hijack watch

1 announced prefix conflict with AS134196 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:

Reputation

50.0reputation score (HIGHLY_SUSPICIOUS)

AS134196 (ANYUN-INTERNET-TECHNOLOGY-HK-CO-LIMITED - ANYUN INTERNET TECHNOLOGY (HK) CO.,LIMITED, HK) has a reputation score of 25.0 (HIGHLY_SUSPICIOUS). This ASN shows suspicious characteristics.

Threat density
46.1/100
Graph metrics
90.0/100
Historical behaviour
85.0/100
Prefix age
20.0/100

These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.

Registration

RIR
APNIC
Registered
Wed, 20 May 2015 06:06:22 GMT
Abuse contact
admin@cloudie.hk

This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.

Threat-feed evidence

Related pages

Pivot from AS134196 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.

Queries

This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.


MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
     collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
     collect(co.name) AS countries,
     collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
     collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
     collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
     collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
     collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
     collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
     collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
     collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
       a.rir AS rir,
       a.orgName AS orgName,
       a.asRank AS asRank,
       a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
       a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
       a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
       a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
       a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
       a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
       a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
       a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
       a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
       a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
       a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
       a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
       a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
       a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
       a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
       operatorNames, countries, organizations,
       samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
       signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
       prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCount
Run yourself →

The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.


MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observations
Run yourself →

Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.