Autonomous System
AS134196
Last fetched
AS134196 is operated by ANYUN-INTERNET-TECHNOLOGY-HK-CO-LIMITED - ANYUN INTERNET TECHNOLOGY (HK) CO.,LIMITED, registered in HK, and announces 15 prefixes to 26 BGP neighbours. AS134196 has a reputation score of 50.0 (HIGHLY_SUSPICIOUS); 2 of its 4,352 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 15
- BGP neighbours
- 26
- RPKI ROAs
- 14
- MOAS conflicts
- 1
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 2,948
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 9
- Facilities
- 0
- Internet exchanges
- 0
- Customer degree
- 8
- Peer degree
- 16
- Provider degree
- 4
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.05
- Route leaks
- 2
Leak types observed: TYPE2_LATERAL_PEER_TO_PEER, TYPE3_PROVIDER_TO_PEER.
Signals
- bulletproof-hostingHosts content other providers routinely take down.
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 14 ROAs.
- 202.181.27.0/24 · max length /24
- 43.247.68.0/22 · max length /22
- 45.124.24.0/22 · max length /24
- 192.249.89.0/24 · max length /32
- 198.44.255.0/24 · max length /32
- 103.193.148.0/22
- 45.124.24.0/23
- 45.124.24.0/24
- 45.124.25.0/24
- 45.124.26.0/23
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS134196.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 4,352
- Threat-listed addresses
- 2
- Threat density
- 0.0460 %
- Routed prefixes
- 14
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 26 BGP neighbours.
- BSL-AS-AP - Beyotta Services LLP · AS997
- LEVEL3 - Level 3 Parent, LLC · AS3356
- HKIX-RS1 - Hong Kong Internet Exchange--Route Server 1 · AS4635
- MTS - MTS PJSC · AS8359
- NTTE-AS - Ntte Global Network (Brand Name) · AS9232
- TTNET-MY - TIME dotCom Berhad No. 14, Jalan Majistret U1/26 Hicom Glenmarie Industrial Park 40150 Shah Alam Selangor, Malaysia · AS9930
- CNCGROUP-SH-IDC - CNCGROUP IP network of ShangHai IDC · AS17789
- TWNIC-AS - Taiwan Network Information Center · AS18180
- NEBULA-GLOBAL - Nebula Global LLC · AS18186
- KLAY-AS-AP - KLAYER LLC · AS18254
- SGGS-AS-AP - SG.GS · AS24482
- LAWSCLOUDINFRASTRUCTURELIMITED-AS-HK - Law's Cloud Infrastructure Limited · AS24544
- CONRAD - CONRADIT, LLC · AS40004
- CLOUDIE-AS-AP - Cloudie Limited · AS55933
- LDNET - Guangzhou LanDong Information technology co., LTD · AS59043
- CLOUDIE-AS-AP - Cloudie Limited · AS133731
- ZQHWL-AS-AP - ZhongShanShi QiYi HuDong WangLuoKeJi Ltd · AS136250
- ENJOYVC-AS-AP - Enjoyvc Cloud Group Limited. · AS136897
- RAINBOWIDC-AS-AP - rainbow network limited · AS138968
- LANDUPS-AS-AP - LANDUPS LIMITED · AS150452
- LNL-AS-AP - Liberally Network LLC · AS152918
- CDN1COM-AS-AP - CDN1.com Limited · AS154206
- WENZHANGYU - Wen ZhangYu · AS201674
- YUNYOO - YUNYOO LTD · AS206300
- AIRULIMITED - Airu Limited · AS208525
MOAS / hijack watch
1 announced prefix conflict with AS134196 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
Reputation
50.0reputation score (HIGHLY_SUSPICIOUS)
AS134196 (ANYUN-INTERNET-TECHNOLOGY-HK-CO-LIMITED - ANYUN INTERNET TECHNOLOGY (HK) CO.,LIMITED, HK) has a reputation score of 25.0 (HIGHLY_SUSPICIOUS). This ASN shows suspicious characteristics.
- Threat density
- 46.1/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- ANYUN INTERNET TECHNOLOGY (HK) CO.,LIMITED
- RIR
- APNIC
- Registered
- Wed, 20 May 2015 06:06:22 GMT
- Abuse contact
- admin@cloudie.hk
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS134196 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.