Autonomous System
AS9304
Last fetched
AS9304 is operated by HUTCHISON-AS-AP - HGC Global Communications Limited, registered in HK, and announces 1,391 prefixes to 441 BGP neighbours. AS9304 has a reputation score of 9.3 (REPUTABLE); 325 of its 1,807,616 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 1,391
- BGP neighbours
- 441
- RPKI ROAs
- 1,417
- MOAS conflicts
- 56
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 77
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 826
- Facilities
- 175
- Internet exchanges
- 22
- Customer degree
- 215
- Peer degree
- 436
- Provider degree
- 17
- 2.27.214.0/23
- 2.216.204.0/22
- 5.83.221.0/24
- 5.100.230.0/24
- 9.151.32.0/20
- 9.151.224.0/21
- 9.232.64.0/21
- 9.237.80.0/20
- 9.249.48.0/20
- 13.141.58.0/23
- 13.141.112.0/23
- 13.141.114.0/23
- 13.141.116.0/23
- 13.141.118.0/23
- 23.26.148.0/24
- 23.187.40.0/24
- 23.188.216.0/24
- 23.230.2.0/24
- 23.230.9.0/24
- 23.230.51.0/24
- 23.230.160.0/24
- 23.230.195.0/24
- 31.22.107.0/24
- 31.56.1.0/24
- 31.56.6.0/24
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.51
- Origin mismatches
- 30
- Route leaks
- 2
Leak types observed: TYPE2_LATERAL_PEER_TO_PEER, TYPE3_PROVIDER_TO_PEER.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (22 total)
Facilities (175 total)
- Equinix MI1 - Miami, NOTA
- Digital Realty NYC (60 Hudson)
- CoreSite - San Jose (SV1)
- Digital Realty NYC (111 8th Ave)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- CoreSite - Los Angeles (LA1) One Wilshire
- Equinix NY2/NY4/NY5/NY6 - New York, Secaucus
- Equinix NY9 - New York, 111 8th Avenue
- Telehouse - London (Docklands East)
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Equinix LD8 - London, Docklands
- Digital Realty London LON1-3
- Digital Realty London LHR20
- Digital Realty London LHR19
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Digital Realty AMS17 - Amsterdam
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
- Global Switch Amsterdam
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- ITENOS Frankfurt (FRA1)
- Digital Realty AMS3/5/7/8/10 - Amsterdam
- Digital Realty London LHR21 (closed)
- Equinix PA7 - Paris, Energy Park
- Equinix FR7 - Frankfurt, Gutleutstrasse
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 1,417 ROAs.
- 102.165.12.0/24 · max length /24
- 154.193.2.0/24 · max length /24
- 154.193.35.0/24 · max length /24
- 154.194.195.0/24 · max length /24
- 154.196.134.0/24 · max length /24
- 154.196.160.0/24 · max length /24
- 154.196.179.0/24 · max length /24
- 154.196.180.0/24 · max length /24
- 154.199.4.0/24 · max length /24
- 154.200.1.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS9304.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 1,807,616
- Threat-listed addresses
- 325
- Threat density
- 0.0180 %
- Routed prefixes
- 1,310
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 441 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- UUNET - Verizon Business · AS703
- APPLE-ENGINEERING - Apple Inc. · AS714
- SURFNET-NL - SURF B.V. · AS1103
- COGENT-1239 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS1239
- CW - IDDQD-AS · AS1273
- WNET - WNET TELECOM USA Corp. · AS1820
- AS1916 - Rede Nacional de Ensino e Pesquisa · AS1916
- TELENOR-NORGE-AS - Telenor Norge AS · AS2119
- IIJ - Internet Initiative Japan Inc. · AS2497
- VECTANT - ARTERIA Networks Corporation · AS2519
- ATGS-MMD-AS - AT&T Enterprises, LLC · AS2686
- ATGS-MMD-AS - AT&T Enterprises, LLC · AS2687
- AS-SSI - Netflix Streaming Services Inc. · AS2906
- NTT-DATA-2914 - NTT America, Inc. · AS2914
- SOVAM-AS - PJSC "Vimpelcom" · AS3216
- VOXILITY - Voxility LLP · AS3223
- GTT-BACKBONE - GTT Communications Inc. · AS3257
- TDC - TDC Holding A/S · AS3292
- SWISSCOM - Swisscom (Schweiz) AG · AS3303
- RIPE-NCC-AS - Reseaux IP Europeens Network Coordination Centre (RIPE NCC) · AS3333
- CITICTEL-CPC-AS4058 - CITIC Telecom International CPC Limited · AS4058
- ZEN-NET - Zenlayer Inc · AS4229
- BSO - IX Reach Ltd · AS4455
- HKISL-ASN - Internet Solutions Limited · AS4594
MOAS / hijack watch
56 announced prefixes conflict with AS9304 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
- 109.122.10.0/24
- 118.143.196.0/24
- 144.225.190.0/24
- 149.88.160.0/24
- 149.88.162.0/24
- 149.88.163.0/24
- 149.88.179.0/24
- 156.255.32.0/24
- 175.100.164.0/24
- 175.100.166.0/24
- 189.105.64.0/20
- 203.82.252.0/24
- 203.82.253.0/24
- 203.82.254.0/24
- 2a06:4d80::/29
- 2a07:a300::/29
- 2a07:f240::/29
- 2a0a:4c00::/29
- 2a0e:8880::/29
- 2a0f:16c0::/29
- 2a0f:29c0::/29
- 2a0f:2d40::/29
- 2a0f:2f40::/29
- 2a0f:3640::/29
- 2a0f:7280::/29
Reputation
9.3reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS9304 (HUTCHISON-AS-AP - HGC Global Communications Limited, HK) has a reputation score of 72.0 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 72.3/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 95.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- HGC Global Communications Limited
- RIR
- APNIC
- Registered
- Thu, 04 Sep 2008 06:40:29 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@hgcbroadband.com
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS9304 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.